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Abstract 
The thesis seeks to offer knowledge and insight into management and business in the 
South American state of Venezuela. We have been at pains to context this 
characterization; so the thesis begins with sections devoted to the history, society and 
economy of Venezuela and seeks to emphasize factors which have served to shape 
business practice and values. This is followed by presenting the results of the first 
episode of field work, interviews carried out in Germany with managers having 
business and management experience in Venezuela this material being used to form a 
preliminary characterization. This concludes Part I of the thesis. 
In Part II the results of quite extensive fieldwork on Venezuela itself are presented. This 
fieldwork was in the form of numerous company visits and executive interviews, 
supplemented by periods spent as an observer in one or two Venezuelan organizations 
and by interviews with others having relevant knowledge of business practice in 
Venezuela, for example, consultants and management educators. The discussion 
illuminates some key features including personalism, the importance of social networks, 
the emphasis on the human aspects of management, and the expectation of employees 
that bosses will be both decisive and paternal. We also highlight factors that have 
tended to restrain entrepreneurialism and management proactivity, including the effects 
of oil wealth. 
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SECTION ONE 
1 Introducing the research project 
1.1 Objectives of the study 
Due to increasing globalisation, or as a Venezuelan-German investment banker put it 
the smallest entity is Europe today, and an unstable East Asian market in the late 1990s, 
Latin America has regained importance in the world's economic market. 
Therefore it is rather surprising, that so far hardly anything has been written about 
understanding and doing business in Latin America. 
What can be found in this field are information guides about "Doing business in ... " 
edited by accounting companies or official institutions' in order to stimulate investment 
in a particular country. What the reader gets is an insight into technical parameters such 
as taxes, law requirements and restrictions, audit and accounting procedures. 
But the picture that is given will be somehow incomplete. Little research has been done 
when it comes to questions like what are the core values of society, what impact do they 
have on Venezuela as a business entity, how is business actually done and how does 
management work ? 
Identifying the answers will not only contribute to an understanding of the human side 
in business, but it will also serve as a guide on how to participate in Venezuelan 
business. In order to compete successfully in global business it will become increasingly 
important to have a sound understanding of the mentality of local managers and 
workforce. 
The thesis also intends to mediate between Venezuelan and foreign companies and 
people to make both sides more familiar with each other, to evoke an understanding of 
how business is done there, why it is different, and how these differences can be used to 
In the case of Venezuela, see publications of CAVENAL, CONAPRI, KPMG or PwC. 
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create something transcendent, something useful, perhaps leading to a synergy, where 
everyone benefits and motivation and growth are stimulated 
The project will also pinpoint some differences between different Latin American 
countries, in order to overcome the belief that Latin American countries resemble each 
other more than European ones. The reader will also find out, that some prejudices 
about Latin America and Venezuela are ceasing to be true or were never true in the first 
place. 
The thesis will also give an answer to the never-ending question of whether there will 
be a convergence in global management practices or not. Evidence will be given in the 
Venezuelan case. No other Latin American country has been influenced more by the 
United States of America than Venezuela. 
Depending on the reader, the thesis will serve theoretical and practical purposes at the 
same time, creating a genuine contribution to knowledge, and to European 
understanding of business and management in Venezuela. 
1.2 A tool to keep track 
As this thesis also wants to provide some clues on how to manage companies 
appropriately in Venezuela, it is useful to have some analytical framework, in order not 
to lose orientation in this rather complex environment. "The risk of being overwhelmed 
is real. t92 
Thus, a model structuring the different impacts on management will be derived from 
Austin's Environmental Analysis Framework. 3 It can also be used as a kind of guideline 
on how to read the thesis. The different aspects will be examined, then their 
consequences on management will be shown. 
Three interacting environmental factors, economic, political, and societal have an 
impact on the nature of business culture at four levels of business environment, i. e. 
international, national, industry, and firm. These levels exert influence on management 
behaviour as well -a complex pattern of interdependencies emerges. 
2 Austin, 1990, p. 29. 
Introducing the research project 
The thesis will be divided into two major sections. Section One gives insight into the 
three environmental factors, economy, polity, and society. The chapters in this first part 
can be understood as providing background knowledge. They offer information that is 
helpful to understand the following second part of the thesis. Then Section Two will 
discuss Venezuelan business culture and management behaviour. 
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Figure 19: Biggest employers in Venezuela, 1998. 
(source: Business Venezuela, 1999, pp. 56-58; Dinero, 1999, pp. 38-39) 
In the following chapters a common base of knowledge will be elaborated, containing 
three pillars that can be identified in the figure above: political, economic, and societal 
factors. Each of these exerts an influence on the national, international, and industrial 
environment of Venezuela that also affect management behaviour. 
All these factors have to be kept in mind, when analysing management, because they 
will explain why management differs from country to country. 
ibid., 1990, p. 29-38. 
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1.3 Sources of information 
1.3.1 Data gathering 
The author had the same experience as Enright, Frances, and Saavedra (1996), namely 
that reliable market and industry data and business-related statistics tend to be scarce in 
Venezuela, due to technical deficiencies, smuggling, or even political manipulation. 4 
The reasons are manifold. 
First of all most of the Venezuelan companies are privately owned rather than being 
quoted companies and are not obliged by law to disclose or publish company 
information. 
Secondly, Venezuelan managers seem to be reluctant to make information about their 
companies available to suppliers, competitors, and clients. 
Additionally, the lack of an effective legal system creates a business environment 
fraught with mistrust. According to Infoamericas (1998a) and (1998c), a market 
intelligence and strategic consulting company, the reason for poor information coverage 
is an incomplete information structure, and cultural variables reducing the flow of 
information. Infrastructural factors include government information, being characterised 
by "poor quality and lack of timelinesss5, a business press that is "still underdeveloped 
and often biased with weak research capabilities", off-the-shelf studies, being "general 
in scope such as country risk analysis", and internet Web-sites, where only a "few offer 
value added market information. " Cultural factors include issues such as patriarchal 
management, weak middle management decision making, corruption, as "valuable 
information is closely guarded by both the public and private sectors and may only be 
available at an `extra-official cost", crime and security, because "consumer research is 
inhibited by fear that criminal motives may be behind door-to-door and telephone 
surveys", and elitism, as "business decision-makers and high level consumers ... isolate 
themselves from the public. " 
However, in the 1990s business information becomes more and more available, either 
via magazines, such as Business Venezuela, Venezuela Now, Daily Journal, Gerente 
Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, pp. 11,197,388; Austin, 1990, p. 298. The following quotations are taken from Infoamericas, 1998a; ibid., 1998c. 
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Venezuela, VenEconomy Monthly, or The Monthly Report or via consultants or 
universities, such as IESA. 
The data provided by official institutions tends not always to be reliable. The official 
unemployment rate in Venezuela for the year 1997, provided by the Central Statistical 
Office, OCEI, and the Central Bank of Venezuela, BCV, was: 11.7 percent. 6 But when 
unemployment is combined with underemployment, the rate might approach 50 
percent. 7 Taking into consideration that nobody really knows exactly how many people 
live in the barrios (squatter settlement, illegally based on private or public land, are 
formed in response to a critically inadequate housing shortage) around Caracas or the 
other major cities, the rate might even approach 60 to 70 percent. 
Therefore one has to rely on word-of-mouth information and personal communication 
networks. Hence, the research project places strong emphasis on original field research. 
The same attitude is found in Infoamericas (1998a), saying that due to the lack of 
reliable secondary research, any desk research assignment is incomplete without 
complementary primary research efforts. 
In this case, a wide range of interviews was conducted during the different stages of the 
research project. The author did three months of extensive interviewing in Germany. 
The aim was to find out how Venezuelan management was perceived by German 
expatriate managers who used to do business in this particular Latin American country. 
Therefore, all people interviewed had at least stayed in Venezuela once. Hence they all 
had personal experiences there and could speak about their impressions. 
In order to get a more complete picture, the author visited managers of many different 
companies in Germany, different in terms of sector of industry, size of firm, function in 
the company, and level of involvement in the Venezuelan market, i. e. from exporting to 
producing in the country. Enterprises which had only exported one machine to 
Venezuela five years ago where not included as their experience might be 
unrepresentative. Companies that were visited had been doing business in the following 
industries: oil and gas exploration and exploitation, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, 
chemicals, logistics, manufacture of industrial machinery, for example printing, textile 
6 IMF, 1998, p. 70. 
Austin, 1990, pp. 45,55. 
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machines, plastics, briquettes, filters and sealing, electronic equipment; feed additives, 
project consulting, engineering, investment banking. 
Managers from different levels were interviewed. This gave the researcher the 
opportunity to view Venezuelan management and business from different angles and 
perspectives. A broad base of interviewees was chosen in order to get an overview 
about strategic and important issues. For example, the "Head of Division of Finance and 
Accounting" would probably identify other issues than a "Marketing Manager" being 
responsible for "Area Management South America" or the "Director of International 
Sales and Operations". An "Executive Sales Manager" would describe the same 
situation differently from an investment banker. They would also pick different areas of 
management to talk about. 
Another group of people in Germany, although they were hard to find, formed a 
valuable source of information: Venezuelan expatriates working in Germany. Due to 
their work experience in both environments, they proved to be very useful as they were 
able to identify differences between Venezuelan and German management, from a 
Venezuelan perspective. 
Studying related literature has been an interesting task. There is a decent literature on 
Latin American history. Although some literature exists on politics and the economy of 
Venezuela, hardly anything has been written about Venezuela as a business entity so 
far. Studies done so far mainly focus on the development and the nationalisation process 
of the petroleum industry on the one hand, and on political parties and poverty on the 
other. 
In order to obtain more recent data about Venezuela, the internet served as a useful 
source. The web-sites of international banks, embassies, foreign chambers of industry, 
universities, multinational companies, and on-line newspapers gave evidence of the 
great utility of the new electronic medium. What struck the author most, was the high 
sophistication of web-sites of comparatively large Venezuelan industrial groups. 8 
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Another source of information was the material that was provided by the companies the 
author visited to conduct interviews. 
Contact was also established with university professors in Germany who dealt with 
Latin America in their field of study, i. e. politics, and sociology. It is also interesting to 
mention, that chairs dealing with the subject of International Management are few in 
number, or are just on the verge of coming into existence in Germany due to the rapid 
process of globalisation and the growth of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
This first phase of research was valuable and necessary in order to get the flavour for 
the country under examination. According to Lawrence (1989) "it is not unusual for 
researchers to have background information on a society and its institutions prior to 
fieldwork, such information being gained by any amalgam of study, reading, fact 
grubbing, prior to visits or residence. "9 It was also useful for establishing a network and 
a wide range of contacts for a later stage in the research process: Fieldwork in 
Venezuela. 
As already mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, original fieldwork was also conducted 
in Venezuela for another two months. Interviews were done with multinational 
managers, Venezuelan domestic managers in the fields of personnel, sales, production, 
investor relations, industrial relations, and purchasing, chief executive officers, 
presidents, industry participants, ex-government officials, university professors, 
executives of trade chambers, industry experts, economic observers, analysts, and 
business consultants, in the cities of Caracas, Maracaibo, Valencia, and Puerto Ordaz. 
During this stay in Venezuela the researcher had the opportunity to stay with a German 
company doing business in the mineral extraction industry. Thus it was possible to 
spend periods as an observer in this firm to get an insight into challenging issues such as 
day to day problems in Venezuelan management or how to motivate employees to 
participate in the work processes. 
8 For example: www. sivensa. com, www. empresas-polar. com, www. mavesa. com, or 
www. cisneros. com. 
Lawrence, 1989, p. 99. 
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A questionnaire was also used to identify central values and patterns in Venezuelan 
management behaviour. The "back translation" approach proved to be very helpful. '° 
The translated, Spanish version of the questionnaire was translated back into English by 
a third person, ideally being a Spanish manager, who had not been involved before. 
1.3.2 A note on interviewing 
Before going to conduct research in Venezuela, the author interviewed a wide range of 
managers in Germany. As mentioned above they came from various fields of business, 
and this was helpful in obtaining knowledge about issues that would be worth pursuing 
further in Venezuela. 
What struck the researcher most was the fact that almost all of the managers interviewed 
took the time to talk uninhibitedly about themselves. Although the interviews were 
recorded with a tape recorder, people answered the questions without hesitation, 
sometimes providing information of a private nature, and giving insight into issues that 
could have got them into trouble easily if used to their harm. 
What made them speak so frankly to the researcher ? 
Two reasons come to the author's mind. Firstly, the way people answered the questions 
was somehow provoked by the style in which they were asked. By asking fairly 
straight-forward and easy-to-understand questions in the beginning, the interviewees 
never had to feel inferior. Simple psychology tells us, that only if a person feels 
comfortable, will he or she relax, and only then might it be possible to find out 
something interesting. It also has to be kept in mind, that they were talking to a person 
they had never met before. 
The questions were also open-ended and some of them were constructed in a way that 
forced people to prioritise; for example: What struck you most in Venezuela ? 
Although having had a structured list of must-ask questions, the interviewer tried to 
establish a friendly atmosphere to make it look more like a conversation than an 
interrogation. Questioning was intended to be natural and sympathetic. Interviewees 
were free to express curiosity, compassion, and scepticism. 
Additionally, the interviewer made sure to sound harmless, never approaching an issue 
directly. Asking a simple question like Are there import regulations for the products 
10 See for example Cateora, 1987, p. 271. 
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you need for doing business ?, might take you further than asking directly What about 
bribery and corruption ? 
Secondly, it had to do with the people themselves. They all had been working in or 
originated from a country, i. e. Venezuela, where it is hard to find sources that provide 
reliable data. Therefore it is necessary to get in contact with people and talk. At some 
stage in their career the people interviewed, experienced a situation, where they had to 
rely on other people's knowledge and friendliness as well. Additionally it was felt that 
there is demand for a study like the one that had been undertaken. The interviewed 
managers wanted to state their opinions, because they felt that in this research project 
their point of view and experiences were taken into consideration to build this research 
thesis. Thus they put effort into trying to make a valuable contribution. Bonilla offers 
another explanation in saying, perhaps they were driven by a "desire for self- 
knowledge. 
... Because these men are successful and 
intensely involved in the present, 
they rarely look back. " 
As the author was fortunate enough to convey that the thesis was not to serve as a 
benchmark study or competitor analysis, the interviewees revealed their thoughts about 
issues like corporate strategy, competition, corruption, or government relations. 
Concerning the process of identifying senior and important interviewees and getting 
appointments with them, it was easy to approach German companies directly, asking for 
managers who had experience with management in Venezuela. 
To be successful in this task in Venezuela, a different, more indirect approach had to be 
chosen. A reason can be found in the fact that a different information culture prevails. 
Although Venezuelans do not tend to be more suspicious towards strangers, they tend to 
be reluctant to share information, especially company related or financial issues. 
Yet funnily enough they will tell you after only five minutes of conversation that they 
are married but have two girl friends in addition. 
11 Bonilla, 1970, p. 147. 
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Therefore a trust building approach needed to be taken. It was important to establish a 
personal network where key decision-makers and influential businessmen were 
identified and convinced to play the part of a mediator, establishing contacts to other 
potential interview partners. Infoamericas (1998c) comes to the same conclusion when 
talking about interviewing decision-makers. It is considered to be "difficult to obtain 
anything substantial unless a third-party contact is used. ... The upper echelons of 
society that are often the subject of research efforts are very hesitant to reveal personal 
information beyond opinions. -)912 
The author had the experience that Venezuelan managers being approached via third 
persons were extremely helpful and did not hesitate to share their knowledge and 
information. This does not imply that they boasted about their profits, but they took 
their time and answered patiently any question they were asked. Once the ice was 
broken, information could be collected easily. 
1.4 Disclaimer 
When reading the thesis, the reader will come across extensive citing from the 
interviews. In doing this, the author wants to allow the material to speak for itself, and 
to give a better understanding of the issues under discussion. 
But as most of the quotations from interviews in the first few chapters are from 
interviews that were conducted in German, they had to be translated into English. 
Therefore readers are requested not to expect an idiomatic English style. The 
corresponding quotations in later chapters are from interviews conducted in Spanish and 
the same request applies. 
1.5 Overview 
The first section of the thesis will give some background and context to management in 
Venezuela. Following the protagonists of divergence theory, believing that management 
differs by country due to unique cultural and historical backgrounds, we will first of all 
provide some insight into Venezuela's history in terms of politics, economy, and 
society. 
12 Infoamericas, 1998c, pp. 2,3. 
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We will then analyse Venezuela's current economy to identify strengths and 
weaknesses of Venezuela as a business entity. 
At the end of section one a primarily expatriate view of Venezuelan business culture 
will be provided. Topics like education, the workforce, management, and bureaucracy 
will be discussed to provide further insight. 
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2 Analysis of politics and history 
2.1 The need to look at Venezuelan political history 
To understand today's economy and society, it is vital to know something about 
Venezuela's historical development. It has a deep impact on management and business 
culture as well. Being familiar with the historical settings also gives hints and clues, 
sometimes it is even possible to find explanations, for past and current problems in 
Venezuela's economic performance and business interactions. Lombardi (1986) holds a 
similar point of view: he thinks that by outlining the major patterns of a country's 
history and principal structures, the analysis given in subsequent chapters can be put 
more readily into context. 13 In later chapters we will analyse the peculiarities of 
Venezuelan management. One phenomenon for example is the importance attached to 
liderazgo (leadership). Usually employees need someone who tells them what to do and 
they also need somebody who accepts responsibility. Another phenomenon isfacilismo 
(the ease of life). Due to windfall gains of petroleum especially during the Saudi times, 
la epoca Saudi in the 1970s and the policy of sembrar el petroleo (to sow the oil), 
Venezuelans were used to easy-to-access-public funds, a highly protected economy and 
highly subsidised domestic products, establishing a rent-seeking and a papa paga por 
todo (dad, i. e. the state, pays for everything) mentality, that prevented real 
entrepreneurialism, long term business planning and real industrialisation to occur. 
Thus, if writing about what characterises management in Venezuela, it will not be 
enough to simply indicate the nature of contemporary Venezuelan management style 
without dealing with the question of what might have caused it to be this way. In fact, it 
is all deeply rooted in Venezuela's history. 
In the following section we will therefore take a closer look at the development of 
Venezuela in historical-politicial terms, culminating in the question why the change in 
government in 1998 had to take place as a logical consequence of the last 40 years. 
13 Lombardi, 1986, p. 5. 
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2.1.1 Colonisation 
On his third journey to the new world in 1498 Christopher Columbus discovered the 
Venezuelan coast between the Orinoco delta and Isla Margarita. The other coastal areas 
were discovered by Alfonso de Ojeda, who named the country due to the palafitos 
(Indian huts built on stilts) he saw when sailing into Lake Maracaibo that reminded him 
of Venice: Venezuela, the Spanish word for "little Venice". 14 
In 1500 the first permanent Spanish settlement was founded. Roughly 30 years later, the 
Spanish king leased western Venezuela to the Welsers for exploration and town- 
building until 1546, because he did not consider it to be a valuable part of country. '5 
In 1567 Caracas was founded. Ten years later it became the headquarters of a Spanish 
governor, who had to report to the audiencia of Santa Domingo. 16 
This shows how little importance the conquistadores (conquerors, especially members 
of the Spanish soldiers and adventurers who conquered South America in the 16`h 
century) attached to Venezuela in the beginning of the colonisation period. Other 
countries, such as Peru or Mexico seemed to be much more attractive, due to their rich 
cultural heritage from the Incas, Mayas, and Aztecs. 
The distance from Spanish authority allowed an upper class of criollos (Creole, a person 
of European - especially Spanish - ancestry but bom in the Americas) to emerge. They 
were later instrumental in overthrowing Spanish colonial rule. '7 
In order to regain control over the Venezuelan colony, the Spanish crown instituted 
reforms in the second half of the 18th century. A monopoly of the tobacco trade was 
handed over to the state, and customs were established. The existing monopoly for 
trading spirits was taken away from the current suppliers and given to the state as well. 
At the same time, Equador had to struggle with the Spanish dominance too. Therefore a 
revolt began in Quito in 1767 and gained momentum in Venezuela as well. The rebels 
wanted the expulsion of all chapetones (derogatory expression for Euro-Spaniards) and 
the abolition of duties and state monopolies. Spain answered by increasing their military 
forces. 
14 Hillman, 1994, p. 30. 
15 
Allen, 1977, pp. 22-23. 
o. V., 1992, p. 106. 17 Blutstein, 1977, p. 30. 
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Additionally, the governors of Venezuela started to make preparations to defend their 
territory. They also made sure that the rights of the influential Basque-directed trading 
company Real Compana Guipuzcoana were safeguarded. 18 It was created in 1728 by 
the Realistas (descendants of the Spanish crown) to control the colony' s trade to make 
it safe and profitable for Spain. 19 Thus it can be considered as a trade cartel. 
In 1777 Venezuela became a captaincy general. Nine years later, its designation was 
changed to the Audiencia de Venezuela, thus granting the country judicial- 
administrative authority as well 2° The provinces of Cumanä, Guayano, Maracaibo, San 
Cristobal-Merida-Trujillo, and the islands of Margarita and Trinidad were soon tied 
firmly into the management bureaucracy of Caracas, strengthening its position as the 
centre of defence, administration, and justice, and also of fiscal and financial matters. 
Until today, Caracas has never given up its role as the dominating metropolis of 
Venezuela. 21 
This has led to geographic dualism: Cultural and physical disparities between the 
cosmopolitan life in the capital city and the more rural, less developed life in the rest of 
the country are immense, having negative effects on national administration, especially 
in terms of communication 22 
The same phenomenon exists in some European countries as well, although to a far 
lesser extent; e. g. Great Britain and London (due to monarchy), France and Paris (due to 
absolutism and power centralisation of the king), Belgium and Brussels. The ancient 
expression "all roads lead to Rome", is just another example of a country being 
centralised around one capital. 
As ministerial offices in education, health, or transport are centred around Caracas, they 
provide almost no scope for decision making or implementation at other levels or in 
other localities. 23 
'a Salmoral, 1992, p 214; other members were the Spanish king and wealthy landowners in Caracas. 19 Allen, 1977, p. 26; Blutstein, 1977, p. 298. 20 Mortimer, 1990, ve0013/2. 21 Lombardi, 1986, pp. 7-9; see also Myers, 1986, p. 138, Vasconi, 1980, p. 192. 22 Stewart, 1986, p. 224. 23 Kelly, 1994, p. 302. 
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2.1.2 Enlightened society and protectionist economy 
The structure of employment in the Andean region was similar to the other Hispano- 
American areas. The Spanish and the Creoles controlled administration, the military, 
landed property and production facilities. Both groups, being heads of a supposedly 
enlightened society, organised flamboyant parties in a European traditional fashion, 
visited literary circles and translated doctrines of human rights, while Indians and slaves 
lived in poverty. 24 These differences in wealth distribution were increased by the 
Bourbons' reforms, when the rights of land were transferred from the Jesuits to the big 
landowners. For example, ten haciendas of the province of Azuay were taken over by 
only two people, Juan Chica (8) and Manuel Garcia (2). 25 Haciendas are defined as 
large estates often producing for export, representing a social as well as an economic 
system. The hacienda system symbolises a very unequal distribution of land, with a 
small number of people monopolising the bulk of cultivable land. 
Tessa Cubitt (1995) considered these haciendas to be "a major obstacles26 in the 
development of Latin America. To her mind, modernisation could only happen if these 
feudal-like institutions were eliminated via the modernisation of agriculture in social 
and economic terms. 
Although the society seemed to be enlightened, the economy was still protectionist. 
Spain did not change its archaic trading system - silver for handcrafted articles. It also 
failed to release its monopoly over Venezuelan trade. 
The royal department for settling financial matters exerted a noticeable fiscal pressure 
on north-Andean settlers. This was increased when the trade with tobacco, spirits, salt, 
gambling cards, and gunpowder was monopolised by the state. This estanco-system 
eliminated competition and held back money. Thus Venezuelan traders complained 
about Real Compana Guipuzcoana making large profits, repatriating the revenues to 
Spain at the expense of the local workforce and limiting trade with other countries and 
colonies27. The locals started to engage in black market activity. 
24 Salmoral, 1992, p 218. 25 ibid., 1992, p 218. 26 Cubitt, 1995, p. 136. 27 Blutstein, 1977, p. 31. 
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The goods were shipped to Curacao and to other islands, from which they were taken to 
Holland and to other countries. 
It is important to understand that the Venezuelan striving for independence from Spain 
was mainly based on economic motivation and not on an egalitarian ideology. 
2.1.3 "War to death" 
The first attempts in 1797 and 1806 to achieve independence from the Spanish colonial 
empire did not succeed. Although the Creoles' revolt of 1810 lead to a declaration of 
independence and proclamation of the Republic in 1811, Simon Bolivar, el libertador28, 
managed to defeat the Spanish in los Llanos, Carabobo for good only in 1821. 
A critical role was played by General Jose Antonio Päez, who managed to make the 
plainsmen, llaneros, change side. Initially these cowboys, originating from the 
Venezuelan countryside, had an equalitarian social ethic and, thus, social equality as a 
war aim. 29 Thus they fought against Bolivar's criollos in the beginning. 30 
Simon Bolivar's offensive warfare to liberate Venezuela from Spain, beginning in 1813, 
became famous as Campana Admirable. 3' 
The Republic of Gran Colombia was proclaimed in 1822, having elected Simon Bolivar 
as president. He united Venezuela, New Granada (Colombia, Panama), and Quito 
(Ecuador). 32 General Päez was named military commander for the state of Venezuela. 
The criollos were the winners in the end, but twelve years of devastating war killed over 
one-third of the total population and shattered society. 
Important changes in society occurred. Since the Campana Admirable, Bolivar recruited 
his troops from any race, as long as they were patriots. Thus mestizos (someone of 
mixed European and Indian stock) and even Indians and blacks were able to climb the 
social ladder. The military was paid by the grant of land. Hence, many soldiers and 
llaneros became terratenientes, penetrating the most exclusive circles of the 
Venezuelan "high society" of the time, taking over their properties. 33 
28 Salmoral, 1992, p. 208; many authors still write biographies about Simon Bolivar, for further detail 
see for example Perez Arcay (1999). 29 Bonilla, 1970, p. 43; Silva Michelena, 1967a, p. 71. 30 Blutstein, 1977, p. 33. 31 Salmoral, 1992, p. 226. 32 ibid., 1992, p. 229. 33 Silva Michelena, 1967a, p. 71. 
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These changes were also made possible, because a lot of landowners lost their lives 
during the war. 34 Overall between one fourth and one third of the whole population lost 
their lives. 35 
The war had a laming effect on the economy as well, as Venezuelan patriots lost their 
Caribbean trade links due to the naval war with Spain. 36 As there was no money left in 
the public purse, unpopular laws had to be established again. Although the existing 
state's monopolies were diametrically opposed to the political opinion of the 
republicans, they needed to be maintained. Thus the state-licensed shops (estancos) for 
37 tobacco and salt, and part of the monopoly for spirits were kept in force. 
2.1.4 Gran Colombia (1823-1830) 
2.1.4.1 Rise... 
The political dissolution of Gran Colombia took nine years and happened in two stages. 
The first phase lasted until 1827. During this period Bolivar was engaged in liberating 
Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. While he was not in Venezuela, General Päez had the 
military power. He was considered appropriate, because it was believed, that the slaves 
followed him. He was a man originating from the lower class and he had started to give 
freedom to his slaves. 38 
In the second stage, beginning 1828, Bolivar came to power directly via dictatorship. It 
was the only way to govern the alliance at this point in time. Unfortunately this 
worsened the crises, breaking Gran Colombia's neck in the end. 39 There were riots in 
Bogota and in Peru. 
In 1829 in Valencia, Venezuela started to build its own committee, which consisted of 
prominent personalities, to prepare the separation. 
34 Allen, 1977, p. 28. 35 Mortimer, 1990, ve0015/1. 36 See chapter on economic development. 37 Salmoral, 1992, p. 235. 38 Bolivar, 1950, II, p. 522. 39 Salmoral, 1992, p. 237. 
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2.1.4.2 ... and Fall 
After Bolivar had died in 1830, Gran Colombia was officially dissolved, because the 
territories wanted to go separate their ways. Bolivar's dream of a federation, something 
like a United States of Hispano America, was very short lived, only until the creator 
himself had faded away. Seven days before he died, he wrote his last testimony, saying 
"If my death will contribute to a system containing no parties and that the unity will be 
strengthened, I will step calmly into my grave. '-40 
The reasons for the failure of unity were manifold. After the enemy Spain, had 
disappeared, there was further reason to combine, for forging strong bonds between the 
different states. They were lacking economic links, common socio-economic interests, 
and a strong historically developed sense of belonging together. 41 
The three regions, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela had a different geographic and 
economic structure. 
The dominant form of agricultural property of the last of these three was the plantation. 
Typical products were cocoa, indigo and cotton near the coast and pasture in the interior 
of Los Llanos. Venezuela's economy was more or less based on export oriented 
monocultures, being cultivated by slaves. In New Granada (Colombia) and in Quito 
(Ecuador) mid-sized haciendas existed, where food, e. g. wheat, cocoa, sugar, tobacco, 
etc. were produced by a paid labour-force for urban centres nearby or for local 
consumption. 42 There even existed small manufacturers producing textiles, called 
obrajes. But gold was the main export. 
Geographical peculiarities had a disintegrating effect even on the regions themselves: 
The Andes were difficult to traverse, long distances and an almost non-existent 
infrastructure of roads and rivers in Venezuela, New Granada, and Ecuador caused 
regional problems. Thus these issues lead to further separation on a supra-regional level, 
also hindering transport, trade, and communication, which would have been vital for a 
successful merger of different states. 
Another reason, inhibiting a flourishing alliance, was to be found in socio-ethic 
heterogeneity and regional tensions. These resulted from uneven and unfair distribution 
ao Larrazäbal, 1975, III, p. 334. " König, 1992, p. 578. 42 Salmoral, 1992, p. 221; König, 1992, p. 578. 
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of wealth, property and political rights. In Venezuela, having around 700,000 
inhabitants, a small caste of Creoles being terratenientes and exporters of agricultural 
products was opposed to a large group of Negroes and slaves (60% of the total 
population) 43 Due to the plantations, the Venezuelan economy was dependent on 
slavery. On the contrary, in Ecuador and New Granada, slavery played only a minor 
part. Thus it was almost impossible for a pan-Andean government to set up laws, being 
appreciated and obeyed by all its member states. 
Until the mid-20th century, the country was marked by civil wars and dictatorship 
keeping Venezuela outside the industrialising world, as will be shown in the next 
section 44 
2.1.5 The struggles of independence -a republic only by name 
2.1.5.1 Conservatism and agricultural society (1830-1847) 
General Jose Antonio Päez became the first president of the independent Venezuela. His 
politics were marked by conservatism and a society based on agriculture, giving his 
supporters, los notables, landowners, merchants, intellectuals and civil servants enough 
space for political collaboration and economic activities. Päez' agriculture-oriented 
policies promoted the interests of merchants and farmers, but neglected the sectors of 
manufacturing and industry. Low duties on European consumption goods meant strong 
competition for local manufacturers 45 
2.1.5.2 Political disintegration and economic stagnation (1847-1869) 
The following two decades were marked by corruption and incompetence. After the 
conservatism under Päez had come to an end in 1847, Jose Tadeo Monagas, a caudillo 
(South American dictator, normally a military man who assumes power by force and is 
noted for autocratic rule. More than 30 different caudillos governed Venezuela from 
1830 to 1958. In no other country in Latin America was caudillismo so pronounced than 
in Venezuela), became president. The supremacy of the liberal oligarchy began. As the 
43 König, 1992, p. 580. 
o. V., 1992, p. 107; Silva Michelena, 1967a, p. 54. 45 König, 1992, p. 606 f. 
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Monagas-clan was occupied with securing its power, the government became more and 
more personalistic and authoritarian, limiting public rights and making political 
opposition impossible 46 
1.1.5.3 Autocracy and "modernisation"(1870-1898) 
For almost twenty years Guzman Blanco was leading Venezuelan politics. He believed 
that Venezuela could only be able to play an important role in international politics, if 
its political system was restructured. Thus he established a central government in 
Caracas, and therefore slowly took away the power from regional caudillos 47 
His striving for modernisation did not significantly improve the economic situation. 
Guzman Blanco eliminated the wealth and influence of the Catholic church by 
abolishing all of its privileges and confiscating its land 48 As he was favouring a small 
but powerful elite, it was little wonder, that in 1873 3.5 per cent of the landowners 
possessed 53 per cent of the agricultural soil. It became even worse in the following 
decades. In 1891,5.6 per cent of the people owned 74 per cent of the land. 9 
2.1.5.4 Back to despotism and caudillismo (1899-1945) 
When Colombian Cipriano Castro, a supporter of radical liberalism, seized power by 
military invasion in 1899, autonomy was given to the states again and the regional 
caudillismo, i. e. dictatorships, regained influence. 50 But his despotic leadership 
bankrupted the country. 
Suffering from a kidney disease, Castro had to travel to Europe, enabling his deputy 
Juan Vincente Gomez seized the presidency in 190851. The most cruel dictatorship in 
the history of Latin America began. His regime was so brutal, that even today no plaza 
or street is named after him. He harmed the majority of the inhabitants, favouring a very 
small minority. Interestingly enough, Gomez was the first ruler who managed to 
46 König, 1992, p. 610 Of. 47 ibid., 1992, p. 614. 48 Blutstein, 1977, p. 35. 49 Brito Figueroa, 1966, I, p. 296. so König, 1992, p. 618. 51 Blutstein, 1977, p. 298. 
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construct the first centralised governing system, without causing regional caudillos to 
revolt, as he created a federal council with them as its members. 52 
The oligarchy, having held power since the 17th century, was forced to give in to 
Gomez. During his dictatorship lasting almost 30 years he made his family and 
supporters into big landowners, while the government, which was more or less the 
Gomez family, became a huge, highly concentrated economic power for the first time in 
Venezuelan history, i. e. when the economic development process began. 53 
Gomez granted many haciendas to his lieutenants to reward their loyalty during former 
wars and conflicts. 54 
Each province was made to a satellite of Gomez, being controlled by his thieves and 
murderers. Finally he monopolised cattle farming, meat production, and the dairy 
industry, as well as the textiles, pulp, soap and match industries. His followers 
controlled the lottery, cinemas, the distribution of medicine, automobiles and 
ss furniture. 
In 1920 Venezuela became rich due to the exploration and exploitation of its oil 
reserves. Thereafter, it developed into one of the most modem states of Latin America. 56 
Due to government controlled oil revenues and total dictatorship, the state managed to 
get hold of further resources. This constellation brought out a new structure: the state 
did not work for a specific societal class any longer, but for itself. The majority of the 
population was put at an even bigger disadvantage than before. Gomez' political 
programme was based on physical repression. Thus it is small wonder, that education 
policies were neglected and eighty per cent of the state's budget were spent on debt 
servicing, the military forces, the ministry of the interior, and on road constructions. 57 
Even in early 1970, the state bought large quantities of modem weapons. 58 This is 
somehow or other a Latin American phenomenon. Even countries like Chile possess 
aeroplanes, such as the "Mirage", although the country is only some 60 km wide. Some 
critics say, the country is, geographically speaking, not big enough, to execute air 
manoeuvres, as they cannot even fly circles due to the restricted air space. 
52 Hillman, 1994, pp. 34,48; Hellinger, 1991, p. 36. 33 Ahumada, 1967, p. 12; see also Salazar-Carrillo, 1994, p. 40. 54 Naim and Frances, 1994, p. 171. 55 Izard, 1996, p. 665. 56 o. V., 1992, p. 107. 57 Izard, 1996, p. 671. 58 Blutstein, 1977, p. 245. 
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When Gomez died in 1935, General Lopez Contreras, his son-in-law and minister of 
war succeeded him. His government was also based on repression and corruption. 
Interestingly enough, he was the first president, who established a national plan in 1936, 
adumbrating the policy of sembrando el petrdleo, sowing the petroleum. Oil revenues 
were supposed to be used for the nation's economic and political development. 59 
In 1941 General Medina Angarita was elected by civil servants, a supporter of Gomez 
and also a former minister of war. 60 
2.1.6 Political parties around the era of WW2 
During the Second World War, new political parties came into existence, trying to solve 
social problems, e. g. Acciön Democrätica (AD) the Democratic Action Party, created 
by Römulo Betancourt in 1941.61 Medina was ousted by a military junta in October 
1945, and the first free elections were held in Venezuela. 62 
In 1952 Marcos Perez Jimenez set up a military dictatorship. Nearly all top positions in 
the government and in the companies government had an interest in, were controlled by 
officers. Distributing key posts on the basis of personal loyalty rather than professional 
merit, this dictator showed a damaging favouritism. 3 By expressing exaggerated 
nationalism, intensified by territorial claims against Guyana and Colombia, Jimenez 
tried to get people to accept the introduction of a strict census, the death penalty, a spy 
network, and complete repression being controlled by the SN, Seguridad Nacional. 64 
Six years later he was overthrown by a joint effort of all opposition parties and the more 
progressive parts of the military. 65 
2.1.7 Consequences 
It could be shown that Venezuelan politics, from independence in 1830 until the mid- 
20th century, were marked by military dictatorship and oppression, caudillismo, 
climaxing during the regime of Marcos Perez Jimenez (1950-1958). 66 Some researchers 
59 Coles, 1994, p. 194. 60 Izard, 1996, p. 673. 61 o. V., 1992, p. 107. 62 Blutstein, 1977, p. 41. 63 Blutstein, 1977, p. 251. 64 Izard, 1996, p. 676. 65 ibid., 1996, p. 695. 66 Levine and Crisp, 1994, p. 245. 
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say, that the era of caudillismo did not last until 1958. Their definition of caudillismo is 
somewhat tighter. They define caudillismo as "small regional dictatorships". The years 
under Perez Jimenez were not caudillismo in that narrower sense, because he centralised 
power in Caracas and withdrew power from regional caudillos. According to Blutstein 
(1977), this "military tradition is central to the understanding of the society as a 
whole. s67 
It was a ferocious machinery of official bullying, serving the interests of the traditional 
elite, or oligarchia, and of foreign business interests by securing "law" and order. Naim 
and Frances (1994) suggest that General Gomez's practise of "granting business 
privileges and concessions to members of his circle was maintained and became an 
established component of the country's business culture.. "68 
However, with the beginning of democracy in Venezuela in the 1970s, the armed forces 
started to improve their public reputation and started to be regarded as professional. 
It is also worth mentioning that Venezuela has never been engaged in a foreign war. 69 
Hence, it never had to suffer under a foreign trade embargo as for example Cuba has, or 
experience exclusion from economic aid as did Spain after the Second World War, not 
being included in the Marshall Aid plan or to give it the official title `the European 
Recovery Programme. ' 
2.1.8 Changes in political conduct 
The ousting of Jimenez appears to have marked the end of military dictatorship and of 
juntas in Venezuela. 70 
The AD was strongest party with Betancourt as its leader. Again, his term of office was 
marked by repression versus demonstrators, unemployed people, trade unions, 
campesinos (rural dweller, usually of modest economic means; a peasant), and wild 
settlers. ' 
In 1964 the change of government happened in accordance with the constitution for the 
first time ever. According to Hillman (1994) the political change caused by elections 
67 Blutstein, 1977, p. 246. 68 Naim and Frances, 1994, pp. 172-173. 69 Blutstein, 1977, p. 206. 70 ibid., 1977, p. 44. 71 Izard, 1996, p. 685. 
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instead of violence was considered to be an exception to the rule in those days. 72 Social 
unrest could be handled and the guerilla movement having had its peak period from 
1962 to 1965 could be stemmed. 3 During the administration of President Raül Leoni 
(1964-1969) the manufacturing output was increased significantly due to an intensive 
import-substitution programme. Unfortunately Venezuela only had a small domestic 
market and high labour costs, creating disadvantages in comparison to other Latin 
American countries. 
From 1968 to 1983 the government changed peacefully between AD and the right wing 
Social Christian Comite Organizaciön Politica Electoral Independiente (COPEI), 
initially conservative and catholic oriented. The reason for it can be found in Hillman 
(1994). He states, that leaders of the political parties agreed to share power by "planting 
the roots of a party-system known as pacted democracy. " This phenomenon is variously 
identified in literature as partidocracy or pactocracy. The democracy is said to be 
"centralized, monistic, delegative, caudillistic, consociational, democratarian, 
democradura, hybrid, and pacted. "74 
This perception can be supported by the following expressions offered by a managers of 
MNCs in Venezuela interviewed in Germany. 
"What does democracy mean ? Democracy in its true sense does not exist in 
Latin America. It is more a mixture between democracy and dictatorship, 
democratura so to speak. " 
"State control and state-owned companies means ... a hidden military 
regime and not democratisation. " 75 
In 1968 Rafael Caldera Rodriguez from COPEI won the presidential election. He kicked 
off with some economic reforms 76 
Six years later, president Carlos Andres Perez (AD) carried on with the national 
economic reforms. In 1975 the petroleum industry was nationalised and due to its 
revenues, it was possible to implement ambitious plans concerning the education of 
workforce, building of large public monuments, and industrialisation. This policy 
supported the scheme of sembrando el petröleo, because it was meant to provide the 
country with means of wealth after the petroleum was gone. 7 
72 Hillman, 1994, p. 54. 73 o. V., 1992, p. 107. 74 Hillman, 1994, pp. 24,169). 'S Interview with a manager of a MNC. 76 Izard, 1996, p. 695. 77 Coronel, 1983, pp. 165-166; Blutstein, 1977, p. 2; see also Moll, 1994, p. 8. 
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The earlier exploitation companies were compensated, and in their place a couple of 
national companies took over. They were known by the summary initials of PDVSA, 
Petröleos de Venezuela S. A. 
The public sector grew immensely, up to 200 state-owned companies, accounting for 
almost three quarters of the gross domestic product. 78 This also meant an increase in 
corruption and inefficiency. Perez brought various non-party members into government. 
He favoured especially wealthy people from the private sector, and those subsequently 
known as Los Doce Apostoles. 79 Venezuela is probably the only nation that has a 
dictionary itemising Venezuela's main corruption scandals since 1958, revealing a 
steady increase in the number of cases from one administration to the next. It is a best- 
seller written by Ruth Capriles Mendez, Diccionario de la corrupciön en Venezuela. 
Some analysts say, that Perez' policies fostered the growth of an "emerging 
bourgeoisie. i80 As the state as well as the private industry thought that this prosperity 
would last for ever, they both started to get into debt and Venezuelan society became 
more and more dependent on foreign countries. 
In 1978 COPEI won the elections with its candidate Luis Herrera Campins again. 
The elections in 1983 and 1988 were won by the AD. The policies involved massively 
subsidising the economic system, extensive government controls, artificial employment, 
and high protection measures that distorted the economy. This damaged the economic 
structure in terms of efficient work-flows and competitiveness. The reason for this 
rather dubious policy-making, i. e. increasing public-sector budgets, is fairly straight 
forward: To avoid conflict at all cost. This caused a picture of "illusion of harmony" to 
arise, under which institutional decay, economic stagnation and social regression 
occurred. 8' 
At the end of the eighties (1987 and 1988), Venezuela was running into massive 
economic problems. Wages and prices were frozen. 82 
In February of 1989 C. A. Perez became president of the republic of Venezuela again. 
78 Izard, 1996, p. 687. 79 Martz, 1994, p. 50. 80 Ellner, 1993, p. 150. 81 Goodman et al. (1994), p. 9. 82 Izard, 1996, p. 696. 
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According to Izard (1996), Perez' economic reconstitution programme had negative 
economic consequences; the political networking and the violation of human rights by 
the state security service lead to violent unrest. 83 Contrary to this some say that it was 
not solely Perez' fault, because he started to put several people from private industry 
into ministerial offices. But they all left after one year. They could not change anything. 
Bureaucracy and partidismo were too strong that even being chosen by the president, if 
one does not belong to the ruling party, or if one works against it, the days of one's 
political career are numbered. 
Still, the first successes showed in 1990, when the inflation rate fell. 84 But poverty and 
disatisfaction were still increasing. Strikes and students' protests shattered the country. 
In 1992 Hugo Chavez Frias, known as el Comandante, twice organised a putsch. During 
his second attempt in November he even bombed the president's palace, but several of 
the bombs did not actually detonate 185 Another curious event occurred when Chavez 
tried to broadcast his video-taped message: The tape was recorded on a VHS cassette 
that was incompatible with the Beta system of the government-owned TV station ! 86 
In the elections of 1993 both traditional parties AD and COPEI lost half of their votes 
and ex-president Caldera won the election, as head of the heterogeneous party alliance 
Convergencia Nacional (CN). By nationalising the complete banking sector he averted a 
serious banking crisis. 87 The launch of the "Agenda Venezuela", a macroeconomic 
adjustment package to strengthen the country's economic performance was launched, 
but failed to succeed. 88 
83 ibid., 1996, p. 696; o. V., 1992, p. 107. 84 o. V., 1992, p. 107. 5 Schmid, 1999c, p. 5; Hillman, 1994, p. 141. According to interviews it is believed that some bombs 
were filled with sand, because the producer cheated on them. 86 Hillman, 1994, p. 147. 
Izard, 1996, p. 696. 88 Rios, 1998, p. 16. 
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2.2 Patterns in History 
Following Lombardi's characterisation (1986), Venezuelan history can be divided into 
three sections: 
1. ) 17`h century to 1830, culminating in a mature colonial society at the end of the 
period; 
2. ) The era lasting from independence up to the rule of Guzman Blanco, with a 
reorientation of the Venezuelan elite to the needs of an expanding North Atlantic 
commerce (1830-1920); and 
3. ) The petroleum driven economy from 1920 until the present. 89 
In colonial times, Venezuela was naturally dominated by the Spanish, and government 
was centralised in Caracas. 90 Lombardi (1986) writes critically: 
"Political revolution or social and economic changes, all could take place 
elsewhere; but before any of them could become part of the national destiny, 
they had to come under the influence and control of Caracas" (Lombardi, 
1986, p. 7). 
During the second period, Venezuela was dominated by the demands of North Atlantic 
commerce. Under Päez, who managed to maintain peace, the Caracas elite diversified 
rapidly into a commercial bureau "serving as an intermediary between the sources of 
finance and commodity speculation and the producers of cocoa, coffee, or hides. "91 
These planters had to borrow vast amounts of money in order to be financially capable 
of rebuilding plantations that had been devastated in the War of Independence (1813- 
1821). The vicious cycle of credit-financed export crop production began. When the 
world coffee prices fell, farmers were forced to sell their properties to finance houses. 
The economic downturn was finally brought to an end by Guzman Blanco. Being well 
educated he managed to gain international resources to finance a Venezuelan recovery. 
His successor, Gomez, put the coping-stone on the commercial bureaucratic pattern, 
with a modern Caracas and undeveloped provinces. 
Thirdly, being dominated by foreign oil exploration and exploitation experts in the 
1920s and onwards, it showed how underdeveloped Venezuela was at this point in time. 
89 Lombardi, 1986, pp. 1-31. 90 see also Myers, 1986, p. 138. 
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Old-fashioned and inefficient ways of producing commodity goods and a primitive 
technology proved incompatible with the highly sophisticated process of petroleum 
exploitation. 2 
A succinct formulation would be that Venezuelan society has always been influenced 
and shaped by external economic and political forces since colonialisation. In early 
times it were the Spanish conquistadores; then the demands of international commerce 
came into play; and, finally, foreign, mainly North American, interests in the petroleum 
industry dominated the country. 
Hence, the formation of Venezuelan society has never been a process of natural 
evolution. This conclusion points in the same direction as Allen's thesis that 
"deeply ingrained in the thinking of many Venezuelans is the belief that 
they are impotent in the face of forces beyond their control, that they are not 
and have never been really in charge of their own affairs. "93 
The following chapters will describe the consequences. What has been written so far 
can be considered significant for understanding contemporary Venezuela, especially 
when it comes to possible reasons to explain economic problems, management style, 
education and mentality in Venezuela. 
2.3 Recent changes in politics 
2.3.1 The political situation after 40 years of a two-party-system 
The opinion is widespread that AD and COPEI exercised "a rigid and self-serving 
effective duopoly of power" between 1958 and 1998.94 
The 1980s and 1990s were marked by a democracy, that was "really a combination of 
elections with a corrupt elitist system of the old Spanish style, where small groups ran 
everything. "95 As from 1980 to 1992 the average Venezuelan lost over half of his or her 
purchasing power in real terms, people started to wonder where the petrodollars had 
91 Lombardi, 1986, p. 14. 92 ibid., 1986, p. 19. 93 Allen, 1977, p. 16. 94 Kielmas, 1998, p. 28. 95 Geyer, 1992, p. 49. 
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gone. 6 Navarro (1994) writes that the parties seem to be "controlled by a small group 
of apparatchiks", who are willing to preserve their authority, no matter what the costs. 
He even puts it more bluntly by saying that political parties are seen as a combination of 
"clubs of contractors" and "shameless populists", winning elections and attracting 
activists "by granting them access ... to government contracts, welfare payments, and 
favours. "97 
The origin of this problem can be found in the electoral process, because the president 
of Venezuela cannot be re-elected. Therefore every president and his party know that 
they only have a limited period of time, i. e. five years to reap the benefits of being 
elected. 
Thus they are not only tempted to put their friends, family members, "nieces, nephews, 
children", supporters, and loyalists into companies where at least some state influence is 
still prevalent, but everyone who is connected with a political party or economic or 
social power structure tries to feather their nest as long as possible. 
The legislative period can be structured in the following milestones: 
"In their first year they are not productive because they need to settle in 
their posts. ... Thus there is not much business to do for us ... In the second 
year they try to find out where they can get money. In the third year they 
touch the springs of money, ... in the fourth year they really do make money 
... and waste it, because they don't want to leave a single cent to the next 
government. ... Especially in the last year of governance presents are distributed. It is called raspar la olla. If you know it is over soon, you 
scrape out the pan thoroughly. ... It does not matter on which chair I sit, I try 
to take as much as possible with me, because I am out soon. ... Thus the best 
years for us in terms of business are the years before the elections. "98 
The consequence is that policymaking is short term. Thus it seems to be impossible to 
govern continuously over a longer period of time. This does not only harm a people's 
welfare but also stimulates opportunistic behaviour in the population at large, 
exemplified by the politicians. 
The social situation worsened and although official statistics tell another story, 
employment is far above 20 percent, and some employers even have problems with the 
unemployed, as they demonstrate almost daily for jobs. They are standing outside the 
companies with their CVs in their hands, asking if the firms can provide jobs. 99 For the 
96 Kielmas, 1998, p. 28; Burggraaff and Millett, 1994, p. 59. 97 Navarro, 1994, p. 121. 
98 Interviews with managers of MNCs with subsidiaries in Venezuela. 99 Interviews with a manager of a MNC in Venezuela. 
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first time in 40 years, Venezuelans started to express an intense preference for 
change. 10° 
2.3.2 "La Revolucibn Democratica"- Why it was possible 
In 1997 Chavez founded the MVR, "Movimiento V Republica" and one year later he 
enlarged the party to Polo Patriötico, PP, an alliance combining thirteen other parties, 
including parties such as MAS, and PPT. In December 1998, he won the elections, 
leaving Henrique Salas Roemer and his Proyecto Venezuela, PVRZL, behind. '0' 
His victory can be seen as the people's response towards rising discontent, steady 
worsening of real incomes, decay of public services, public health and education 
systems, and juridical administration. '02 
Can we face the political future optimistically ? 
According to Jones (1999), President Chavez can be seen as a mixture between 
"journalist and Robin Hood"103, not being a member of the establishment. ' 04 
Despite this, he put at least 50 military officers into public administration and 
enterprises. 105 This can be understood as an act of nepotism, that has been done by 
former governments as well, as shown above. Others consider it to be a move back to 
caudillismo. l°6 
The remaining issue deals with policymaking. People start to feel uncomfortable, 
companies are hesitant to invest large sums of capital in projects, because president 
Chavez has not yet delivered a clear economic concept. As one area manager states, his 
economic plan "is considered to be like god: Everybody has heard of it, but nobody has 
seen it. " This again has a deep impact on selling behaviour. Generally, in Venezuela one 
needs `to think around three comers', because the whole economic development is 
dependent on politics. 
10° Rios, 1998, p. 16. lot Bodemer and Nolte, 1999, p. 2; Schmid, 1999c, p. 6. 102 Schaeffler, 1999, p. 1. 103 Jones, 1999, p. 2. 104 Pickert, 1998, p. 10. pos Schaeffler, 1999, p. 3. 106 see for example Matthies T., 1999, p. 3; Bodemer and Nolte, 1999, p. 7. 
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According to Welsch and Werz (1999) the consequences of the last 40 years of 
Venezuelan policymaking visualised the challenges the new government currently has 
to face: 107 
1. ) Corruption: Even in the 1970s during the times of the oil bonanza, the government 
and its party were accused of embezzling public money and funds. It is thought that 
90 billion US Dollars are deposited on foreign private bank accounts in the USA 
and Switzerland. This behaviour evokes the mentality of the conquistadores who 
also deprived Venezuela of its wealth not only during, but since the times of early 
colonisation. 
2. ) Facilismo: The general code of conduct that was acquired due to the populist 
legislation of governments in the past, and also due to the overstaffing in public, 
state-owned industries. 
3. ) Many attempts to reform the political system have already failed. 
4. ) Decreasing public income and increasing impoverishment of large population 
groups, who had previously been upwardly mobile, i. e. were included in the so- 
called middle class, lead to a mixture of political anomie and to an increase of social 
protest. 
5. ) The increasing dislike of political parties has reached a high level even by Latin 
American standards. 
6. ) Social impoverishment has reached unknown standards. Depending on the source of 
data it is believed that 80 to 90 percent of the Venezuelan population are below the 
UN poverty line. 
7. ) According to many Venezuelans that were questioned and to external observers the 
achievements of the previous governments were unimpressive. 
107 Welsch and Werz, 1999, pp. 7-10. 
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8. ) Due to the generally felt improbability of reforming the political system , and to the 
disappointment with political parties, the military option seems to be acute again. 
The direction government will take cannot be anticipated: one has to be patient. 
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3 The structure of Venezuelan economy 
3.1 History of the economy until the 1920s 
During the times of discovery and colonisation (1498 to 1750) Venezuela was virtually 
ignored by Spanish trading ships, because it was considered to be a small, rustic colony 
compared to the wealthy and culturally advanced states of Peru and Mexico. 108 
As shown in the chapter on commerce during the colonial times, early international 
Venezuelan trade was marked by protectionism and governance through the Spanish 
crown, realistas, and upper class criollos. 
On achieving independence, Venezuela had started to do some minor exporting since 
the 1820s. But international trade was hindered by several factors. First of all, the 
Venezuelan economy suffered enormously during the War of Independence (1813- 
1821). Plantations and haciendas were `mourning the loss of manpower', and severely 
decreasing harvests of cocoa, indigo and tobacco. Probably worse, during the war time 
the population of cattle went down from 4.5 million to 256,000 animals. 109 This was due 
to the common phenomenon that the armed forces slaughtered the animals in order to 
get sufficient amounts of meat without paying the ranchers. Thirdly, Venezuelan 
patriots lost their Caribbean trade links because of a lost naval war against Spain, and 
also due to corsair piracy. In 1811 the USA and so called "alien colonies", mainly 
British possessions, were the biggest partner in international trade (35.2% and 34%). 
The financial misery evoked by war was the main reason why Bolivar continued to run 
the estanco shops. "" 
Hence, Venezuela's development in terms of economic growth could not keep up pace 
with countries such as Mexico or Argentina. "" 
Under Päez (1830-1847) Venezuela developed into a society based on agricultural 
exports. 112 
108 Naim and Frances, 1994, p. 170; Blutstein, 1977, pp. 29,90. 109 Salmoral, 1992, p. 232. 110 See chapter on political history. 11, Lombardi, 1986, p. 4. 112 According to Vasconi et al. (1980, p. 192), this is typical for many Latin American countries. 
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The USA, Great Britain, and Germany held equal shares of 25 % in Venezuelan export 
activities. This lead to an increase in German subsidiaries based in Venezuela, mainly 
merchants, representatives of ship building companies, and -later on- bankers. They 
sometimes got married to members of indigenous families. The immigration of German 
agricultural and manual workers was rather small, although the Venezuelan government 
was very much interested in drawing such people into the country to substitute the 
missing local workforce and to let them contribute to domestic consumption. ' 13 
The era of Monagas (1847-1869) was marked by economic stagnation. 
The production of coffee just started to become substantial at the end of the 19`h 
century, when it was spread to the Andes. The amount of coffee exported could have 
been improved, but president Guzman Blanco and his successors neglected to diversify 
agricultural production and to strengthen local industrialisation. Thus Venezuela was 
still heavily dependent on exporting coffee, and hence on the world market prices, and 
on importing consumer products as well. In 1890, for example, coffee constituted 75 per 
cent of all exports. "4 Due to the flourishing coffee production, Venezuela became one 
of the wealthiest countries in Latin America, although only small groups of the 
Venezuelan population benefited from this rise in income, while the masses continued 
to live in poverty. l 5 European trading houses began to be established, some were 
British or German subsidiaries, others were founded by resident immigrants, such as H. 
L. Boulton. The first regular boat service was from Caracas to New York. 116 
The wealth generated lasted until the 1920s. The revenues from coffee exports were 
invested in cattle ranching and in the sugar cane industry, leading to further prosperity 
lasting until 1929.117 
3.2 Settlement patterns 
The harbours towns and Caracas formed the centre of economic activities. 
Unfortunately a regional equilibrium and an integration of the different economic 
regions did not happen. 
113 König, 1992, p. 608. 114 Coronel, 1983, p. 5; Izard, 1970, p. 183. 115 Karlsson, 1975, p. 26. 116 Naim and Frances, 1994, p. 171; the Boultons are still one of the most influential families in Venezuela; see also chapter about recent developments in business and economics. 117 Izard, 1996, p. 668. 
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Four different economic sections existed side by side being focussed on export but 
without interregional communication. 
In the west, the most important region was the state of Zulia with the port of Maracaibo, 
specialising in coffee. 
The second zone was located around Valencia and Caracas. They exported different 
agricultural products such as coffee, cocoa, sugar, cattle and copper via the harbours 
Puerto Cabello, 120 km west from Caracas, and La Guaira, 13 km north-west from 
Caracas centre. Some local manufacturing like weaving mills in Valencia and tanning in 
Caracas started up. 
The eastern region was marked by the state of Bermudez and Puerto Cartipano, 
exporting coal from Naricual and asphalt from Lake Guanoco. 
Goldmines in El Callao and iron ore in the Orinoco delta formed the fourth economic 
section, having Ciudad Bolivar as a port. '18 
This lead to an extremely uneven population density. Most of the inhabitants lived close 
to the coast and in the valleys of the coastal mountain ranges. 
Comparing the formation of the urban landscape in the colonial period with a modern 
road map, the towns and cities are almost identical. 
Furthermore, today's network in terms of communications, power, and wealth, also 
closely matches the colonial network fully established during the last years of the 18°i 
century. ' 19 Although Venezuela is a federal republic consisting of a Federal District, 21 
states, federal dependencies and approximately 270 autonomous municipalities, the 
state can still be considered to be highly centralised: 120 one fourth of the population 
lives in Caracas, government institutions, authorities, most universities, the international 
airport, and most business headquarters are located in the capital. 
118 König, 1992, pp. 616-617. 119 Lombardi, 1987, p. 7; Borcherdt, 1980, pp. 217-218. 120 Morrisson, 1994, p. 101. 
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3.3 Economic development from 1920 onwards 
3.3.1 The History of Black Gold 
3.3.1.1 The Beginning 
It was in the year of 1914, when the well Zumaque-1 was drilled in the Mene Grande 
area, south-east of Lake Maracaibo, being the discovery of the Maracaibo Basin, one of 
the largest oil fields in the world. In the following years, other important finds in the 
surrounding areas were made, causing a rush into the country, comparable to the 
California gold rush of the previous century (1849). 121 Winners in the game of early 
petroleum discoveries in Venezuela were companies like Shell, Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, and 
Texaco. In the 1920s petroleum started to replace coffee as the most important 
commodity. This had a substantial impact on agriculture. As the following figure shows, 
Venezuela slowed down exporting coffee at the beginning of the 1930s. 
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121 Coronel, 1983, p. 7. 
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Due to oil export earnings and an overvalued currency it did not seem worthwhile to 
cultivate coffee anymore. It could be imported easily with petro-dollars. Venezuela 
began to import even the most basic commodities and food products, including sugar, 
that it had formerly grown, Colombian meat, black beans from the Dominican Republic, 
and frozen vegetables from the USA. 122 
Thus agriculture rapidly lost its importance even in the domestic market! 23 
The dualism, sophisticated dynamic oil industry versus inefficient agricultural 
production, started to evolve and is still prevalent today. '24 
3.3.1.2 Change in international attractiveness 
As shown, Venezuela was the poorest of all Latin American countries until 1920. 
But due to the development of the oil industry in the 1930s, its expansion in the 1940s 
and 1950s, the massive increase in international demand for petroleum in the 1960s and 
1970s, Venezuela became the wealthiest state in Latin America in the mid 1970s. '25 
As Venezuela became one of the most important oil exporting countries in the world, it 
gained strategic importance for the Western hemisphere. Thus large investments were 
undertaken by the government, this being one of Venezuela's principal investors, to 
build an infrastructure for capital, providing great impetus to construction activities126 
Refineries and transportation facilities were constructed, and an efficient road system 
was established facilitating the transport of people and goods in many parts of the 
country. It is typical for oil countries, that "infrastructure in many instances is related 
mainly to the oil sectors127. From 1942 to 1948, government expenditures on public 
works, health, and education increased almost seven times. 128 The people started to rely 
on welfare provided by the state more and more. This phenomenon is called 
paternalismo, and it will be discussed in more detail later on. 
122 Coronel, 1983, pp. 24-25; Blutstein, 1977, p. 37. 123 Stenzel, 1980, pp. 299-300; Karlsson, 1975, p. 36. 124 Weise, 1989, p. 89; Martz and Myers, 1986, p. 73. its Blutstein, 1977, p. 27. 126 Ahumada, 1967, p. 11. 127 Austin, 1990, p. 23. 128 Izard, 1996, p. 668; Salazar-Carrillo, 1994, p. 161. 
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3.3.1.3 A new form of dependence 
Venezuela started to become dependent upon oil rather quickly, immediately and 
completely directing its economy towards this new source of income. The agricultural 
and pastoral economy became totally neglegted. Agricultural production by small 
farmers fell rapidly, because high wages drew people to the oil fields and the cities . 
129 
During the Perez Jimenez years for example, oil made up 98 percent of the total value 
of exports. 130 
Unfortunately this trend was supported by the legislature as well. In 1952 for example a 
trade agreement was signed that opened up the Venezuelan market to American 
imports. This turned out to be a disadvantage to domestic products. 131 Another example, 
showing how heavily the state focused on petroleum was a law passed in 1918 allowing 
the Venezuelan government to expropriate land that was needed for petroleum 
production. 
This `law of crude oil' was actually designed by solicitors of foreign oil companies ! 132 
Thus it was small wonder that initial concessions to foreign firms were extremely 
generous, preparing the ground for blaming the nation's subsequent social and 
economic ills on the exploitative oil concessions made by Gomez. Sullivan (1976) states 
that during the Gomez period (1908-1935) Venezuela "structured the most liberal 
petroleum policy in Latin America. s133 Thus it was little wonder that especially 
American oil companies poured into the country, leading to a form of Americanisation 
no other Latin American state has ever experienced so far. 
But also public acceptance and low taxes permitted the oil consortia to extract resources 
and profits with ease. 134 From 1936 to 1942 three big companies accounted for almost 
99 per cent of total Venezuelan petroleum production: Creole (Standard Oil, Exxon) 50 
per cent, Royal Dutch Shell 35 per cent, and Mene Grande (Gulf Oil) 14 per cent. 135 
By being a major player in the founding of OPEC, the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, in 1960, the Venezuelan government was able to improve its 
bargaining position vis ä vis the large oil companies, making sure enough money stayed 
129 Blutstein, 1977, p. 37. '30 Martz and Myers, 1986, p. 73. 131 hard, 1996, p. 679. 132 ibid., 1996, p. 669. 133 Sullivan, 1976, p. 258; see also Allen, 1977, pp. 12,63. 134 Lombardi, 1986, p. 20. 
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in the country. 136 Other founding members were Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. 
Their main objective was to control oil price and production. Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo 
is considered to be the "principal architect. "' 37 
3.3.1.4 Nationalisation of oil industry in 1975 
In 1943 a new hydrocarbons law was established, saying that royalties138 had to be as 
much as the oil companies' revenues. 139 This law was not changed until 1975, when the 
petroleum industry was nationalised by Carlos Andres Perez. Due to its revenues, it was 
possible to implement ambitious plans concerning the education of the workforce, the 
building of large public monuments and industrialisation. The earlier oil exploitation 
companies were compensated, and in their place, a couple of national companies took 
over. They were brought under the command of PDVSA, Petröleos de Venezuela S. A. 
and included Lagoven (50% of the production, formerly Creole, Exxon), Maraven 
(25%, formerly Shell), Meneven (formerly Gulf), and Llanoven (formerly Mobil). '40 By 
1978 the process of integration was finished and Llanoven merged with CVP, the 
original state oil company, to Corpoven. 
The income resulting from oil increased because of favourable economic activity during 
the Korean War, and this made it possible to continue investing in development 
projects, such as the petro-industry of Moron, the hydroelectric power-station of Caroni, 
and the metalworking industry at the Orinoco. According to Martz and Myers (1986) 
major foreign manufacturers were also forced by government decree in 1976 to sell 80 
percent of their stock to Venezuelans. '4' 
This established a form of state capitalism that still exists. 142 The good thing about it 
was, that many employees benefited from this measure. From then on, the Venezuelan 
oil workers became a privileged, elite sector of the working class: the labour 
aristocracy, as they were sometimes called by politicians. 143 
135 Izard, 1996, p. 677; Salazar-Carrillo, 1994, p. 28. 136 Karlsson, 1975, p. 33. 137 Myers, 1986, p. 246. 138 Fee or tax a company has to pay the government when exploiting oil. 139 Izard, 1996, p. 677; see also Marts, 1986, p. 244, Vasconi, 1980, p. 196. '40 Coronel, 1983, pp. 88-90. 141 Martz and Myers, 1986, p. 80. 142 see for example Ashoff, 1992, p. 18. 143 Ellner, 1993, p. 144. 
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Unfortunately, it also meant a decreasing role for the private sector and for foreign 
enterprises. 144 The transfer of ownership to the state was considered to be a "capitalistic 
adjustment to nationalistic pressures and compensation for the inadequacy of domestic 
entrepreneurship. i145 In fact it was a new mechanism to reinforce the domination of the 
ruling class; e. g. the signing of profitable service contracts between the new Venezuelan 
state companies and the former multinational owners. Benefiting most were obviously 
the affluent, those who already owned several companies, and obviously the state itself. 
The main reason for nationalising the oil industry was simply a question of retaining the 
revenues pouring out of the country, mainly to North America. Some authors however, 
point to other reasons. Blank (1986) for example states, that the fourteen separate 
foreign-owned companies proved too fragmented for efficient production. '46 
The public sector grew immensely, going up to 200 state-owned companies, accounting 
for almost three quarters of the gross domestic product. 147 Especially in the 1970s, a 
vast number of state enterprises were established: 11 in 1971, sixteen in 72, fourteen in 
73, seventeen in 74, and in 1975 not less than incredible forty-nine. 148 Few Latin 
American countries delegated more of their total economic activity to the public sector 
than did Venezuela. Myers (1986) explains it in terms of the Venezuelans' reluctance to 
leave economic development to private companies due to the negative experiences in 
the early history of Venezuelan capitalism. 149 
As one can see in the figure below, Venezuela's state of well-being moved up and down 
with petroleum, making itself a slave to an external factor, i. e. the world's petroleum 
price. 
144 Naim and Frances, 1994, p. 175. '45 Bigler and Viloria V., 1986, p. 185. 146 Blank, 1986, p. 270. 147 Izard, 1996, p. 687; Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 15; Moll, 1994, pp. 114-115; Pachner, 
1980, p. 324. 
14 
148 
Bigler and Viloria V., 1986, p. 184. 149 Myers, 1986, p. 128. 
The structure of Venezuelan economy 41 
Petroleum production & spot crude price, 1900-1998 
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3.3.1.5 Economic prosperity in the 1970s - Venezuela Saudita 
3.3.1.5.1 Paternalismo 
The petroleum crisis in 1973 had an enormous impact on Venezuela. During the period 
lasting from 1974 to 1985, the oil industry contributed the most in the country's external 
commerce ever, even outperforming the flourishing 1950s. 150 Between 1970 and 1975, 
the income increased by factor 4.8, tax income increased by 3.6, and dollar reserves by 
8.5.151 This was caused by an dramatic increase in the oil price due to the Yom Kippur 
War of 1973 and the Middle East conflict. The oil price increased its value almost over 
night: In October 1973 the barrel of crude petroleum cost 2.83 US $, while in 1974 it 
was worth 10.41 US $ (first oil shock), climaxing in the year of 1980 at 30.69 US $ per 
barrel (second oil shock, triggered by the overthrow of the Shah of Persia in 1979). 1 2 
150 Salazar-Carrillo, 1994, p. 239. 151 Izard, 1996, p. 693. 
152 BP, 1997, p. 14; Morrisson, 1994, p. 94. 
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This led to an economic boom and full employment. Additionally, President Carlos 
Andres Perez decreed, that wages had to be increased between 15 and 35 percent. '53 
These government-authorised wage increases, combined with foreign exchange controls 
that subsidised imports, led to a change in consumption patterns. '54 In 1971 Venezuela 
imported 46 percent of its basic foodstuffs, in 1978 this figure approached 70 percent. 155 
To put it in absolute figures, the agricultural imports from the United States rose from 
500 million Bolivars in 1970 to more than 2 billion Bolivars by 1979.156 
Aware of the fact of growing dependence, the government tried to strengthen local 
manufacturing by subsidising domestic products. 
In some industries it was not possible to obtain an import license for a product that was 
already manufactured by a Venezuelan company. Thus, foreign competition was kept 
out of the domestic market artificially. 
This process of import-substitution was taken over by the subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations, not only displacing domestic producers, but also displacing domestic 
workers since their advanced technology was less labour intensive. 157 Thus especially in 
the 1970s international companies rushed into Latin America, setting up local 
subsidiaries. '58 This was the only way to get a foothold in the Venezuelan market, as 
imported products were penalised with a high import taxation as mentioned above. 
These import substitution policies failed for various reasons. 159 It was for example 
cheaper to import food than to buy Venezuelan-produced products. Another issue was 
that money was not spent wisely on farming and agricultural reforms. Small peasant 
farmers received credits to buy expensive machinery, but they did not make use of it, 
because they were not trained in modern agriculture methods and preferred sticking to 
traditional ways of doing things. 
But even if some peasants were willing to farm their own land, administrative problems 
sometimes made it impossible to succeed, e. g. seeds sometimes arrived only after 
planting-time. 160 The peasant farmers were also able to buy fertilisers and seeds at a low 
price. As some of them were still used to the easy money, it was common to sell the 
153 Morrisson, 1994, p. 105. 154 Mortimer, 1990, ve0017/6. 155 Martz and Myers, 1986, p. 81. 156 Herman, 1986, p. 345. 's' Portes, 1988, p. 2. 158 For example companies like Beiersdorf AG, Bayer AG. 159 Herman, 1986, p. 345; Allen, 1977, p. 231. 160 To study further issues, see Weise, 1989, p. 107. 
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acquired materials to bigger landowners and to professional agricultural companies to 
make instant profits. The same phenomenon, this "get-rich-quick-mentality", happened 
during the land reforms in the sixties. Initially it was another measure to prevent the 
people from leaving the countryside. Agricultural land was distributed to peasants. As 
they were not used to possessing and managing agrarian land, they sold it to the big 
landlords and moved to the city. 161 
This resulted in a significant decline in overall agricultural production. Salazar-Carrillo 
(1994) concludes, that "petroleum's fiscal contribution was not well utilised to promote 
Venezuela's economic development during this period. s162 
Governmental economic policy was merely based on the popular maxim "Hay pa' 
todo". 163 To put it in the words of Goodman et al. (1994): 
"All claims, needs, and aspirations could be accommodated without wasting 
time in sorting out trade-offs and setting priorities among mutually 
exclusive funding initiatives. " 
According to Morrisson (1994) this did not create an entrepreneurial orientation, but a 
widespread rent-seeking mentality, because each company had to negotiate individually 
with the government. 165 A manager of a company doing business in Maracaibo 
wondered if this might also be the reason why some people tend to be lazy, that is, 
because they were used to getting anything they wanted: 
"Today it changed, people no longer get electricity and gas for free, but thus 
still expect it. They pinch our electricity. Illegal power supply is common. " 
Authors like Enright, Frances, and Saavedra (1996) think that due to heavy reliance on 
governmental favours and protection, paternalism, many Venezuelan private-sector 
firms became inefficient and uncompetitive, especially in the 1990s. The domestic 
market is not a closed market anymore and thus inferior domestic products are 
purchased less than during more protectionist times. In addition, the government set 
price controls for 12 basic food products, providing an indirect subsidy to all consumers 
of these goods. Thus even the affluent received these benefits. 166 
The contribution made by petroleum exports to support economic growth in the long 
term was rather modest. The process of supporting private investment and import 
16' The idea of fast fortune will be examined to a deeper extent further on in the thesis. 162 Salazar-Carrillo, 1994, p. 221; see also Weise, 1989, pp. 179-183. 163 translation: there is enough for everything; see Kelly, 1994, p. 301. 164 Goodman et al. (1994), p. 10. 165 Morrisson, 1994, p. 94. 166 Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 343. 
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substitution was soon neglected. This can be seen by looking at the ratio of import by 
use of commodity: In 1977 32.4 percent of imports were capital goods, necessary for 
production and manufacturing. By 1984 this figure had decreased to 17.4 percent. On 
the other hand, the import of consumer goods had risen from 10.8 percent in 1977 to 
15.1 percent in 1980.167 
Venezuela became a leading importer of French perfume and champagne, Italian leather 
goods and furniture, German cars, American domestic appliances, and Scotch. 168 Hence, 
the petroleum boom led to a change in domestic priorities and pattern of consumption 
and savings, and also to a higher standard of living for all Venezuelans. What this meant 
in practical terms will be shown later. 
3.3.1.5.2 "Estc berrato, dame dos 1" 
Shopping trips to Miami became fairly common. This is one of the reasons why some 
authors (mainly North Americans) critically consider Miami as the city, that "is fast 
emerging as Latin America's capital. s169 Pan American Airlines flew from Miami to 
Caracas five times per day. This was made possible due to a very high rated Bolivar 
compared to the US-Dollar. Richer people started to spend their holidays in Florida, 
visiting Disney World. 170 The expression of estä berrato, dame dos, became a popular 
expression to describe Venezuelan consumption and buyers' behaviour. Entering a shop 
in Miami, the Venezuelan saw a nice camera for 100 US-Dollars, he did not bargain, but 
stated that the price seems to be low, 171 therefore, he would like to have two of them. 
This dicho was more than just words. It was the symbol for a philosophy: spending in 
abundance. 
According to a German manager who spend more than 25 years of his life in Venezuela, 
they had the attitude of "we can buy anything, we are the greatest. " Even coconuts were 
imported, because due to the social benefits system it was too much work to climb the 
palm trees and throw the nuts on the ground. 
167 Salazar-Carrillo, 1994, data gathered from table 10.2 on p. 243. The corresponding figures for 1997 
are 33 percent for capital goods and 22 percent for consumer goods (BfAi, 1998a, p. 2). 168 Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 245; Hillman, 1994, p. 92. Venezuela is said to have the 
highest per capita consumption of Scotch in the world. 169 see for example Moran, 1982, p. 285. 1° Weise, 1989, p. 7. 171 This was due to the high overvaluation of the Bolivar to the US-Dollar. 
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For A-level graduates it was a common practice to make Caribbean cruises as final year, 
school-leavers' trip. 
3.3.1.6 The oil's effect on the distribution of employment 
The economic expansion and the nationalisation of the oil industry in late 1975 lead to 
an increase in the state bureaucracy. It was always possible for the state to employ more 
people than were actually needed. 
This was a way of doing favours to friends and supporters of the regime of honouring 
their loyalty. It also gave rise to corruption and stealing of money. 172 
The chart on state employment in Venezuela shows the vast increase of jobs in the 
public sector over the last 40 years. It is almost unbelievable that the figure rose from a 
mere 45,000 employees in 1958 to 1,475,000 public servants by 1997. 
Venezuela: State employment, 1958-1997 
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Figure 4: Venezuela: State employment, 1958-1997. 
(data source: Izard, 1996, p. 692: IMF, 1998a, p. 71) 
172 Izard, 1996, p. 692. 
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Due to the windfall gains of oil, the state was never really forced to staff efficiently. 
Public sector managers sometimes had more than two secretaries for example. Others 
had several chauffeurs but only one car. 
This process of rapid economic development stimulated the expansion and 
differentiation of the bureaucracy, making it one of the "main avenues" for people 
striving for upward mobility. 173 
Many people started working in the secondary and tertiary sector, especially banking, 
finance, and securities, increasing the population of the cities, particularly the 
metropolis of Caracas. As they left the primary sector, they also lost the ability to being 
self-supporting in food. "' 
The following figure shows the sectoral shift in employment. 
Venezuela: Shift in sectoral empl oyment 1941-1997 
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Figure 5: Venezuela: Employment by sector, 1941-1997. 
(data source: Boeckh and Hörmann, 1992, p. 519; IMF, 1998a, p. 71) 
'73 Silva Michelena, 1967b, p. 90. 14 Izard, 1996, p. 680; Carias, 1980, p. 259; Karlsson, 1975, p. 36. speaks of an "exodus of rural 
labourers to the oil camps", temporarily resulting in labour shortages. 
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The tertiary sector, including commerce and financial institutions, transport and 
communications, and services was the main beneficiary. In 1941 only 28 per cent of the 
total employment was employed in the tertiary sector, while in 1997 this figure reached 
nearly 65 per cent. The decline of the primary sector was even more remarkable. It 
shrank from 53 per cent of employment in 1941 to 13 per cent in 1997. 
It can also be seen, that Venezuela experienced an unusual economic evolution. 
The stage in which the secondary sector grows most, scarcely occurred. 
The figures show that economy moved from the primary to tertiary, with little industrial 
development in between, as will be further evidenced. All attempts at "sowing the 
petroleum" in order to develop the secondary sector seem to have failed. 
This would explain the country's relative backwardness in terms of development, since 
"industry is often the driving force behind a country's development into a sophisticated 
economy. " 75 
It can also be concluded that the petroleum industry did not provide a large number of 
jobs (at least not directly). The exploitation and refining processes in the oil industry are 
highly sophisticated and automated, so that few new jobs are created. 
3.3.1.7 The oil's effect on internal migration 
Due to the fact that both domestic and foreign capital is being concentrated in industrial 
centres, people follow in search of work, adding population concentration to capital 
accumulation. 176 This thesis proposed by Tessa Cubitt can be verified in the case of 
Venezuela: As export crops lost their economic predominance, Venezuelan peasants 
migrated to the oil-producing areas, like Zulia, and to the cities, like Maracaibo or 
Caracas. '77 
In 1936,76 per cent of the population lived in rural areas, were illiterate, and poor. 79 
per cent were located in coastal and mountain regions. But by the mid-1970s, some 80 
percent had become literate, and lived in urban areas, one of the highest rates in the 
hemisphere. This figure had risen to 93 percent in 1996 according to CIDEIBER, and is 
"S Wells Fargo, 1999b, p. 3. 176 Cubitt, 1995, p. 152. 177 Coles, 1994, p. 194; Moll, 1994, p. 130; Allen, 1977, p. 37. 
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expected to rise to 97 percent by 2025.178 Mortimer states, that about 75 percent of the 
total population was concentrated on 20 percent of the national territory. 179 According 
to Weise (1989), 90 percent of the Venezuelan population lived in only 10 percent of 
the geographical area. 180 This seems to be a bit over the top, because our own 
calculations with data from OCEI suggest, that in 1995 60 percent of the population 
lived on 10 percent of the land, which is closer to Mortimer's figures (1990). 
The movement of the rural population to the cities did not occur in a gradual or even 
manner, but as a rapid rush to a few receiving centres: Maracaibo, but mainly Caracas, 
as it was the political capital, and the place of residence of the dominant class. 
In the late 1930s even Maracaibo was hit by this phenomenon, as the oil companies 
moved their headquarters from there to Caracas in order to be closer to the political 
power centre. 181 According to Portes (1988) this Latin American phenomenon, fast 
growing cities combined with highly unequal income distribution leads to other 
distortions like rising levels of criminality, infratructural problems, i. e. canalisation or 
traffic congestion. '82 
Many of the Venezuelans were of the opinion that geographic mobility was linked to 
upward social mobility. Thus urban areas became synonymous with the prospect of 
greater excitement, better economic conditions, and the illusive thought of gaining 
instant wealth. In contrast, rural centres were perceived as traditional, poor, and 
stagnating. ' 83 
There is still some truth in this perception today, because according to a report on 
labour conditions published by the World Bank in 1998, mean earnings in Caracas are 
twice as high as wages in rural areas. 184 Unfortunately this migration entailed negative 
side effects. The big cities especially suffer an acute shortage of housing, leading to 
squatter settlements, called barrios, encircling urban cores. 185 It was not possible to 
create so many jobs for the masses, leading to a typical profile of major Latin cities 
178 CIDEIBER, 1997b, p. 3. 179 Mortimer, 1990, ve0024/1. 180 Weise, 1989, p. 51. 
18, Karlsson, 1975, p. 41; the chapter on bureaucracy reveals some of the reasons why it is important to stay close to the geographical areas of political decision-making. ý$Z Portes, 1988. P. 1. 183 Stenzel, 1980, p. 304; Mathiason, 1967, p. 124. 184 World Bank, 1998, p. 57: Rural: 64,504 Bolivares per month; Caracas: 125,151 Bolivares per month. 185 The phenomenon of barrios will be examined to some deeper degree in a separate chapter dealing with Venezuelan society. 
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featuring low rates of unemployment together with high rates of casual or informal 
employment which often represented half or more of its total labour force. 186 
As mentioned in the chapter dealing with the historical context, the government under 
Perez tried to stop this movement by reintroducing the scheme, of sembrando el 
petröleo. It was not only an attempt to diversify the industry, but it was also an attempt 
to stop urban crowding. According to Weise (1989), the project of artificial birth of a 
city, does not solve the problems being generated by a wrong agricultural and industrial 
policy. The model city Brasilia did not cure the problem of migration in Brazil either . 
187 
In Venezuela regional corporations were set up, like the complete industrial city Ciudad 
Guayana, having both an integrated steel mill and an aluminium plant. ' as Unfortunately, 
there was a negative side to it: As these both facilities were government operated, they 
contributed a great deal to the huge state apparatus. 
The following figure shows that the pace of urbanisation in Venezuela between 1960 
and 1997 was the most rapid in the whole of Latin America. 
In 1997 95 percent of all Venezuelans lived in urban areas, followed by Chile (88 
percent), Argentina (87), and Brazil (83). It is interesting to note that the figure for 
Argentina in 1960 was already 74 percent. A reason might be that it was the first Latin 
American country that began with the process of industrialisation in the early 1900s. 
The figure also gives evidence of the fast population growth during the last 40 years. 
Starting equal with Argentina with a population of 7.5 million inhabitants, Venezuela 
had almost 23 million inhabitants in 1997 while Chile had only around 15 million. 
Especially from 1960 to 1980 the population increased dramatically, by a 100 percent. 
ß86 Portes, 1988. p. 2. $' Weise, 1989, p. 3. 188 Blutstein, 1977, pp. 2,153. 
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Latin America: Population growth and urbani sation, 1960-1997 
Total population (in Mlo. ) 
i 1"0 Iwo 1990 I"T 
F-I 
Venezuela 7.5 15.0 19.5 22.8 67 83 92 95 
Chile 7.5 11.0 13.0 14.5 68 81 86 88 
Argentina 20.5 28.0 32.5 36.0 74 83 86 87 
Brazil 72.5 121.5 148.0 163.5 45 66 76 83 
Mexico 38.0 67.5 83.0 94.0 51 63 71 75 
Latin America 207.5 344.5 421.5 474.7 49 64 72 78 
Table 1: Latin America: Population growth and urbanisation, 1960-1997. 
(source: IADB, 1991, p. 272; IADB, 1998, pp. 205-206; own calculations) 
Venezuela 7.5 15.0 19.5 22.8 
Chile 7.5 11.0 13.0 14.5 
Argentina 20.5 28.0 32.5 36.0 
Brazil 72.5 121.5 148.0 163.5 
Mexico 38.0 67.5 83.0 94.0 
Latin America 207.5 344.5 421.5 474.7 
3.3.1.8 The oil's effect on population growth 
Due to accelerating opportunities and economic expansion between 1936 and 1976, the 
Venezuelan population rose by factor four, from three million to over twelve million 
inhabitants, thus doubling the number of inhabitants every twenty years. In 1941 only 
Caracas and Maracaibo contained more than 20,000 people. 
30 years later there were fifty cities with between 20,000 and 100,000 population, 
eleven cities hosting 100,000 or more inhabitants each. ' 89 
This was partly caused by legal immigration. Because Venezuela was short of skilled 
oil-workers, oil companies imported people. "'0 But informal immigration also occurred, 
mainly of Colombians (30%), Spanish (25%), Italians, Portuguese (about 15% each), 
and some political refugees from Chile, Uruguay and Argentina. '`" Colombians 
especially were lured by higher salaries than in their home country. 192 
189 Blutstein, 1977, p. 24. 
90 Allen, 1977, p. 37. 
19' Izard, 1996, p. 690; Mortimer, 1990, ve0025/1; Carias, 1980, p. 265. 192 see Hillman, 1994, p. 10; Stewart, 1986, p. 219; Allen, 1977, p. 143; estimates range between 500,000 
and 1,000,000 indocumentados (undocumented or illegal aliens). 
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Actually, massive foreign immigration was outspokenly encouraged by Marcos Perez 
Jimenez in order to create a new Venezuela and a modernised Caracas. 193 Hence, in the 
1940s and 1950s more than two million Europeans immigrated, starting up businesses 
in construction, apparel manufacturing, furniture making, and metalworking. 194 In a 
later chapter of the thesis it will be shown, what a great impact this international 
geographic movement had on Venezuelan management and business culture. It is hard 
to find a `typical Venezuelan manager', although communalities can be identified. 
3.3.2 Industrialisation by the state 
In the early 1960s the government under President Betancourt also started to increase its 
activity in the non-petroleum industry by "sowing the petroleum". The idea was to 
create new industries in order to reduce the dependence of the economy on non- 
renewable materials, petro-dollars, and foreign manufactured goods, and to diversify 
exports, thus achieving sustainable political and economic development. 195 
The oil industry became the source of funds for rapid industrialisation, infrastructure 
investment, and a subsidiser of inefficiently working companies. Enright, Frances, and 
Saavedra (1996) state, that "a paternalistic and interventionist ethos developed as the 
state became the dominant player in the economy. "196 
As mentioned before Ciudad Guayana was created, a new industrial centre located close 
to the Orinoco at the base of the Guayana Highlands to decentralise industrial 
development away from Caracas. 
This "model industrial town" has been the most ambitious project of planned industrial 
development initiated so far by Venezuelan government, transforming the region into 
the "Ruhrgebiet of South America. "' 97 
As an autonomous development agency being responsible for this project, from 
supervising the steel plant to all aspects of stimulating and overseeing development of 
the vast Guayana region, the state-owned Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana, CVG, 
was created. 198 The first major plant, being built in 1962, in this region was Siderürgica 
193 Lombardi, 1986, p. 21. º94 Naim and Frances (1994), p. 174. 19S Coles, 1994, p. 194; Morrisson, 1994, p. 105; Ashoff, 1992, pp. 24-26; Martz and Myers, 1986, p. 74. 96 Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, pp. 2,354. 197 Ellner, 1993, p. 153; also Mortimer, 1990, ve0017/6. 198 Ellner, 1993, p. 150; Martz and Myers, 1986, p. 75; Lerner, 1967, p. 312. 
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del Orinoco, SIDOR, a CVG subsidiary. In 1967, Aluminio del Caroni, ALCASA, was 
built next to the SIDOR complex. 199 
According to a manager from the engineering and construction business who was 
responsible for setting up metalworking companies, it was almost a competition by 
state's presidents in the seventies to own the biggest steel plant. Thus when Venezuela 
was enjoying windfall gains from oil in the 1970s, they decided to realise a project that 
had been planed for a long time: to transform the existing works from one million tons 
capacity to 5 million tons. 
"This was done in seven years, according to the motto of Money does not 
play any role. It was incredible. I still have old movies from it. When flying 
into Puerto Ordaz, there were territories, that were graded. Two hundred to 
three hundred Caterpillars were driving around. It was like an ant-hill down 
there. They suddenly were all there. They were imported. That was 
excavation work. Then large-scale industry came, it was established there. 
15 billion US-Dollars were spent on infrastructure, then they started to 
expand the oil industry. , 200 
From the start the state preferred prestigious buildings, to developing a healthy 
employment sector. 201 According to Martz and Myers (1986), this trend was continued 
by Perez. Building gigantic projects, like a replica of New York's Rockefeller Centre, a 
luxurious mountaintop hotel, and the world's most expensive officers' club he tried "to 
move Venezuela into the ranks of the developed countries. ... The historic attitude of 
dependence on state economic initiatives became more deeply ingrained than ever. "202 
3.3.3 The end of paradise ?- "The lost decade" 
The region wide economic crisis in the late 1970s and 1980s led to a dramatic reversal 
in previous patterns of growth. 
This era is widely known as the lost decade, in which nearly all Latin American 
countries suffered from economic decline. Unfortunately Venezuela was hit most due to 
its mono-structured economy, heavily relying on world market raw material prices. 
According to Nolte (1999) the Inter-American Development Bank invented this 
199 Blutstein, 1977, pp. 153-154. 200 Interview with a German manager who had been responsible for constructing the Orinoco steel works. 201 Brewer-Carias, 1995, p. 169; Borcherdt, 1980, p. 236; Pachner, 1980, p. 324. 202 Martz and Myers, 1986, p. 81; Mortimer, 1990, ve0016/4. 
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expression, the lost decade, to symbolise the economic downturn in the 1980s. 
Furthermore, the 1990s they declared to be the decade of hope. 203 
Due to nearly unlimited wealth, Venezuela was used to massive petro-dollar loans, 
hoping now that an upward turn in terms of trade would help to amortize the debt in the 
near future. Because Venezuela was rated triple A (AAA) in the international bond 
market in 1977 by Standard & Poors and also by Moodys, it was easy to get loans. 204 By 
late 1982 most of the affluent Venezuelan somehow knew that a devaluation was 
inevitable, and started buying dollars from the loans and funds they received from the 
government. 205 It is not astonishing that Venezuela's total foreign debts rose above 30 
billion US$ by 1982, making it one of the most indebted less developed countries of the 
world. 206 
We have to keep in mind that in this year Venezuela was still enjoying abundant wealth. 
Therefore there is some reason to say that money was vastly wasted. The issue was, that 
government spending at least equalled the money received from oil. Even in 1974, when 
207 oil revenues tripled, government expenditures rose by a factor of three as well. 
The expectations of being able to pay back credits in the near future were not met, but a 
new oil shock of the early 1980s led to the sharpest economic downturn of the twentieth 
century for the country. Between 1981 and 1984 Venezuela's GDP per capita declined 
by 16%. 208 This was mainly caused by changes in the international petroleum scene. 
At an OPEC meeting in 1983 the member states agreed to cut production quotas, 
leading to a shortage of 6 billion US Dollars per year to finance the Sixth National Plan, 
leading to large deficits in the current account balance. 209 As the economy had relied 
heavily on oil-sector revenues to finance public spending and to stimulate demand in 
other sectors, it was vulnerable to external and internal pressures that emerged during 
the mid-1980s. 21° 
203 Nolte, 1999, p. 51. 204 In 1998 the rating was as follows: S&P (B+), Moody's (Ba2), Duff & Phelps (BB). 205 Coppedge, 1994, pp. 71-72. 206 Ameringer, 1986, p. 430; see also Weise, 1989, p. 1. 207 Coronel, 1983, p. 230. 208 Portes, 1988, p. 4. 209 Morrisson, 1994, p. 96; Martz and Myers, 1986, p. 87. 210 Salazar-Carrillo, 1994, p. 254. 
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3.3.3.1.1 RECADI times 
The current, unrealistic system containing a highly overvalued Bolivar for many 
decades could no longer be kept up. According to Moll (1994) the phenomenon of an 
overvalued currency is a typical symptom of the "Dutch disease ". 211 Due to a strong 
currency, the industry and agriculture sectors contract, because goods start to become 
too expensive in the international market. Import substitution and subsidising the 
industrial sector are attempts to strengthen the domestic economy, but lead to the 
opposite: uncompetitive products in terms of quality and price. 
On the 24th of February 1984, Venezuela had to devaluate the currency for the first time. 
This day is called Black Friday in Venezuela. Although some writers consider it to be 
the 18th of February; see for example Ellner (1993). 212 One interviewee mentioned 
sarcastically that many more Black Fridays were to come in Venezuela's future. 
In order to stabilise the tight fiscal situation, the government established a three-tiered 
exchange system. The Oficina del Regimen de Cambios Diferenciales, RECADI, was 
founded. In 1983, essential imports, like foodstuffs or medicaments, were traded Bs. 4.3 
(in 1986: 7.50) to 1 US$, nonessential imports and overseas government purchases were 
at Bs. 6 (14.50), and luxury items and foreign travel were charged at a flexible rate, 
being around 13 to 1 in 1983213 Unfortunately the crisis was made worse as a result of 
this scheme, because the government bought preferential dollars at 4.30 and sold them 
to the private sector at 6 or even higher, having a devastating effect on the foreign debt 
burden of the private companies, i. e. doubling it. 14 
According to Perez Perdomo (1994) the abuse of preferential exchange rates was one of 
the biggest corruption scandals in Venezuelan history, though the literature produced 
has failed to reflect its actual size so far. 215 Investment in Venezuela naturally decreased 
due to the complex exchange system. As a consequence, unemployment was 
unofficially estimated to be around 20 to 25 percent. 216 
211 Moll, 1994, pp. 72-75. 212 Ellner, 1993, p. 65. 213 Moll, 1994, p. 200; Martz and Myers, 1986, p. 87; Weise, 1989, p. 8, footnote 1. 214 Martz and Myers, 1986, p. 90. 215 Perez Perdomo, 1994, pp. 315-316. 216 Kulinat, 1983, p. 332; Bridges, 1986. 
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According to Coppedge (1994) "RECADI was being used to finance corruption on a 
massive scale. "217 Friends of those who controlled the assignation of dollars bought 
them at the preferential rate and "sold them on the open market at a price 100 percent or 
150 percent higher. , 218 Some companies invoiced higher bills on imports, or made 
dummy or speculative imports. 219 
"This was the greatest for a Venezuelan, who is clever, knowing how to 
make loads of money only with having to work very little. They imported 
overvalued machines, sought subsidised dollars for it, received the amount 
they overpaid back from the foreign company, and after changing the 
subsidised dollar back into Bolivars again, they gained profits of 20,30, or 
even 40 percent without having to work for it. ... That has been the best 
ever. Thousand RECADI-Dollars, that were re-imported into the country 
were worth double the original value in Bolivars.... You should not make 
such policies in Venezuela . It has been the most dangerous ever. They are 
really clever, they immediately know how to play the game. Containers full 
of sand entered the country, officially declared as machines. ... Dollars left the country for expensive goods, that never really arrived. The ones that had 
the power of distributing the dollars made most money, and that was the 
state again, because the institution belonged to the state. That was really 
crazy. It was the time where imports were done. A real boom took place, the 
ships were full, because anything was bought only to receive subsidised 
dollars for it. 
... Money left the country without end. The country nearly bled to death. s22° 
When light was shed into the scandal, 2,800 businesses were investigated, and more 
than 100 executives from leading multinational enterprises left the country in fear of 
prosecution. 221 
3.3.3.1.2 
... and again ! 
The negative trend in economic development was re-inforced by capital flight, 
intensifying the scarcity of capital and the need to devalue the Bolivar. 222 Due to 
negative real interest rates, the petro-dollars were not spend within the country, but in 
the late 1980s Venezuelan residents began to move large amounts of their domestic 
Z" Coppedge, 1994, p. 85; see also Hillman, 1994, pp. 44,50; Sonntag and Maingön, 1992, p. 64. 218 Perez Perdomo, 1990, p. 561. 219 Ashoff, 1992, p. 29. 220 Interview with a German manager who has been doing business with Venezuela for more than 25 
years. 
221 Mortimer, 1990, ve0039/1. 222 see also Austin, 1990, p. 50; Weise, 1989, p. 183; Myers and Martz, 1986, p. 442. 
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accounts to the off-shore banking system and to foreign stock exchanges. The 
following quotation serves to illustrate the consequences of capital flight: 
"Private companies and <non-oil> public entities ... borrowed capital 
from 
state-owned financial institutions to finance <foreign> investment or current 
expenditures. The financial sector and other public entities borrowed from 
abroad, thus feeding the exchange market with large amounts of dollars 
which the private sector re-exported. The outcome was $30 billion in public 
and publicly guaranteed foreign debt in 1988 and private foreign assets of 
$55 billion. s2 3 
At the end of the 1980s, Venezuela experienced another phase of economic welfare. 
The oil price rose from 14.96 US$ per barrel in 1988 to 23.81 in 1990, leading to a 
strong decrease in national production and manufacturing. 224 It seemed as if the 
Venezuelans rested on their oil laurels and, once again, missed a big chance to diversify 
the industrial base of the country in order to become less dependent upon the production 
of one mineral resource, namely petroleum and its world market price. The money 
being gained through the petroleum industry was mainly spend on satisfying increasing 
consumption, foreign debts and financing PDVSA's overseas expansion. 225 
This crazy economic behaviour climaxed in a banking crisis in 1994 and 1995.226 The 
crash had a deep impact on the real economy, because the government investigated and 
discovered that `friendly banks' had given unsecured loans to many companies, and the 
government required these loans to be repaid, causing further business failure. 227 
223 Morrisson, 1994, p. 95. 224 Salazar-Carrillo, 1994, p. 270, Table 11.8, Value Added in Manufacturing, 1986-90: Printing for 
example decreased by 81% between 1986 and 1990, textiles by 83 %, tobacco even by 93 %. 225 ibid., 1994, pp. 257-258; PDVSA started to buy into companies in Germany, North America and 
Sweden in 1986. 
226 Garcia-Herrero, 1997, p. 50. See chapter on banks further down for more details. 227 ibid., 1997, p. 65. 
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3.4 Recent developments in business and economics 
By the beginning of the 1990s markets had to open up due to international pressure 
exerted by the WTO. Venezuela stopped preventing competition via import licenses or 
foreign exchange controls. The country was allowed to import ready made products. 
Many companies immediately started doing this, because it was not feasible to produce 
in Venezuela any longer. 
This caused rising unemployment. Unofficial estimates say that hundreds of thousands 
lost their jobs. The official figures were kept small by counting subempleados as proper 
employees. These people are also called underemployed, as they only work for a couple 
of days a week, but not regularly. 
The Venezuelan government started to privatise unprofitable public companies, such as 
CANTV, the public telephone company and Viasa, the state-owned airline. 
The attempt to privatise parts of CVG failed twice, because no investor was found. The 
new (as of 1999) president Chavez is still willing to sell the majority of state-owned 
companies, such as in electricity and aluminium, except PDVSA228 
3.4.1 Foreign trade 
The composition of exports and imports is typical for mono-structured economies, that 
have reached a certain level of development. 2' Exports are mainly based on one single 
raw material and its derivatives, oil. 
In 1997, petroleum was 79 percent of all exports. Second and third largest were steel 
and aluminium, with shares of 4 and 3.3 percent. 230 Imports mainly consist of 
machinery and manufactured goods. In 1996 for example 78 percent of all imports was 
the sum of basic manufacturers (leather and skin manufacture, textiles, metal and plastic 
industry), miscellaneous manufacturing (shoes, hats, sound recording industry, optical 
equipment, arms and ammunitions, and art objects), and machinery (transportation 
equipment, construction products) 231 
228 N. N., 1999b. 
229 Weise, 1989, p. 121. 230 IMF, 1998a, p. 94, own calculations. 231 Information provided by the Consulate General of Venezuela, Houston, Texas, 1999. Access via the 
internet under: http: //www. consulvenhou. org/gimport. htm (30.03.1999) and own calculations. 
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The following figure gives some insight into the export composition of selected Latin 
American nations in 1991 and 1992. Although these figures might be a bit dated they 
are good for the purpose of comparing different countries with each other in the same 
year. 
Export composition, selected Latin American nations 
ercent of total exports 
Argentin 
(1992) 
a Brasil 
(1992) 
Chile 
(1991) 
Colombia 
(1992) 
Mexico 
(IM) 
Pem V 
(1991) 
enezuela, 
(1992) 
Food and 
Agriculture") 54.6 25.0 25.9 33.0 11.1 21.2 2.5 
Crude Materialset 9.0 13.9 23.1 6.5 3.9 24.1 0.8 
Fuels 8.9 1.7 0.5 28.5 30.0 10.0 81.3 
Chemicals 5.8 6.5 3.5 5.4 7.7 2.1 2.7 
Basic 
Manufacturersc) 11.8 29.2 37.2 12.4 11.4 35.5 10.7 
Machinery and 
Transport Equipm. 7.5 22.4 1.2 2.3 31.7 1.0 1.5 
Misc. Manufactur. 
and Other°j 2.4 1.4 8.6 12.0 4.5 6.1 0.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
At inc uses rooa, tbeverages. Animals, Animal and vegetaoiee rats, ana iooacco. 
B) Includes Hides. Oil seeds. Wood and Wood Products, Textile Fibres, Minerals, and Metal Scrap 
C) Includes Rubber Products, Paper Products, Textiles, and Metal Products. 
D) Includes Clothing, Photo Equipment, Electronics. Instruments, Toys, Etc. 
Table 2: Export composition, selected Latin American nations. 
(source: Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 36) 
It is interesting that except for Venezuela all the other countries that are being listed try 
to diversify their exports. 
As already noted Venezuela's exports are dominated by fuels. This means Venezuela's 
economy is highly dependent on the international price for crude oil, making the 
economy very volatile and unstable by the same token to other external factors, for 
instance, the US dollar rate. Other products only play a minor part. The second largest 
figure in Venezuelan exports is made up of basic manufacture, and is a meagre ii 
percent. This includes for example textiles. Indeed, Venezuela has some textile industry. 
Exports are usually made to neighbouring states, such as Colombia but also the USA. 
The reason for limited export activity in other sectors of the economy can be found in a 
highly protectionist state legislation that prevented foreign products entering the market. 
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Foreign goods can be acquired in Venezuela, but due to a high import tax, it is cheaper 
to "buy Venezuelan". 
These goods are cheaper indeed but also worse in terms of quality and they offer less 
value for money. As the few Venezuelan products that existed never had to compete 
with international products on the domestic market, they were far too simple to 
penetrate other countries. Hardly any Venezuelan company tried to do it and the ones 
232 that tried, failed. 
It is interesting to compare the export figures on machinery and transport equipment. 
Mexico is ranked first with almost 32 percent, Brazil is second with 22 percent. The 
reason lies in the existence of huge production facilities, maquiladoras, typically owned 
by foreign MNCs that mainly manufacture for the demands of international markets. 
Especially the areas around Sao Paolo and Belo Horizonte in Brazil are famous for their 
huge industrial complexes, while Tijuana (Mexico) likes to boast of being "the richest 
town in the Third World !" 
Brazil, Chile, and Peru especially managed to diversify their exports in three different 
areas. All three have almost equally high percentages in the export of food and 
agriculture on the one hand, and basic manufacturers on the other. These products are 
not as closely linked to international commodity prices as for example oil and other 
commodities. Thus these economies are not as volatile, or as subject to external 
influences as for example in Venezuela. 
232 For example Grupo Corimon, as told by the group's former chief executive officer during an interview. 
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3.4.1.1 Main trading partners 
The figure below provides some information about Venezuela's main trading partners. 
Venezuela's leading trading p artners, 1990 an d 1992/4 
Country Vonismislan Exports 
1990 1992 
United States 51.6 54.6 United States 46.7 47.1 
Dutch Antilles 0.31) 9.6 Japan 3.9 5.3 
Netherlands 3.9 4.0 ¬ Germany 9.9 5.8 
Colombia 2.1 3.6 10 Italy 4.8 3.7 1 
Germany 3.7 2.4 Brasil 4.0 3.3 
Japan 3.0 2.0 4) Colombia 2.0 4.9 
Brasil 1.9 1.9 76 ö United Kingdom 3.0 2.5 
Canada 2.6 1.1 Spain 2.2 2.22) 
Belgium-Luxembourg 1.4 0.7 Canada 2.9 3.0 
United Kingdom 0.9 0.5 France 3.5 2.7 
Ten-nation Total 71.2 80.7 Ten-nation Total 83.1 80.5 
This figure is suspect. Other sources give this figure as high as 7.2 percent. The same source as the rest of t he table 
gives 6.5 percent in 1989 and 6.1 percent in 1991. 
2) figure of 1992. 
Data Source: International trade statistics yearbook, United Nations (1992) and PROMEXPORT, Venezuela (1994). 
Table 3: Venezuela's leading trading partners, 1990-1994. 
(source: Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 37; Consulate General of Venezuela, Houston Texas) 
As it is typical for underdeveloped countries, they are heavily dependent on doing trade 
with the USA (as indeed are some developed countries, for example Canada). In 1992, 
almost 55 percent of all exports went to the United States although Venezuela used to 
do a lot of trade with Europe, especially with Spain, England, France, the Netherlands, 
and Germany in the beginning of the nineteenth century, oil shifted the importance 
towards the United States. These days, most of the Venezuelan crude gets shipped to 
North America. 
It is also interesting to note that only two countries of the ten leading trading partners of 
Venezuela are other Latin American countries: Brazil and Colombia. 
This shows that inter-Latin American trade has not been fully developed yet, although 
there exist many free trade agreements already, for example CARICOM (Guayana, 
Suriname), Mercosur (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil), or the Andean Pact 
(Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Equador, Bolivia). 
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3.4.1.2 International investment 
"We were begging like children to get the contract ! "`33 
Most of the foreign corporations went to Venezuela in the golden 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s. Money was easy to make, as the Bolivar was highly overvalued. 
These companies are still there, but tend to operate on the same level or even on a 
smaller scale. Hence, the attraction Venezuela exerted on foreign investors in the 
seventies could not be preserved until the 1990s. The country falls in the mid-field of 
the Latin American countries' priority list. Today, states like Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, 
Chile, Peru or even Colombia seem to be more interesting for foreigners. 
Latin America: Net forei gn direct investment, 1992-1998 
Argentina 4,019 3,262 2,982 4.628 4.885 6.647 5.800 32.223 
Brasil 1,924 801 2,035 3.475 9.123 18.601 22.500 58.459 
Chile 538 600 1,672 2.220 3.561 3.467 2.500 14.558 
Colombia 679 719 1,501 1,943 3,208 5,192 2,625 15,867 
Mexico 4,393 4,389 10,973 9,526 9.189 12,748 9,300 60,518 
Peru 136 670 3,083 2,048 3,242 2,030 2,070 13,279 
Venezuela 473 -514 136 686 1,676 4,611 
3,145 10,213 
Seven 
-nation 12,162 9,927 22,382 24,526 34,884 53,296 47,940 205,117 
Total 
(in Mio. USS 1 
Venezuela 
Percentage 3.9 -, 0.6 2.8 4.8 8.7 6.6 
of Total 
preliminary figures 
Table 4: Latin America: Net foreign direct investment. 1992-1998. 
(source: ECLAC, 1998, p. 96) 
The graph shows that Venezuela holds a minor stake in foreign direct investment in 
Latin America; only 6.6 percent of FDI in the six largest markets in Latin America go to 
Venezuela. The positive effects and the importance of this type of investment in the 
case of Venezuela are explained in Harrison (1996): 
?; t Interview with a German manager who used to do business in Venezuela in the 1970s. This quotation 
was taken when he talked about the rush for FDI into Venezuela during the Saudi times. 
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Joint ventures and plants with foreign equity participation tend to export more than their 
domestic counterparts, exhibit a technological edge, higher levels of total factor and 
labour productivity, and pay higher wages. Harrison's investigation (1996) did not find 
evidence that technology spills over from foreign to domestic firms in Venezuela. 
234 
The following chart shows that foreign direct investment in Venezuela in 1997 was 
limited to three sectors: petroleum (the privatisation of some marginal oil fields allowed 
private companies to explore and exploit crude oil), telecommunications, and banking. 
At least the first two were caused by privatisation initiatives. 
Distribution by sector of FDI inflows in Latin America, 1997 
PRIMAII : 
PNUFACTURES 
SERVICES 
' POWOUM f, Maquilla Telecom Banking 
Argentina xXX X XXX 
Brazil x X XXX 
Mexico X XXX X 
Chile x XXX 
Colombia x XX 
Peru x xx 
Venezuela x XX 
Central. Am. X X 
Caribbean x X X 
Figure 6: Distribution by sector of FDI inflows in Latin America, 1997. 
(source: ECLAC, 1998b, ot. 11) 
This means that state initiatives were almost the only means of drawing foreign money 
into the country. There is hardly any FDI in consumer goods, electronics, the 
automobile industry, construction, or agriculture. 
This stands in sharp contrast to other Latin American countries. In Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, capital has been invested in the private 
manufacturing sector as well. 
234 Harrison, 1996, pp. 172-173,182. 
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3.4.2 Structure of the economy 1999 - white elephants, family conglomerates and 
one-man-shows 
Government is still a leading actor in the economy, shaping industry structure and 
setting the rules in the game of business. 235 
Venezuelan industry is marked by a twofold distribution of company sizes. Either there 
are large firms (9.3 percent of all manufacturing firms), with more than 150 employees, 
generating 63 percent of manufacturing employment and 86.1 percent of manufacturing 
value added as of 1991, or there are small firms (about 66 percent) employing 10 to 50 
people, accounting for 15 percent of manufacturing employment, and 3.8 percent of 
manufacturing value added. 236 
Another significant characteristic, that runs through all levels and sizes of companies, is 
the high degree of vertical integration. It is a measure to protect companies from an 
uncertain environment, deficient infrastructure, and lack of information. Caused by a 
shortage of outside suppliers, companies are sometimes forced to be their own 
suppliers. On the sale's side, the story is pretty much the same, because distribution 
channels tend to be much longer than in the more industrialised countries. 237 
In Austin's view (1990), private and public business tends to be highly concentrated in 
developing countries due to "the scarcity of financial and management resources, 
inadequate physical and social infrastructure, deficient information, ... and institutional 
weaknesses" impeding "the functioning of economic and political markets. "238 The 
businesses are also highly concentrated in geographic terms. 
Even at the end of this millennium industry in Venezuela is still mainly located in the 
central region between Caracas and Valencia, the Region Centro-Norte-Costera, having 
the Area Metropolitana de Caracas as its centre. In 1980 for example 2.4 percent of 
Venezuela contained 37 percent of the population, 67 percent of all manufacturing and 
75 percent of all industrial workers. 239 
It is mainly consumer goods that are produced there, focussing on import substitution 
items, including textiles, leather, paper, tyres, tobacco, light engineering products, and 
modern appliance items, such as radios, television sets, and washing machines. 
235 see chapter on the history of economy; Borcherdt, 1980, p. 240, calls the state "uno de los 
empresarios mäs grandes del pals". 236 Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, pp. 13-14. 29 Berlin, 1996, p. 849; Austin, 1990, pp. 263,290; the beer industry will be examined to a deeper extent in the section about private economic groups. 238 Austin, 1990, p. 141; see also Infoamericas, 1998b, p. 1. 
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A second industrial group, oil refineries and associated petroleum plants are centred at 
Moron near Puerto Cabello and in Zulia state, Maracaibo. 
Finally, the complex of heavy industries at Ciudad Guayana and Puerto Ordaz in the 
Orinoco-Caroni region forms the third industrial group in geographic terms. 240 
3.4.2.1 State owned companies 
The industries of oil, gas, and iron ore are tied to the state by law. In fact, many others 
are in the public sector, as well, such as steel, aluminium, electric power, 
communications, airlines, mining, petrochemical, fertiliser, and milk. 241 
In the next section the two biggest public companies will be examined, namely: PDVSA 
and CVG. 
3.4.2.1.1 High vertical and horizontal integration in the oil business - The 
conglomerate called "PDVSA ": Company No. 1 in Venezuela 
Venezuela's economy is still run on oil. It is still controlled by the state-owned 
company PDVSA. The whole value chain of PDVSA seems to be vertically integrated, 
forward and backward, as will be shown in the following. In the 1980s Petröleos de 
Venezuela started to invest in foreign companies in order to secure its sales potential in 
the overseas downstream market. This scheme was called "downstream investment 
abroad" with the strategic objective of diversifying global sales, securing access to 
important foreign consumer markets, and keeping up-to-date with technological 
standards. 242 
Thus in 1983 a joint venture was established with VEBA Oil, Germany, called Ruhr Oel 
GmbH, the largest refining company in Germany, which supplies this market with oil 
products and chemicals. Three years later 50 percent of the shares were acquired from 
Nynas Petroleum, Sweden, a daughter of Axel-Johnson Refinery, which operates 
refineries in Sweden, Belgium and the United Kingdom. Additionally, PDVSA owns 50 
percent of the shares of CITGO, USA, a daughter of Southland Corporation of the USA, 
239 Borcherdt, 1980, p. 217; Kulinat, 1980, p. 243; see also chapter on patterns of settlement. 240 Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, 1999a, p. 4. 241 Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 15. 242 Weise, 1989, pp. 66,83. 
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this being the third-largest gasoline supplier in the USA, and the largest in terms of the 
number of sales outlets. 
In 1987 the same relative amount in shares was bought in Champlin-Refineries in 
Corpus Christi, USA. In 1997 Venezuela invested DM 700 million to participate in 
petroleum refinery in Schwendt, Germany, making Venezuela the most significant Latin 
American investor in Germany. 243 
In 1997 PDVSA was the largest corporation in Venezuela, contributing 78 % to all 
exports and 26 % of the GDP, generating 57 % of all fiscal revenues. It is also the 
largest supplier of oil to the United States. PDVSA is third in refining capacity and 
fourth in production capacity in the world. 244 Thus it is fair to say, that PDVSA differs 
from the average state-owned company. It seems to be a "well-run, imaginative, and 
aggressive oil company, integrated horizontally and vertically. "245 
Until 1997 PDVSA was a holding company, consisting of three separate companies: 
Corpoven, Maraven and Lagoven. 
Each of them was a fully integrated oil company whose functions included exploration, 
development, production, refining and transportation, as well as domestic distribution 
and exports. Each company had its own board and management structure, its own 
corporate identity and corporate culture. 246 PDVSA had a buffer function to absorb and 
deflect "political pressures, thus ensuring that the operating companies would remain 
performance-oriented, and that they would continue to be run in accordance with the 
soundest managerial and technocratic principles. "247 By the end of the nineties, the 
structure caused inefficiencies and gave rise to internal conflicts. 
When Roberto V. Mandini became president of PDVSA, he announced a new corporate 
structure to push forward the transformation begun in 1997. The three companies were 
broken up and merged into PDVSA. As a result of this transformation, PDVSA 
anticipated "that more advantages and substantial savings ... convert into a significant 
increase in value to the shareholder ... as an integrated corporation. s248 One outstanding 
feature was the reduced number of board members, having line responsibilities as well 
as traditional corporate responsibilities. 
243 Wiesheu, 1998, p. 7. 244 Burelli, 1997, ot. 36. 
245 Bailey, 1994, p. 392. 
246 Bottome, 1999d, p. 31. 247 ibid., 1999d, p. 32. 
248 PDVSA, 1997, p. 2-3. 
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Most of the members of the board of directors joined the company between 1975 and 
1980. Some of them hold higher degrees from North American or European 
universities. Hector Ciavaldini, for example, the new head of planning and member of 
the board, obtained a Ph. D. from the University of London in the combustion of 
hydrocarbons. But there are also two vice presidents who are active colonels in the 
Venezuelan Army. At the moment of the appointment to PDVSA one of them was in 
charge of the Armed Forces Central Hospital in Caracas. 
Mandini himself is a civil engineer, who graduated from the University Central de 
Venezuela in 1961. He joined Creole Petroleum in the same year as a civil engineer in 
the Western Division. In 1963 he received a scholarship from the Company, and 
obtained a Master's Degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of 
California at Berkeley. In 1965 he rejoined Creole, where he held technical, operational, 
and managerial responsibilities in the Western and Eastern Divisions. Once the oil 
business was nationalised, Mandini continued his career with Lagoven, the Creole 
successor, until he was named Production Co-ordinator at PDVSA in 1980. In 1981 he 
was appointed member of the Board of Lagoven, Vice-President of Meneven in 1985, 
Vice-President, then President of Corpoven in 1986, and Executive Vice-President of 
Citgo Petroleum Corporation in early 1995, holding this position up to the moment of 
being named President of PDVSA. 249 
On the other hand, many issues were emerging: PDVSA lost its entity as a buffer, 
different organisational cultures clashed, board members were "both judge and jury 
when it came to evaluating their performance. "250 
However, an impossible situation was created, because board members no longer had 
time to think about long-term policy and strategy and -in effect- they were responsible 
for evaluating their own performance. 
When Hugo Chavez took presidential office, the organisational structure and executive 
level staffing was changed once more. The functions and the operating divisions have 
been separated again. PDVSA is responsible for defining policy, setting goals and 
evaluating performance, and the operating divisions being responsible for getting the 
job done 25' 
249 more information about CVs of board members available in the internet: www. pdvsa. com. zso Bottome, 1999d, p. 33. 251 ibid., 1999b, p. 1. 
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The habit of changing posts is something that shows the relationship and the overlap 
between the state and state owned companies, and the considerable influence the 
government has on the economy. Mandini had to resign and Hector Ciavaldini was 
appointed as president of PDVSA, although he never held an executive position in the 
industry. In fact, many people that were questioned were rather worried about the 
likelihood of a process that would "politicise" PDVSA as a company. 
The following chart shows the highly vertically and horizontally integrated structure of 
PDVSA. 
PDVSA at a glance - new organisational structure 1999 
"HActor Clavaldini 
"Oswaldo Contreras Maza Board of Directors 
-Eduardo ProselJ 
, Domingo Mariscobetre 1-116ctor Clavaldini 
"Cartos JoniB President 
"Alres Barreto 
Eduardo Praselj Oswaldo Contreras Maza Domingo Marl scobetre Carlos Joni! Aires Barveto 
Vice-President General Vice-President Vice-President Vice-President Vice-President 
"PDVSA General Counsel's Offi -National and 
International . Manufacturing and Marketing ce 
"Pequiven 
Public Affairs Management 
-Internal Controllership 
Division 
"PDV Marina "Proesca 
-Chemical Developments 
rporate Loss Prevention -Co 
and Control Management -Isla 
Refinery 
"1NTEVEP "Bopec "Borco "Bariven "Deltaven -Human Resources "Interven 
*Corporate Process Analysis 
dS it H "PDV America an ecur y, ygiene, and "PDV Europe Environment Managements 
"PDVSA Services Division -Exploration and Production -Excellence Centres Division 
(Cybernetic Engineering "PDVSA Faja : Corporate Finance Coordination and Projects/ PDV IFT) "PDVSA Gas 'Corporate Strategy. Economic "Biserca "CVP Studies, New Business "Palmaven -Bitor -National Oil Promotion "CIED and SOFIP "Carbozulia -Functional Managements 
Figure 7: PDVSA at a glance - new organisational structure 1999. (data source: Bottome, 1999c, p. 30. 
In the following paragraph some of the most important organisations of PDVSA will be 
introduced. The functions of CIED (Centro Internacional de Educacion y Desarollo), a 
subsidiary of PDVSA responsible for professional development and education, 
compromise executive, professional, technical level and crafts education and training. 
These functions are carried out by its three branches: the Managerial Development 
Institute, the Institute for Professional and Technical Development, and the Industrial 
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Training Institute. The majority of the courses offered are open to other national and 
international companies, specially to those with activities related to the oil business. 52 
Another institution is INTEVEP (Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Petroleras). It 
"serves as the research and development institute for the Venezuelan petroleum and 
petrochemical industries ... to minimize the technological 
dependence of those 
industries on foreign sources. "253 Then there is Bariven, responsible for the purchase 
abroad of equipment and materials required by PDVSA and its subsidiaries. 
PDVSA manufacturing and marketing is in charge of crude refining activities and the 
manufacture of products and their marketing. It supplies the national and international 
markets, and is also responsible for the marketing of natural gas and marine 
transportation, while participating in hydrocarbons industrialisation projects. Finally, 
PDV Marina is responsible for maritime transportation activities. 54 
Employees of PDVSA are considered to be working in a secure environment, not 
having to worry about being made redundant, earning above-average wages and 
enjoying excellent fringe benefits in areas such as health, housing in company-owned 
condominiums, including clubs, and company stores or subsidised shopping malls. 55 
According to a Venezuelan manager, 
"PDVSA is not a typical example of a state-owned company. A certain level 
of pragmatism is prevalent, and it pays attention to productivity. In the 
normal state enterprises it is mainly politics that you pay attention to. " 
A German manager who has been dealing with state-owned companies in Venezuela for 
almost 30 years, comes to a similar conclusion: 
"PDVSA has never been a state company, Venezuelan style, because it has 
been inspired by American or US-trained personnel. There are Americans, 
who continued to stay in the country after nationalisation and are employed 
by PDVSA, but have more drive due to their roots, education, and 
mentality. " 
252 see also Resumen de Actividades, CIED, 1996. 
253 Coronel, 1983, p. 91. 254 Bitumenes Orinoco S. A., p. 29. 255 N. N., 1999a; Morrisson, 1994, p. 100. 
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3.4.2.1.2 CVG 
The Corporaciön Venezolana de Guayana was formerly established to co-ordinate the 
industrial development of the Guayana region. It currently includes the following 
companies in certain fields: 
Aluminium sector: ALCASA, producing primary aluminium and semi-finished 
products, VENALUM, the nation's largest aluminium producer; BAUXILUM, producer 
of bauxite256; and CARBONORCA, a producer of carbon anodes for primary 
aluminium reduction, where BAUXILUM and VENALUM are the primary 
shareholders. 257 
Iron and steel sector: Fesilven and SIDOR. The privatisation-process of SIDOR was 
completed in 1997.70 percent of the shares went to Consorcio Amazonia (Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela), covering SIDOR's debts of 640 million US$, 1,202 
million US$ went to the state. 258 
Gold-mining sector: Minerven. 
Forestry: Proforca. 
Infrastructure: Ciudad Guayana Bridge, North Bank Road between the New Bridge and 
the existing Ciudad Bolivar Angostura Bridge, and Ciudad Guayana airport. 
Energy sector: EDELCA, the nation's largest electric company, obviously supplying 
electricity to the CVG holding company. In accordance with the "Agenda Venezuela" a 
massive privatisation process began. The investment portfolio included every 
production facility in which CVG holds a major or a minor participation, except for the 
companies EDELCA and Ferrominera del Orinoco, hydroelectric generation and iron- 
ore exploitation operations, respectively. 259 Because the scheme "Agenda Venezuela" 
was began by the former president Caldera, it was stopped immediately after the newly 
elected president Hugo Chavez came to power in 1999. 
Like PDVSA, CVG is marked by a high level of vertical integration. Enright, Frances, 
and Saavedra (1996) say, that it is "integrated from iron ore to finished steel .,, 
260 Unlike 
PDVSA, although exporting as well, it is not a competitive industry. The total costs 
being caused by Venalum and Alcasa are not known to a full extent, due to hardly 
256 Bauxiven, Interahimina merged into Bauxilum in 1994. 257 Venalum: 39.43 percent; Bauxilum: 51.81 percent, CVG: 8.76 percent. 258 BfAi, 1998b, p. 3. 259 Information provided by CVG, according to: www. cvg. com (15.07.1999). 260 Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 264. 
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transparent accounting measures. It is sure that the reported losses since 1991 onwards 
only show parts of the whole story and are one of the main reasons why almost all of 
CVG's subsidiaries are on offer for privatisation. 
This financial misery might be caused by the way of staffing, as explained by a German 
manager who has dealt with public companies in Latin America for more than 20 years. 
"CVG like Corpozulia are institutions that people got pushed into, in the 
way we push people into the European Parliament. When they are not useful 
anymore, then they go to the CVG. It is stuffed with old-school ejecutivos 
and politicians, who all sit in there firmly via family, party or other ties. " 
As CVG still has a strong influence on the economy and on business in general, it is 
important to work with them together, especially if a company wants to make an 
investment into a huge project. Even though they might not be efficient, they are the 
ones who decide whether the supply, i. e. with water, electricity, or infrastructure, 
functions to your benefit or not. 
3.4.2.2 The private sector 
As mentioned earlier on, Venezuelan companies were heavily subsidised during the 
1970s and 1980s, and thus found it very hard to adjust to the uncertain world of 
international competition. Authors like Naim and Frances are convinced that 
Venezuelan private firms will have to undergo "an almost complete revamping of their 
traditional ways of doing business" in order to be competitive in a growing 
international, and global business environment. 261 This seems to be a daunting task, 
because the private sector was almost solely created by the state. 
Thus the public and the private sector are closely linked at least in some areas of 
industry and commerce. 262 
3.4.2.2.1 Grupos econömicos 
A second type of typical Venezuelan company are the large family-owned and family- 
controlled business groups. There are about fifteen of them in Venezuela who are also 
said to govern the country economy-wise. According to Blutstein (1977), the "large 
261 Goodman et al. (1994), p. 22. 262 the close relations between private enterprises and the state and its impact on doing business will be discussed later on in the chapter about bureaucracy. 
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number of family owned businesses points up the dominance of the upper class in the 
overall economic system . 
`'3 "2 
They grew during the times of a small, protected domestic market, and built the big 
industries financed by the state at the end of the 18 `h century. The conglomerates are 
marked by vertical integration and diversification in more than one sub-sector of 
industry, and in commerce and banking as well . 
264 According to Austin (1990), 
"A business group is defined as a large, multi-company association that 
operates in different markets under common financial and management 
control and maintains a relationship of long-lasting trust and co-operation 
among group members. " (p. 126) 
Business groups, being common in Asia, Latin American, and African countries as well, 
tend to be diametrically opposed to multinational companies, because they are 
"diversified in their activity but geographically concentrated, whereas MNCs are 
generally diversified geographically but concentrated in their activity. "265 
Private industrial groups 1999 
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Figure 8: Private industrial groups 1999. 
(source: Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, pp. 16,76) 
263 
Blutstein, 1977, p. 60. 264 Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 2.; Naim and Frances, 1994, p. 166; Vasconi, 1980, p. 200; 
Allen, 1977, p. 237; see chart; see also chapter on society. 265 Austin, 1990, p. 126. 
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These groups are characterised by a highly concentrated ownership, generally managed 
by one family or a small number of families. Managers were mainly recruited by the 
founder, being either direct descendants or relatives by marriage. 266 
Traditionally, they have control over sectors like beer, liquor, edible oil, textiles, 
apparel, footwear, leather, wood processing, and furniture. They are also strong in 
intermediary products such as cement, tiles, paint, construction materials, pulp and 
paper and graphics industries. 267 
According to Naim (1989), this leads to a tight network of family ties between 
managers and other influential people in all sectors of industry. 
As one can conclude from the figure shown above, the Phelps and the Cisneros (ODC - 
Organizacibn Diego Cisneros) group are both engaged in the broadcasting sector. 
Both companies own one of the leading beauty contests. The "Miss Venezuela" contest 
is shown on the "Channel of Beauty" of Venevisiön, belonging to ODC, "Chica 2001" 
is connected to Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), which is owned by the Phelps 
group. 268 As most of the Latin American beauty queens come from Venezuela, Enright, 
Frances, and Saavedra (1996) conclude that competition among private investors proves 
s269 "a powerful engine of growth for Venezuelan television broadcasting. 
Private companies are usually financed through retained earnings, capital parked in a 
foreign country, or loans from either friendly banks or their own banks. Some of them 
are listed on the Caracas Stock Exchange, such as H. L. Boulton y Cia., S. A. C. A. 
We will now take a closer look at the beer industry to give an example of vertical 
(forward) integration into wholesaling. 270 The beer market in Venezuela is practically 
monopolised by one company, Grupo Polar. This brewer shares 85 percent of a market 
that ranks eighth in world consumption per head (80 litres per year), and also distributes 
95 percent of all beer produced in the country through a highly controlled distribution 
network: 
Four manufacturing plants produce beer and forward it to eight distribution companies. 
They bring it to eighty Polar-owned warehouses, who then sell the product to two- 
266 Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 16; Naim and Frances, 1994, p. 166; Allen, 1977, p. 237. 267 Nairn and Frances, 1994, p. 168. 261 Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 55. 269 ibid., 1996, p. 71. 270 The following case study is taken from Valverde, 1992, pp. 8-9,12. 
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thousand owner drivers, who act as independent salesmen, carrying the beverage to 
111,355 retail outlets. The owner drivers are linked to the producer by long-term 
exclusive-dealer contracts. 
These represent a formidable entry barrier to new competitors, and therefore lead to 
reduced consumer choice. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to get a foothold in 
the market, by companies like Brazilian Brahma. The joint venture of Cervecera 
Regional (Organizacidn Cisneros) and Canadian Labatt Brewing Companies was 
eventually disbanded. 
Grupo Polar holds large market shares in the following industries: maize oil: 90%, 
snacks: 75%, maize flour: 67%, ice cream: 60%, malt beer: 60%, and rice: 35%, 
according to CAVENAL (1998a). 27' In the late 1980s Polar started to export its 
products to North America to enhance efficiency, making it one of the world's fifteen 
largest breweries. 72 
3.4.2.2.2 Foreign Multinational Firms 
It is very difficult for small Venezuelan businesses to grow, because financial resources 
are sometimes hard to obtain, venture capital does not exist. One way to grow, is by 
relying on foreign direct investment. Thus many international companies have either 
established subsidiaries or joint ventures with local firms. Foreign ownership may 
exceed 51 percent of the capital stock in all non-reserved sectors. 273 In spite of legal 
barriers limiting foreign ownership, dominant JVs can be found in global industries 
such as automobiles, appliances, glass, tobacco, soft drinks, consumer electronics, 
pharmaceuticals, and detergents and personal hygiene. This includes the following 
firms: General Motors, Ford, Fiat, Renault, Toyota, General Electric, Philips, Owens 
Illinois, Guardian, Phillip Morris, American Tobacco, Pepsi-Cola, Coca-Cola, Sony, 
Philips, Matsushita, Procter and Gamble, Colgate-Palmolive, Nabisco, Nestle, Kraft, 
Heinz, Del Monte, Ralston-Purina, and Cargill. Services like radio broadcasting and 
television, newspapers and magazines in Spanish, and professional, consulting, and 
advisory services are reserved for nationals. "Foreign investors are limited to supplying 
271 CAVENAL, 1998x, p. 11. 272 Mortimer, 1990, ve0055/2. 273 Price Waterhouse, 1997, p. 31. 
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technology to the Venezuelan companies operating in these areas. s274 All the big 
international auditing companies, banks and insurance companies have subsidiaries 
there, e. g. Citibank, PricewaterhouseCoopers, or KPMG. 
3.4.2.2.3 Small businesses and informal sector producers 
The second group is defined as small enterprises, such as street vendors, tailors, 
shoemakers, repairmen, light manufacturers, that are operated by individuals or families 
and are not legally constituted, forming an integral part of the economy. 275 Sometimes 
they are used as subcontractors by the formal sector, e. g. as a supplier for the 
automotive industry. 
Another group is made up of small businesses. Some of them are little factories with 20 
to 30 employees. As companies are often forced to buy raw materials or tools from 
abroad, they tend to have a bank account in Miami or Curacao to be able to make 
necessary imports. It is also a means to secure the stability of their assets. Parts of the 
business process take place in Miami: Payment, shipping, export, and import. 
Another interesting fact is, that almost everyone who does small scale business tends to 
have more than one company or at least owns titles in other firms, being gerente 
general of company X and gerente de ventas of company Y at the same time. 
It probably serves as a means to minimise the risk of loosing everything if one only has 
one company to fall back on. 
3.4.3 Strengths - What are they good at ? 
"To be honest, in nothing, really. s276 
Although the process of real industrialisation has never taken place in Venezuela, 
because of the windfall gains of oil, there are still some industries, in which Venezuela 
has the chance of developing some strength and excellence. 
The following chart provides a good summary of those industries, that do have 
competitive advantages. It also shows, where these bonuses come from. It is obvious, 
that the reliance on inherited factors is dominant, while other sources of advantages like 
274 Price Waterhouse, 1997, p. 6. 275 Austin, 1990, p. 135. 276 This answer was frequently given by Venezuelan managers in Venezuela, when asked, what they 
think Venezuelans are good at. 
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created factors, demand conditions, related and supporting industry, firm strategy and 
structure, or rivalry, have been neglected to a great extent. According to Austin (1990), 
this is a LDC phenomenon. 
Usually, these countries tend to rely more heavily on natural resources than developed 
states. " This again serves as a great disadvantage, because the nation's ability to ` 
develop the human, knowledge, and capital resources vital to improve economy's 
productivity seems to be limited. The country's economy is also dependent on external 
factors, principally the world prices for commodity goods. 
Sources of advantages in Venezuelan industry 
Industry Inherited Created Demand Related & Firm Strategy Rivalry 
Factors Factors Conditions Supporting & Structure 
Industry 
Rehani 
Oil +++ ++ 
Petrochemicals +++ + 
Steel +++ + 
Aluminium +++ 
Agriculture 
Rice + 
Cocoa ++ 
Pulp, Paper +++ 
Import Substitution 
Textiles 
Autos & Auto Parts 
Services 
Tourism ++ 
Talent-based 
Engineering + ++ ++ 
Software + 
Telenovelas ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Table 5: Sources of advantages in Venezuelan industry. 
(source: Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 173) 
Compared to the pattern of Swiss businesses, there a big differences. Switzerland, like 
Germany, is a country, that does not have any significant amounts of natural resources 
and raw materials. Therefore, they always had to built their export base upon human 
resources rather than natural endowments. 
It is also worth mentioning, that the Swiss market itself is rather small and not 
interesting in terms of sales. It has also achieved a degree of de facto protection (high 
entry barriers arising naturally) through its decentralisation (Lawrence and Edwards, 
277 Austin, 1990, p. 42. 
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2000). Swiss companies soon noticed, that they can only be successful if they are 
competitive in global terms and if they see the world as their "home" market (e. g. 
Nestle, Swatch, Ciba Geigy). 
It seems also, as if a high level of rivalry in the domestic market stimulates growth, 
expansion and inventiveness (watches, pharmaceuticals). This again leads to a high 
level of state-of-the-art industrialisation and economic development. 
L- 
Dyes 
Pharmaceuticals 
Watches 
Textile Machinery 
Banking 
Trading 
Chocolate 
internationally successful Swiss industries 
nherited Created Demand Related & Firm Strategy Rivalry! 
Factors Factors Conditions Supporting & Structure 
Industry 
++ + ++ + 
+++ + ++ ++ ++ 
+++ ++ + ++ + 
++ + + + + 
++ ++ + ++ ++ 
++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
++ + + ++ + 
Table 6: Sources of advantages in selected internationally successful Swiss industries. 
(source: Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 177; Bonner, Porter, Weder, and Enright, 1991) 
Venezuelan companies never had to be efficient and competitive due to import 
substitution. Thus, if one is not competitive in the domestic market, it is impossible to 
be competitive globally. 
Enright, Frances, and Saveedra (1996) identify clusters of competitive industries. 
A cluster consists of buyer, supplier, and related industries. It is important because 
national industries and economies tend to grow through their development. 
A good example is the German automotive industry, consisting of a large number of 
successful car manufacturers, a vast number of suppliers of automotive parts, and a 
highly competitive domestic market. 
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Venezuela has only a few clusters of competitive industries. 78 One of them, is the mass 
media entertainment cluster. Related industries are fashion, modelling, beauty pageants, 
TV and commercial production, advertising (including agencies, such as J. Walter 
Thompson and Saatchi & Saatchi), broadcasting, telenovelas, and music. 
Some clusters can be identified in technology. According to Austin (1990), there are 
three aspects in LDCs that stand out: "The technological level is low, technological 
development is concentrated, and technological sources are foreign. s279 It is quite true 
for Venezuelan industry. Although the steel industry cannot be called competitive on 
the whole, there are some areas, where Venezuela has advantages compared to other 
countries. It is the world's leading producer of DRI - direct reduced iron (direct 
reduction is an iron making process, which utilizes natural gas to reduce iron ore to 
produce Direct Reduced Iron, DRI). 280 
Another competitive cluster, of course, can be identified in the sector of petroleum and 
petrochemicals. 
3.4.4 Weaknesses 
3.4.4.1 Manufacturing 
In the 19`h century up to the Second World War, manufacturing activities were very 
limited because the demand for manufactured goods was low. In 1920, for instance, 
about 70 percent of the population had negligible purchasing power for manufactured or 
foreign-made products. 281 The necessary goods were by and large handcrafted by local 
artisans. In 1910, only very small factories existed in the following fields: a textile mill 
in Valencia, two breweries in Caracas and Maracaibo, a Caracas match factory, and a 
couple of cigarette and cigar factories in Caracas. It clearly shows, that Caracas 
dominated from the beginning. These branches of industry grew slowly until the 
1940s. 282 Due to the establishment of large oil refineries and war-related import 
restrictions, an industrial expansion occurred between 1948 and 1958, being focussed 
on the domestic market. By adopting a large import substitution programme at the 
278 Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 262. 279 Austin, 1990, p. 56. 280 Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, pp. 126,131-132. 28' Karlsson, 1975, p. 59. 
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beginning of the 1960s due to the performance of petroleum, the food and textiles 
industries increased their shares of the manufacturing output again. 283 
It is important to know, that in these branches of industry, the level of market power 
concentration is very high. For example, Cervecerf a Nacional was established in 1925, 
dominating the country's beer production for several years. When Cerveceria Polar was 
founded in 1941, pushing successfully into the market, the two companies managed to 
dominate the malt beverages' industry (each of them held 45% of the market sales) as a 
duopoly from the mid-1950s on. 284 The main factories were based in Caracas and 
Barcelona (city in Venezuela, east of Caracas). 
The capital goods industry and the whole supplier industry have still not matured. This 
poses problems for guaranteeing a smooth workflow. As a manager of a machinery 
business declared, 
"everything needs to be imported more or less. It starts with really basic 
things. ... Screws are sometimes not available in the quality we need and have to be imported. " 
One reason for it, according to Borchert (1980) is that a strong manufacturing industry 
needs powerful purchasers at the outset 285 Venezuela might be 2 and a half times the 
size of Germany, but it only has a quarter of the population, mainly people who live 
close to the poverty line, thus not forming a target for producers. 
Another reason might be that Venezuela still concentrates on oil, while secondary 
industries are neglected. 
3.4.4.2 Monetary system 
3.4.4.2.1 Banks 
In 1993 there were 50 commercial banks with about 2.000 branches; by 1997 there were 
30 with 1,116 branches throughout the country. The number of finance companies 
(leasing firms) went down from 47 (36) to 15 (12) in the same period, while universal 
banks rose from zero to 10.286 By Venezuelan law these banks are "authorised to carry 
282 According to Moll, 1994, p. 125, a manufacturing industry was practically non-existent. 283 Martz and Myers, 1986, p. 73; Karlsson, 1975, pp. 60-69. 284 Karlsson, 1975, p. 164. 285 Borcherdt, 1980, p. 219. 286 IMF, 1998a, p. 81; according to Schmid, 1999b, p. 4, they are Banco Provincial, Venezuela, 
Mercantil, Caroni, Banesco, Orinoco, Republica, InterBank, Exterior, Fivinez, and Citibank. 
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out simultaneously any operation otherwise reserved to a specific type of financial 
institution. s287 These changes in the structure of the banking system occurred as the 
result of a financial sector reform programme in 1994 and 1995 strengthening bank 
regulation and supervision after the banking sector had collapsed. 
It all began early in the 1970s, when Venezuelan banks started to expand into foreign 
countries made possible due to huge oil profits. 
This made it easier and actually encouraged people to park revenues in foreign accounts 
and to move savings abroad. 288 Capital flight was considered an effective measure to 
avoid the risk of loosing money due to inflation. Foreign ventures also facilitated 
placing government funds in foreign markets as well. They were considered to be less 
risky, politically and economically. 
This lead to a large and non-supervised off-shore banking system, as well as a 
substantial share of off-balance sheet operations in the domestic banking system. It was 
saddled with problems, such as very high levels of insider lending and loan 
concentration. Insiders who knew the true conditions of the banks were given hints to 
withdraw their funds ahead of a possible government intervention, still receiving 30 to 
40 percent interest rates. At this point in time, the banking system was composed of a 
large number of specialised banks, belonging to financial groups. They were owned by 
a few individuals, because of the allowances made by the legal framework in place at 
the time. Some of the banks were also considered to be the house-banks for industrial 
groups, engaging in questionable activities such as "making loans to affiliated 
companies or individuals without proper guarantees or credit analysis, accounting 
gimmicks, manipulating loans in order to gain control of client companies, and failing 
to acknowledge and to reserve for non-performing loans. s289 
The oligopolistic structure of the banking system contributed to reducing the power of 
the supervisory authorities by publishing faked data. To put it simply: They were 
outside the control of the Superintendence of Banks. 290 
Due to lack of supervision, this fraud continued for several years, making this incredible 
banking crisis possible. Other Latin American countries like Argentina or Brazil had to 
cope with the same problem as well, and were even more affected than Venezuela. 
287 Price Waterhouse, 1997, p. 37. 288 Garcia-Herrero, 1997, p. 11. 289 Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 229; see also Schaeffler, 1996, pp. 249-250. 290 Garcia-Herrero, 1997, pp. 51,55. 
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But in Venezuela, because the monetary authorities, i. e. the central bank, provided 
liquidity to the banks without any condition, nor thoroughly assessing the banks' true 
financial situation or changing the management, the issue became even worse. 291 
The crash began, when second largest bank in terms of deposits, Banco Latino, crashed 
in January 1994. The government nationalised it in April that year. Only two months 
later another eight financial institutions were closed (e. g. Banco de Venezuela, the third 
largest), making up 40 percent of total deposits. 292 
By the end of 1994 several other banks were converted from private to government 
ownership or shut down, transferring their deposits, including off-balance sheet 
deposits, to the banks nationalised during the crisis. 293 The changes can be seen in the 
following figure. 
Structure of the banking system, 1993-1996 
Private banks ") 90.2 Private banks 58.4 Private banks 58.9 
Public national banks 3.1 Public national banks 4.4 Public national banks 5.6 
Foreign banks 0.7 Foreign banks 1.7 Foreign banks 2.0 
Regional (public) 6.0 Regional banks 7.6 Regional banks 3) 9.4 
banks Intervened banks') 19.5 Nationalised banks 23.1 
Closed banks 1)2) 8.4 Intervened banks 4) 0.5 
Closed banks 4) 0.5 
the 6 largest banks held 52%. 
Perct of total bank deposits) 
1) It refers to the amount of deposits that these banks held just before being investigated by the 
government or closed. 
2) Although only Banco Progreso was closed before end-1994, this amount reflects the deposits of 
all banks closed between December 1994 and January 1995. 
3) Some of the regional banks were privatised between December 1993 and September 1995. 
4) It refers to the remaining deposits in the balance sheets of the banks that were investigated or 
closed. 
Table 7: Venezuela: Structure of the banking system, 1993-1996. 
(source: Garcia-Herrero, 1997, p. 67) 
In 1996 a macroeconomic programme was announced, because the banking sector was 
still affected by the crisis. It aimed at strengthening supervision and regulation, re- 
privatising nationalised banks, and strengthening the capital base of private banks. 294 
291 ibid., 1997, pp. 12,15. 
292 Fernandez Riva, 1994, p. 93; Casas-Gonzalez, 1997, p. 1. 293 Garcia-Herrero, 1997, p. 62. 294 
IMF, 1998a, p. 19. 
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Under the supervision of FOGADE (national, public Guarantee Fund for Deposits and 
Bank Protection), Banco Venezuela was bought by Banco Santander of Spain and 
Banco Consolidado by INFISA of Chile, stimulating international competition, this 
being the "best guarantee for an efficient and healthy banking system. "295 
Foreign Banks have a market-share of 46% in Venezuela, this being the highest of all 
the Latin American countries. Brazil: 20%, Mexico: 18%, and Colombia: 29%. The 
percentage in Venezuela is impressive, if one considers the fact that foreign banking 
was at 5 percent in November 1996. According to Sandoval (1997, p. 28) other banks 
hold minor stakes in local entities, Spanish Bilbao Vizcaya bank has 40 percent in 
Banco Provincial. Furthermore, foreign banking institutions deliver expertise to the 
local market that may not have existed before, and they bring the financial strength of 
the parent institution. 296 
According to Bottome (1999a), there is no possibility that the crisis from 1994 and 1995 
will be repeated, because regulation has become better, banks have been better managed 
and capitalised. A big problem especially for small and medium-sized companies, 
however, are the high interest rates, being at around 50 (fifty !) percent. 297 
3.4.4.2.2 Capital markets and currency 
In 1969 0.3 percent of the country's corporations had more than 50 shareholders, 94 
percent had 6 shareholders or fewer. 298 This phenomenon was strengthened by the 
petroleum boom in 1974 and 1975, bringing excess liquidity into the monetary system, 
being held mainly by a few large financial institutions. The majority of new investors, 
businessmen and professionals, came from the same group of people that already 
dominated the country. 299 
As can be concluded in the chart below the Venezuelan stock market is relatively 
underdeveloped compared to the stock exchange in Buenos Aires, Brazil, Chile, or 
Mexico. Its market capitalisation can better be compared with countries such as 
Colombia, or to a lesser degree, Peru. 
295 Casas-Gonzalez, 1997, p. 2; see also BfAi, 1998b, p. 6. 296 Gavin and Hausmann, 1997, p. 27. 297 Bottome, 1999a, pp. 11-12. 298 Blutstein, 1977, p. 123. 299 ibid., 1977, p. 124. 
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Stock markets, selected Latin American nations 
Argentin a 
Number of listed 
companies 
1992 175 1.158 245 80 195 287 66 
Market Capitalization 
(million US$) 
1992 18,633 45,261 29,644 5,681 139,061 2,630 7,600 
Market Capitalization 
/ GDP 
1992 0.08 0.11 0.76 0.14 0.42 0.08 0.15 
% of LA. Market 
Capitalization 
1992 9 18 12 2 57 1 3 
Trading Values 
(million US$) 
1992 15,679 20,525 22,029 554 44,582 398 2,631 
Source: IFC (1993), IMF Financial Statistics 
Table 8: Stock markets, selected Latin American nations. 
(source: Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 232) 
The listed companies include many of the largest private sector corporations, creating 
relatively narrow, thin, and risky financial markets. Only a few Venezuelan companies 
had access to international capital. In 1992 for example only 66 companies were listed. 
What is needed to attract more long-term national and international private investment 
are lower interest rates, deeper equity markets, banking reform and better supervision. 
Enright, Frances, and Saavedra (1996) state that "informal reports from experts have 
indicated that two people working together could probably manipulate a single stock 
and that three people ... could move the whole market . 
"3oo 
30° Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 233, but see also pp. 93 and 228. 
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Figure 9: Venezuela: Exchange rate, 1940-1999. 
(data source: DBLA, 1999, p. 137; IADB, 1998, p. 248; BP, 1997, p. 14; Hillmann, 1994, pp. 49-50; BCV data) 
This chart summarises the developments of the exchange rate, the inflation rate and the 
crude oil price in Venezuela. Although the devaluation of the Bolivar happens rapidly, it 
is widely believed by economic analysts that the Venezuelan currency is overvalued by 
50 percent. 301 
3.4.4.3 Physical infrastructure 
Infrastructure can be subdivided into two parts: Physical and informational. 
The deficient situation of the latter was mentioned earlier on. The section will largely 
deal with the physical one, as this poses a major constraint to economic and societal 
development. 
3.4.4.3.1 Unevenly developed: Industrial hot-spots versus rural areas 
Highly attractive zones, including Caracas, the country's commercial, bureaucratic, and 
service centre, the adjacent north central states, a flourishing manufacturing and 
301 Interviews with managers of banks, economic advisers, and consultants. 
The structure of Venezuelan economy 84 
industrial area, the central-western states as Portuguesa and Barinas, which are centres 
of animal farming, and Zulia, which is the hot spot for petroleum extraction30. enjoy an 
infrastructure that is relatively good, compared to other Latin American countries. Some 
people even say, it is the best in the whole of South America. 303 Despite this, it is still 
not good enough to serve as a true competitive advantage for Venezuelan industry. In 
Caracas for example the motorways are piled up three to four layers, making it 
impossible for a foreigner to find his way without getting lost. One interviewee called it 
"the biggest car park of the country, ... the only one. 
" 
As the main cities are linked by the sea, they all possess harbours. 04 This always 
inhibited the establishment of an effective train network. 305 The transport of goods was 
always conveniently managed by boat. Another reason, why the train has never played 
an important role may be found in the high level of Americanisation in business life and 
in society. 
The Venezuelans value cars most; using public transport, such as trains, would 
constrain their sense of freedom - to go where you want, when you want, enjoying a 
high level of privacy, status, and independence at the same time. 
On the other hand, one supplier of training materials for schools, universities and 
companies, mentioned, that it is useful to hire a jeep in order to reach all institutions and 
firms that are located outside the main centres, since most of the roads in the 
countryside are unsurfaced. 306 
3.4.4.3.2 Roads 
Most of the network of roads existing today originate from the Perez Jimenez era and 
the boom years of the 1950s to the 1970s, but the network is in a fairly bad condition 
due to poor maintenance. 307 This was also asserted by several interviewees; for 
example, as one technical project manager of a construction company observed, 
"the matrimiento is just missing. ... They only build new things, 
but 
afterwards they led it go to seed. " 
302 Blutstein, 1977, p. 56. 303 interviews with Venezuelans, but also Schmid, 1999b, p. 9. 304 see chapter on settlement patterns earlier on. Nothing much seems to have changed since the times of 
colonialism. The cities that were important then, are still important in terms of business. 
306 
see also Weise, 1989, p. 47. In Venezuela only 275 miles of railway tracks exist. 306 Interview with manager of multinational company doing business in Venezuela. 307 Enright, Francis, and Saavedra, 1996, pp. 189-190,324; Coles, 1994, p. 195. 
The structure of Venezuelan economy 85 
In the mid 1970s 29,000 miles of roads of all kinds existed, including 12,000 miles that 
are paved. 08 In 1996,53,000 miles of highways were there, 21,000 miles of them were 
paved. 309 The most important bit is the "Carretera Transandina", the Venezuelan part of 
the "Carretera Interamericana". And indeed, the Venezuelan road network is considered 
to be the best one on the continent. 310 But, while total kilometres of road service have 
grown by 83 percent between 1965 and 1996, the number of private automobiles rose 
by almost 250 percent, resulting in heavier traffic flows, accidents, and time lost. 311 
Before Chavez seized power, a so called dia deparada existed. According to the last 
figure on your number plate, one is not allowed to use the car in the city between 6 
o'clock in the morning and 8 o'clock in the evening once a week. It works like this: I 
and 6 are not allowed to drive on Mondays, 2 and 7 are not allowed on Tuesdays, 3 and 
8 on Wednesdays, 4 and 9 on Thursdays, 5 and 0 on Fridays. 
Theoretically one gets rid of 20 percent of all cars during workdays. In fact the 
consequence is slightly different, the affluent have two cars with complementary 
number plates, thus drive every day. The other people who can not afford to own two 
cars still need to go to work, and they have to leave home before six o'clock to 
commute to their workplace, and have to stay there until eight o'clock till they are 
allowed to use their cars again 312 
3.4.4.3.3 Planes 
Venezuela's only international carrier is the ex-government owned airline Venezuelan 
International Airways, VIASA. Another public one, AEROPOSTAL, provides local air 
service. Privately owned AVENSA provides scheduled domestic service to 24 
commercial airports covering high-traffic routes between the major cities. 313 It might 
sound unbelievable, but 497 airports exist in Venezuela. More than 400 are private 
ones, being used by companies to transfer their executives. The three main airports, 
Maiquetia in La Guaira, 40 minutes away from Caracas, if there is no traffic congestion, 
308 Blutstein, 1977, p. 130. 309 World Factbook, 1999, p. 7. 310 Allen, 1977, p. 233. 31 Kelly, 1994, p. 294, and own calculations. 312 This paragraph is based on an interview with a manager of a forwarding agency. 313 Blutstein, 1977, p. 131-132. 
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Grano de Oro in Maracaibo, and Porlamar in Margarita channel more than 90 percent of 
total passengers and international cargo. 314 
It should also be mentioned that the aircrafts originate from the 1970s. 
The author acquired the habit of checking the age of the air-planes when entering the 
cabin and most of the times they dated from 1968 to 1976. The real hassle starts while 
checking in at the airports. No matter where it is in Venezuela, nearly all fluid display 
departure boards are out of order. The gates always change five minutes before 
departure, so that all passengers are running around trying to find the right gate. Delays 
of more than two hours are common. Once landed it is tricky to identify the conveyer 
belt that hopefully carries the luggage, because -again- the electronic information 
device was malfunctioning. 
Surprisingly enough, it all works in the end; all planes take off and land safely, the 
luggage is found. It is just not as relaxing as Europeans might be used to it. 
3.4.4.3.4 Business travel 
When asking expatriates what they suggest as the best means of business travelling, 
they tended to favour planes because of long distances and for safety reasons. 
Going by car is considered to be "too dangerous. If you have a breakdown, you might 
be mugged. No, I would not recommend it", was a common reply. Furthermore, 
Venezuelans have a different attitude towards traffic behaviour: 
"Do not start right away if the red light turns to green. Take your time and 
you better wait to make sure that no comes from another direction. Really 
strange accidents happen there. This gets worse at the weekend. "315 
The German rule of right before left does not really mean a lot in Venezuela. The only 
rule that seems to work is: The bigger the car, the more priority. They also tend not to 
stay in their lanes, as people in England do. 
One Venezuelan manager said that there are many regulations in Germany that do not 
really make much sense to him. The one thing he does appreciate is the fact, that one 
does not always have to put effort in anticipating what the cars driving around you 
might do next. 
314 CIDEIBER, 1997a, p. 3. 315 Interview with an expatriate manager from Argentina working in sales a German MNC. 
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One interviewee reported the following story. It is retold here in order to give the reader 
a flavour of the problems that might arise when travelling by taxi. 
"I had to go back from Maracay to Caracas. ... The manager of our 
subsidiary ordered a taxi for me. It was a taxi, such a taxi I had never seen 
before in my entire life, not even in Cuba. It really was a total nuisance. You 
could look through the closed door into the interior of the car and through to 
the road. I acquired the habit of sitting in the back on the right hand side, I 
never sit in the front, and when I entered, I had a look at the wheel, without 
hub cap of course, and I saw that one of the bolts was missing. The journey 
started, and the driver opened the throttle. I had to calm him down. ... The distance from Maracay to Caracas is 100 to 120 kilometres, 60 of them are 
through the mountains before Caracas. We were approaching the hills, and 
the motorway does big turns, and in between these 4 to 6 lanes there is a 
concrete wall one metre high, and I started to notice that when the car was 
supposed to turn to the left, it worked. But when it was supposed to turn to 
the right, the driver had to turn the steering wheel twice, before anything 
happened. There was no cooling inside. Thus during the entire journey I sat 
in the car and was afraid of being blown out of the car. Anyway, two hours 
later we arrived in Caracas, and I entered the hotel. The seats of the car were 
made of black imitation leather, and I noticed that the people in Reception 
were staring at me astonished. It was in the Gran Dia in Caracas, it is six 
stars. I took off my shirt, and noticed, that it was coal-black. I really had to 
throw it away. I have been in many countries, but I have never experienced 
such a taxi ride before. "316 
This testimony also shows that Venezuela has no institution that is responsible for 
making sure that all cars fulfil a certain technical standard, like the German TÜV or the 
MOT tests in Britain. 
3.4.4.3.5 Electricity and water 
Water supply is a serious problem. There is a small canalisation system in Caracas, but 
although it works occasionally, it is hopelessly overloaded. Especially people from the 
lower classes have to fight against infectious diseases. 
In order to build a proper system, that is financed by revenues, one has to seal the pipes 
first of all, so no one can draw off water anymore. According to unofficial estimations, 
eighty percent of the water is "lost", fuga ! 
316 Interview with a German logistics manager of a German global forwarding company. 
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3.4.4.3.6 Telecommunications 
In 1991 CANTV, the 100 percent state-owned telecommunications monopoly, was 
privatised: 40 percent of the shares were sold to a consortium of private investors being 
led by GTE, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation. 
The consortium: 51% GTE, 6% Telefönica de Espana, 6% La Electricidad de Caracas, 
12% LIMA, and 5% AT&T International. CANTV had to be privatised because it was 
one of the most inefficient of government enterprises (in terms of management, 
maintenance, service, and profit) satisfying only 60 percent of national telephone 
demand in the late 1980s. Thus the use of motorcycle mail carriers was common. 317 
The state continued to hold a big stake in the company: 49 percent. In 1999, the 
government privatised another 35 percent. As per 31s` of May 1999, the shareholders' 
composition was as follows: 40 percent of the shares are owned by Venworld Telecom 
C. A., 37 percent belong to public shareholders, 15 percent are held by employee trusts 
and employees, 5 percent belong to FIV, and 3 percent remain with GTE. 318 In the first 
two years of privatisation more money was invested than had ever been pumped into 
319 telecommunications under state control. 
Although the traditional way of making phone calls seems to be underdeveloped, the 
sector of mobile phones seems to be highly sophisticated. Mobile phones are considered 
as standard instruments in Venezuela. More than ten years ago, restaurants started to 
establish receptions for portable phones, because visitors were disturbed by the 
constantly high number of incoming telephone calls. Thus whenever a phone rang, 
people were asked to step out to answer the call. 
3.4.4.4 Informational infrastructure 
3.4.4.4.1 Postal service 
It seems as if Ipostel, the public service, is unreliable, slow and inefficient. 
Whenever documents are posted, it is a normal thing for the sender to choose private 
delivery companies or courier services. 320 The German Chamber of Commerce in 
317 see Mortimer, 1990, ve0059/1. 318 CANTV, 1999, www. cantv. com (15.07.1999). 319 Genova, 1998, ot. 17; Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 194. 320 The author made this experience, whenever he got information from Venezuelan companies or 
institutions; see also in Dydynski, 1998, pp. 59-60. 
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Caracas for example helps German companies to find Venezuelan sales representatives. 
Therefore they need information material about the German company to find a suitable 
partner. The Chamber advises companies to send information brochures weighing not 
more than 2 kilograms and to send them airmail, because the normal might take several 
months, if it arrives at all 321 
This obviously enhances the establishment of an informal communication network. 322 It 
also helps if problems occur in day-to-day business. If there is an issue to solve, 
business people normally do not write a letter. They would rather pick up the cellular 
phone and call a person they know in order to get things done. 
3.4.4.4.2 Sources of business information 
The lack of reliable information is still perceived as an issue in doing business 
effectively. So that the only way of guaranteeing a more or less reliable business 
environment is to count on trustworthy personal relationships with clients and 
competitors. 323 This is an important thing to know for foreigners interested in doing 
business in Venezuela. In order to get a foothold in the market, one has to be part of the 
game. 
3.4.4.5 Problems facing the economy 
Notwithstanding the unanimous desire of Venezuelan leaders for the past six decades to 
sembrar el petrdleo, the inability to transform and diversify the economy has 
remained. 324 Some other authors say that the scheme of sowing the petroleum even 
widened the gap between rural and urban regions, achieving the opposite of what was 
intended. 325 
Oil is still by far the driving force of the Venezuelan economy, having enormous 
significance for the economic structure. 326 
321 CAVENAL, 1999, p. 2. 322 see also Kulinat, 1980, p. 254. 323 see Perez Perdomo, 1990, p. 559. 324 see also Schmid, 1999b, p. 4; Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, pp. 7-8; Salazar-Carillo, 1994, pp. 
126-137, Marts, 1986, p. 244; Myers and Martz, 1986, p. 438; Borcherdt, 1980, p. 236. 325 see for example Kulinat, 1980, pp. 243,255-256. 326 Majella Bastidas, 1998, p. 20. 
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The words spoken of President Betancourt in 1961, indicate what Venezuela needs to 
do, but still has not achieved: 
"We must dispel the happy theory that the oil derricks are producing an 
inexhaustible quantity of dollars and bolivares. The truth is that we are 
spending the proceeds of unrenewable, perishable wealth, and that we must 
spend it well, taking advantage of the extraordinary current situation of 
Venezuela to establish solid and durable bases for the Venezuelan 
nation. "327 
It could be shown that import substitution was not the right way to foster domestic 
business growth. In fact it harmed the natural evolution of industry more than it helped 
it. 
The lack of competition from foreign firms led to unprofitable, ineffective, and 
uncompetitive companies, neglecting the development of new products and 
workforce. 328 They never had to be better than international rival products, because the 
public sector tried to help them develop. This had a laming, sometimes disastrous effect 
on the business. 329 Thus it is now even harder for the country to focus on what the 
global market requires. 
3.4.5 Opportunities - Areas of growth 
3.4.5.1 Tourism 
Blutstein has stated (1977) that the principal tourist centre is Margarita Island. Nothing 
much has changed since then. It still is the most attractive place to go during holidays. 
Venezuela will have to provide first-class services, infrastructure and a well-organised 
management in order to attract more tourists in the future. What will be hardest, will be 
to acquire "commitment throughout the sector to mastering the service ethic. "330 The 
remaining issues of security in large cities and Isla Margarita, and of offering services at 
reasonable prices also need to be addressed. 331 
327 Betancourt, 1961, p. 404, as quoted in Marts, 1986, p. 246. 328 Enright, Francis, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 2; Naim and Francis, 1994, p. 166. 329 Naim and Francis, 1994, p. 190. 330 Enright, Francis, and Saavedra, 1996, pp. 95,98. 331 BfAi, 1998b, p. 4. 
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Another issue is the problem of pollution in the whole of Latin America. Only clean 
beaches will attract tourism. According to an interviewee who took weekends off to 
enjoy the seaside near Caracas and the beaches of Isla Margarita: 
"I did not enter the water, because I was scared that my flesh might fall off 
my bones. ... When I went for my first walk near the seashore, the beach 
was covered with dead fish. Then I asked the people who were there, how 
come ? They answered, well, the fishermen sometimes throw back in 
superfluous fishes. I laughed and replied well, you can tell this to someone 
who has never been here before. "332 
The same happened to another manager interviewed as part of the research who was 
working for a consulting company doing business with infrastructure projects who went 
to Puerto la Cruz: 
"It is a tourist town. Starting from there, a ferry goes to Isla Maragarita, 
which has a nice promenade, a nice Caribbean beach with palm trees, white 
sand, where signs say: Bathing forbidden ! ... The water 
is so polluted, there 
are so many bacteria, and really dangerous ones, too, that you are not 
allowed to go for a swim there. ... Puerto 
la Cruz has two outlets in the sea, 
that originally went 100 metres into the sea. In our days, they are heavily 
rotten. Hence it (excrement) comes out directly on the beach. As the sewage 
purification plant still has not been installed, the situation has not yet 
improved. 333 
3.4.5.2 Infrastructure 
The sector of infrastructure can be considered as a growth market for related industries, 
such as engineering, construction, market research, and consulting companies. 
As contracts are mainly awarded by the state, the economies need to be stable, 
otherwise no money will be channelled into infrastructure projects. Since the 1970s the 
infrastructure has improved only a little. Most of the goods are transported via trucks or 
ships, but this poses difficulties as well. The Orinoco as a transport river reaching up to 
Puerto Ordaz, the centre of the aluminium and iron industries, has differences in water 
level of up to 12 metres between the dry and the rainy season. This is a challenging task 
when it comes to loading a ship. The rivers are huge, building a bridge there is more 
challenging than bridging the Rhine ! 
332 Interview with a German manager working for a multinational German company doing business with 
chemicals. This one and the following citation may represent an extreme German view. 
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These issues are peculiarities of the country that do not make infrastructure programmes 
easy. 
3.4.5.3 Agriculture and food export 
In comparison to other countries, Venezuela should try to improve its performance in 
the export of foodstuffs. As it can be seen in the table 10.2 in Enright, Frances, and 
Saveedra (1996, pp. 368-369), Venezuela always comes last comparing the value and 
the amount of exports of different food products with the corresponding exports of other 
Latin American countries. The interviewees' common perception was, that Venezuela 
could be self-sufficient in terms of foodstuffs. 
3.4.5.4 Salvation through Privatisation 
Carefully nurtured privatisation could be a remedy to solve the state's economic 
problems. Firstly, the deficits of the state-owned companies could be decreased. 
Secondly, private companies tend to work more efficient, and thirdly, these huge 
deficits would not need to be adjusted by printing more money, causing inflation, in 
turn leading to a decrease in purchasing power. 
It is the only possibility for the state to enhance ist cash flow. The issue that remains is: 
"How much money goes into the state's cash-box ? How much is received 
by the people who have a word to say during the whole process? You never 
know. "334 
Another negative side effect could be rising unemployment, since public companies 
tend to be seriously overstaffed. Delayering will be the consequence to reduce 
production cost. 
The following figure shows a comparison of Latin American countries in terms of 
privatisation processes in 1997. Leader of the group in terms of fiscal revenues is 
undoubtedly Brazil, followed by Venezuela and Colombia. The privatisation attempts 
don't happen on a regular basis, therefore the chart of other years might give a 
333 Interview with a German project manager working at an international engineering consultancy 
planning infrastructure projects in Venezuela. 
"` Interview with a manager from Argentina, working for a German MNC. The problem he was alluding 
to is not exclusively a Venezuelan one. It is an issue that occurs during the privatisation process in any 
country. 
The structure of Venezuelan economy 
): 
completely different picture. Nevertheless it can be concluded that it happens to some 
degree, but needs to be intensified to lead to sustainable results. 
Privatisation in Latin America, 1997: Fiscal revenues & 
number of firms 
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Figure 10: Privatisation in Latin America, 1997: Fiscal revenues and number of firms. 
(source: ECLAC, 1998c, p. 58) 
3.4.6 Threats 
"It is dangerous. 
... 
Corruption is one thing, the other thing is criminality 
that people engage in to survive. People do not have work, and even if they 
do, it is so poorly paid, that it is not enough to earn a living. The ones who 
have a job and some power, enrich themselves through corruption, and the 
others need to `earn their living' through stealing. "335 
This quotation may seem a little exaggerated, but what it does show what the two 
important issues are. 
3.4.6.1 Rising level of corruption 
Many German companies are revising their Latin American strategy, shifting their 
businesses away from Venezuela to Chile, Peru, and Colombia. Frequent reasons were 
335 Interview with a German marketing manager working for a German MNC in cosmetics being 
responsible for the area management in South America. 
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to be found in the large portion of an investment that was lost on its way to fulfilling the 
project ! 
It was felt that after the new president came to power in 1998, the situation got worse. 
The cost of accelerating procedures has risen since then. Some argue this is because the 
people who are now in power want to `quench their thirst' quickly, but also because 
nobody knows how long the new system is going to last. Therefore one has to make 
sure to benefit as quickly as possible. 
3.4.6.2 Rising level of poverty and criminality 
Some companies refrained from buying property in Venezuela, considering the country 
to be too unstable and too dangerous. When they need to acquire a store, they just rent 
it. 
3.4.6.3 Concluding remarks on oil wealth: Curse or Blessing ? 
In fact it is a bit of both, and many other Latin American countries would like to have 
the problems Venezuela suffers from, if they could only enjoy the blessings as well. 
"The question being asked now is not merely what the oil affluence has 
done for the petroleum exporters, but also what it has done to them ! "336 
It is a curse to the extent that petroleum puts the economy through burst-and-bust 
cycles, encourages governmental waste and corruption. 
From a politician's point of view it is wisely spent, because institutions and people who 
might form a threat to the existing democratic system, get their share to play the game. 
"Business got subsidies and protection; strategic unions got subsidized headquarters and 
generous contracts; the military got high-tech hardware, high salaries and all the 
education it could absorb; and opposition politicians got seats in Congress and a share 
of the patronage to distribute. "337 
The consequence is that government spending is so high that the main source of state 
revenues, oil, is not big enough to satisfy corruption, subsidise consumption and pay the 
interest on international debts. These debts are caused by Venezuelans themselves to a 
large extent and are linked to quite a few bankruptcies of financial institutions, such as 
336 Amuzegar, 1982, p. 815; see also Hillman, 1994, p. 14; Abente Brun, 1988, p. 133; Allen, 1977, p. 
122. 
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those of Banco National de Descuento, Banco Consolidado, Banco de Comercio, and 
Banco de los Trabajadores. 338 Another issue is capital flight. During the 1970s and 
1980s, more than 34 billion US$ in private capital left the country. 339 
The growth of different sectors, showing different profiles of development and 
opportunities to develop, is still dependent on the petroleum revenues and is not 
financed by a dynamic development of the internal market. Even in 1997, for example, 
oil revenues represented nearly eighty percent of total exports, and about 70 percent of 
public revenues. 340 According to the World Bank, the role of petroleum is probably 
understated in these statistics, because indirect links exist through the use of oil as an 
input in several industries, for example construction and engineering. The figures reveal 
that macroeconomic stability of the economy is closely related to the price of oil, 
because a "one-dollar change in the price of a barrel of Venezuelan ... oil leads to about 
a $1.1 billion reduction in public sector revenues. "341 
The best example occurred at the end of 1997 beginning of 1998. The price per barrel of 
crude decreased from 12.60 US$ to 9 US$, leading to lost revenues of 5 Billion US$. 342 
At the end of 1998, the national deficit amounted to 5 billion US$. 
The economic crises of the 1980s and the early 1990s showed clearly that without 
sufficient revenues from petroleum, the costs of constructing a new society cannot be 
borne. A change in society is needed in order to relinquish this wasteful consumption 
mode, importing foreign material, social and cultural goods. 343 
Therefore state's social policy can do little under present circumstances. The problems 
are beneath the surface; to solve them, intensive and thorough political, social and 
economic changes need to be made in Venezuela. 344 As one interviewee puts it: 
"Money was never spent on research, and that is the problem. One never got 
anywhere. That makes Venezuela dependent on foreign technologies, which 
they do not want to accept on the one hand, on the other people are too easy- 
337 Coppedge, 1994, p. 178. 338 Izard, 1996, p. 694. 339 Mortimer, 1990, ve0062/2. Pietri's (1998, p. 18) statement, that every year approximately 100 billion 
US-Dollar leave the country illegally, seems a bit too high. 340 IMF, 1998a, p. 52. 342 World Bank, 1998, p. 3, footnote 3. 342 BfAi, 1998b, p. 2. 343 Lombardi, 1986, p. 22. 
344 Izard, 1996, p. 694. 
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going ... to start thinking, we need to learn our things, we need to 
do things 
by ourselves. 
Oil and its revenues allowed the people to buy everything and to produce 
nothing. They never thought that one day they would have to produce things 
by themselves"aas 
Another reason is put forward by Silva Michelena (1967) by pointing out that "the 
general process of change in Venezuela was too rapid and her political instability too 
permanent for her to escape the problems consequent on conflicting ideologies and 
"346 value orientations. 
345 Interview with a German manager working for a German MNC. 346 Silva Michelena, 1967b, p. 89. 
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4 Understanding society and culture 
4.1 Venezuela -a rich poor country? 
"One says, Venezuela is a melting pot, where all races came together, ... but 
the scale of class consciousness in Venezuela does not exist anywhere in the 
world. ... Families keep to themselves. The exchange just happens on the 
same level. Money marries money. "347 
Venezuelan society is marked by a kaleidoscope of different racial groups, having its 
origin in the early sixteenth century. Another bout of immigration by people with a 
different heritage was precipitated by the oil bonanza, drawing Europeans, North 
Americans and Asians into the country. 
Many of the people interviewed in the course of our research and several authors have 
stressed the fact that Venezuela should be a rich country, but somehow the wealth never 
managed to get to the people. To Kelly's (1994) mind it seems as if "colonial heritage 
and imperialist injustice" are still eminent today. 348 One of the Venezuelans that was 
interviewed described how he sees the evolution of Venezuelan society. 
"Colombia was an important location for Spain, and Punto Catharina was 
am important harbour for Spain, like Panama, like down in Argentina Rio 
de la Plata and Mexico. These were the important points of Latin America. 
Venezuela was a military region. There were only soldiers. Then there was 
the idea of El Dorado, a gold treasure, that was supposed to be there. And 
who went there ? 
The adventurers, the soldiers, and this is the origin of Venezuela. Bogota is 
completely different. There is history, there is culture. The language is 
different, completely different. Mexico is also totally different. Not only 
because of the Aztecs, but because the Spanish were a true power there, a 
dictatorship. It was an important location for the Spanish. Of course one 
needs to have the Spanish in the peoples' history as well. We, in Venezuela 
only have the Caribs and man-eaters. We did not have anyone else. It is a 
fact. 
... This is Venezuela. The families that were located in Venezuela, were 
military. They came to the country to bring it under their control. That is the 
development. 
Then the oil came into existence and with it the Americans and a lot of 
money. Then, everybody else came: from Argentina and Colombia. 
Venezuela was La Suiza de America - the Switzerland of America. 
Everyone came, because we had money. We had loads of Colombians. 
Argentines came a lot, when the economy under Peron broke down. 
34' This comment was made by a manager who used to work at a European embassy in Caracas, but now 
works for a multinational construction company. 348 Kelly, 1994, p. 285. 
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The computer guys all came from Argentina, because they were sacked by 
their banks. The banking industry, finance came to power then. ... In 
Venezuela: Computer, what is it ? They were in the hands of Argentines, 
that were trained. ... Now 
it is decreasing. Venezuela is not a poor country. 
Venezuela is a rich poor country. That is the problem. "349 
A German manager also mentioned that there a big differences between Colombians 
and Venezuelans: 
"The baron in Colombia, the landlord, became a manager, and the baron in 
Venezuela became an oil manager. The first one has to work, the second one 
enjoys his life. "350 
4.2 Evolution of society 
In early 1600 the territory that is present-day Venezuela contained a rich mixture of 
Indian groups of widely varying cultures speaking different dialects. 
Due to the vigour of the Spanish conquerors, peninsulares, these indigenous groups 
were extinguished rather rapidly. Accordingly, the traditional and ritual forms, their 
tribal identities, passed out of existence. This loss of an indigenous cultural identity was 
accelerated by mestizaje (genetic mixing involving various combinations of Negro, 
white, and Indian). The earliest conquistadores did not bring Spanish women, so they 
mixed with native females. Although the majority of mestizos were brought up by their 
mothers, they were raised by their fathers as Spaniards. 35' 
Thus they were influenced by Hispanic values and the Roman Catholic Church. 
Although 96 percent of the population still belong to this confession in present times, 
the church did not play such an important part as in other Latin American countries. 
"Venezuelans continue to practice a kind of Catholicism that adheres only loosely to 
church doctrine but is deeply emotional. Laxity in practice is widespread, as is a low 
level of general knowledge of the basic tenets of the faith". 352 
349 Interview with a Venezuelan manager who works in a German electronic equipment company. 
350 Interview with a German finance manager working for a German MNC in pharmaceutics. 351 Allen, 1977, p. 23; Blutstein, 1977, p. 51. 
352 Blutstein, 1977, p. 74; see also Schmid, 1999c, p. 2; Hillman, 1994, pp. 10,31,82. 
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This was caused by the Spanish themselves, because they did not do much to establish 
order and co-ordination, nor did they invest much money and personnel. 353 Compared 
with Mexico and Peru, Venezuela was thought to be a small, rustic colony. Lack of 
economic importance placed it in a position of relative neglect and retarded cultural 
development. 354 
Secondly, the social changes produced by urbanisation and industrialisation resulted in 
an attitude of religious indifference. 355 Therefore the traditional Catholic Church lost its 
long-term dominance of the value system, allowing new ideas from the secular world to 
come into play, leading to a gradual shift towards the norms of contemporary capitalist 
society. 356 The value system is closely related to European attitudes and Christian 
values. Thus it is easier for investors to negotiate in Venezuela than in countries like 
Japan or China, which have completely different standards. 
Hispanic influence was to be found in the structure of organisations or in institutions, 
like local government or the Spanish language. 357 
By the end of the 16`h century most tribes had been virtually eliminated, the few 
survivors brought under Spanish control. Due to diminishing the Indian population and 
growing agricultural economy, slaves were imported from Africa to be used as a cheap 
source of labour until the eighteenth century. Around 1800 730,000 people lived in 
Venezuela. 26% of them were Whites, 15 % Indians, 51 % free people, and 8% 
slaves. 358 The group of "free people" was made up of mestizos, mulattos, coloured 
people, and freed slaves. Today the composition of the population has changed slightly: 
69 percent are mestizos and mulattos, 20.5 percent are Whites, 9 percent Blacks and 1.5 
percent are indigenous people. 359 
353 Blutstein, 1977, p. 54. 354 ibid., 1977, p. 90. 
ass ibid., 1977, p. 75. 
356 Cubitt, 1995, p. 99-100. 
357 Blutstein, 1977, p. 53. 358 Salmoral, 1992, p. 211-217. 359 Schmid, 199a, p. 1. 
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4.2.1 Patterns of society 
From the beginning of colonisation Venezuelan social structure was static and 
structured by class and colour. Feeling superior to their coloured neighbours, the 
Spaniards took every measure (by social usage, or by law) to maintain social 
distance. 360 A privileged social class consisted of latifundistas (owners of large estates, 
of so called latifundios), civil servants, priests, and scholars 361 
Heavily graded differences in status have also been in existence and been actively 
maintained since the time of independence. Venezuelan society was changed little after 
independence. After the realistas had left the country, the Spanish who were born in 
Venezuela, took over and continued to run the country as their predecessors had. 
The rigid social stratification of a small, privileged criollo elite reigning over a small 
middle class and a large lower class still exists today. The ratio of upper, middle, and 
lower class Hillman (1994) considers to be approximately 5: 10: 85.362 
An example will be given from the time before oil was discovered in the 1920s, when 
Venezuela was mainly engaged in small scale agriculture. According to Herman (1986) 
the land tenure system was made up of several groups: the latifundistas, earning their 
living through food processing, marketing, fertilisers and farm implements; commercial 
farmers, owning only simple machinery; minifundistas (peasants owning five-to ten- 
acre plots, supporting their family at subsistence or less than subsistence level, 
contributing nothing to agricultural and economic development) and landless labourers, 
being totally dependent on the protection of the latifundistas, having almost no 
363 purchasing power and not being able to contribute to the consumer market. 
This phenomenon is still prevalent today. It is also common practice for the finceros to 
own small private planes and to commute to their fincas in the mornings and return to 
Caracas in the evenings via the airport La Calotta, which is right in the centre of 
Caracas. 
36° Blutstein, 1977, p. 53. 
361 Rother, 1972, p. 15. 
362 Hillman, 1994, p. 92. 
363 Herman, 1986, pp. 329-330. 
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4.2.1.1 Upper class 
The upper class was composed of more or less pureblood whites due to the "virtue of 
their status as landlords and preservers of the Hispanic heritage. This heritage stressed 
the importance of the patriarchal extended family, the primacy accorded individual 
uniqueness and dignity, the disdain for manual labour, and the distinction between the 
roles of males and females. s3M The powerful families who still have influence today, 
are called los Amos del Valle, the rulers of the valley. 365 
As the class was originally made up of peninsulares and criollos, it has never been as 
uniform as in other Latin American countries. According to Blutstein (1977, S. 54), a 
hegemonic oligarquia has never come into existence due to regional differences. Gil 
Yepes (1986) believes that national elites are divided due to their different cultural and 
socio-economic origins, resulting in diverse ideologies of each elite. 366 Silva Michelena 
(1967a) points out, that in all Venezuelan social strata a "low degree of group cohesion" 
can be found. 367 
In our days, the upper socio-economic class has two elements: one part of it forms the 
oligarquia, the other is made up of industrialists and businesspeople, maintaining their 
position through patrimonial mechanisms and an informal network of families and 
enterprises, controlling key interests, i. e. monetary and economic, in Venezuela. 368 
What can be concluded is that people think in groups. Posing the question of how to get 
into the dominant group to a Venezuelan expatriate in Germany, he answered: 
"At first, you need to be accepted. Then you are in, and you do not have a 
problem anymore. Or one has a certain amount of money. ... One 
has to 
separate. One thing is making money, but you don't belong to us. These are 
separate things. The social background is very strong there. There are many 
people who possess a lot of money in Venezuela, who made business 
through politics. ... But they do not belong to the oligarchy. They are 
separated. There are for example certain areas where these people live. It is 
controlled ... who is allowed to live there and who isn't. There are other 
areas, where rich people live who do not belong to the oligarchy. "369 
This shows that even people from the same class level tend not to mix with each other. 
364 Blutstein, 1977, p. 53., see chapter on machismo. 365 A novel "Los Amos del Valle" exists written by Herrera Luce. 366 Gil Yepes, 1986, p. 161. 
367 Silva Michelena, 1967a, p. 69. 368 Hillman, 1994, pp. 76,78; Allen, 1977, pp. 10,12; see also chapter on Grupos Industriales. 369 Interview with a Venezuelan manager who works in a German electronic equipment company. 
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This phenomenon of in-group and out-group thinking can also be found in doing 
business. 
Social life almost always takes place in clubs, mainly sports clubs. It is vital to be 
member, otherwise it will be hard to get into contact with people of the same 
educational level, because it is nearly impossible to spot them on the street as they tend 
to exclude themselves from daily life. In these clubs one gets to meet people, one gets 
the chance to cultivate contacts and to establish new ones. 
4.2.1.2 Middle class 
A tiny middle class exists in Venezuela, but it is currently declining due to economic 
and political misfortune. It is made up of less successful whites and mestizos who were 
fortunate enough to attain some education or wealth. Originally, this class was made up 
of teachers, non-manual workers, bureaucrats, technicians, and small business owners, 
who tried to imitate the behaviour and values of the higher class as closely as possible, 
although they developed an identifiable social life of their own . 
370 "A clear hierarchy of 
clubs exists by virtue of closed membership and entrance requirements. s371 
According to Vasconi (1980, p. 201), Venezuela's middle class was comparatively big 
in the 1980s when compared to other Latin American countries. And indeed, during the 
1970s and the beginning of the 1980s a relatively large middle class was emerging due 
to the shift to oil and the subsequent expansion of manufacturing, producing a highly 
mobile group, moving "regularly from place to place and job to job. "372 But due to the 
financial crises and corruption, it has started to cease away. Many immigrants returned 
to their mother countries, although they had lived in Venezuela for more than 15 years. 
This was a common perception expressed by expatriates when asked what struck them 
most. A German Director of International Sales and Operations mentioned: 
"What tends to occur more frequently is the class society. The middle class 
is disappearing, there are either the rich or the poor. Either you are part of 
them, like a Mr...., who has connections with his family ... or you are not part of it. If you are not part of it, you might have a job at a good company 
or at an international company or you do not have any job. If you have one 
that is badly paid, you cannot afford the things that are on in Venezuela.... 
370 Blutstein, 1977, pp. 53,61. 371 Hillman, 1994, p. 92. 372 Mortimer, 1990, ve0018/2. 
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Either you are part of the same and you can afford it, or you are not part of 
it, then you are excluded. " 1,9373 
4.2.1.3 Lower class 
Most developing countries struggle with poverty as the central human problem. 374 
Unfortunately, Venezuela is one of these countries, where a significant proportion of the 
population is excluded from a decent life. According to Jones (1999), more than 80 
percent live below poverty line. 375 
For them it was not possible to emulate the values of the upper class, as they were often 
restricted by skin colour, poverty, and occasionally by law. In his study Mathiason 
(1967) found out, that in many respects the campesinos were the "most 
disadvantaged"376 men in Venezuelan society. Therefore, they started to generate a folk 
culture differing in certain aspects; e. g. the upper class was patriarchal, but the lower 
class was based on the mother. 377 
The rural class did not really benefit from the exploitation of crude oil. Hoping to 
improve their standard of living, many ranchos (an urban shelter below minimum 
housing requirements constructed of makeshift materials, such as discarded timber, 
cartons, flattened tin cans, generally by the occupant) migrated into the urban areas378. 
They settled in the outskirts of cities like Caracas or Maracaibo, building barrios. In the 
capital they are positioned on the slopes of mountains surrounding the city, making 
them susceptible to landslides caused by heavy rainfalls. According to Pietri (1998), 60 
percent of Caracas' inhabitants are made up of rancho-population. 379 
Compared to other peasant settlements in Latin America, like Brazilian Favelas in Rio 
de Janeiro or in Peru, the Venezuelan houses are of a better quality. They are not based 
on cardboard and banana leaves set up on a sand hill at a garbage dump, but on bricks 
around the beautiful valley of Caracas. Some of them have electricity (TV) and water - 
obviously acquired by means of illegal cables and pipelines. 
373 Interview with a German manager, being director of international sales and operations at a company 
doing business in the sealant business. 374 Kelly, 1994, p. 283. 375 Jones, 1999, p. 2. 376 Mathiason, 1967, p. 153. 377 Blutstein, 1977, p. 53. 378 See chapter on economic developments. 
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Authors like Weise (1989) feel, that the problems due to wild, uncontrolled land flight, 
cannot be solved; all attempts by central government initiatives to redevelop the slums 
have been unsuccessful so far. 380 
Philippengracht (1981) even calls Caracas a monster, that cannot be tamed anymore. 
Criminality is wide spread and its crime rates are among the highest in the world. 
381 
If going out for supper in Caracas it is common practice that servants of the restaurants 
go and park your car somewhere. It is not only because they are polite, but to make sure 
that you won't be assaulted on your way back from the car park to the restaurant. As 
soon as one leaves the capital to go to another city or into the countryside, the danger of 
becoming victim of a crime decreases. 
4.2.1.4 A note on demographics 
The Venezuelan population is on average very young: 36 percent are below 14 years, 20 
percent are aged between 14 and 30 years, 40 percent are between 30 and 60, and only 4 
percent are older than 60 years. 382 
4.2.2 Social mobility 
4.2.2.1 Once on top - always on top ? 
Even the oil bonanza beginning in the 1920s did not really affect the rigid social 
structure. The upper class mostly formed by terratenientes, military and realistas, a 
small agrarian elite, saw the advantages of a growing economy and went into commerce 
and industry, becoming an urban-based class, la burguesia comercial. Later on, they 
moved into banking, as it promised to be the most lucrative economic sector, la 
oligarquia financiera 383 The landowners started to shift their capital to the urban sector, 
hoping to receive better returns on it. 384 
They got hold of those establishments and things in the economic sphere that would 
normally be run and done by the middle class. Hence a mediator, bridging the gap 
39 Pietri, 1998, p. 18. 
380 Weise, 1989, pp. 28-29; see also Brown and Jacobsen, 1987. 381 Pietri, 1998, p. 18. 
382 CIDEIBER, 1997b, p. 3 and information of CONAPRI's brochure Venezuela - The right countryfor 
investment; own caluclations. 
383 Vasconi, 1980, p. 200. 384 Cubitt, 1995, p. 179, Vasconi, 1980, p. 195. 
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between the very affluent and the very poor, never really gained a strong hold in 
society. 
Soon, another group, i. e. multinational managers from foreign companies, which can be 
seen as belonging to the dominant class, came into existence. Foreign capital could be 
attracted to the country easily, because any company in the E&P business tried to 
benefit from the vast amounts of crude oil in Venezuela. Foreign oil-company 
representatives were often perceived as "heartless new conquerors", that were friendly 
with the dictatorial governments. This strong resentment against foreign corporations 
became "deeply rooted in the social conscience of the Venezuelan people and never 
really disappeared. "385 
Finally a third party joined the club: The expansion of the state in the economy led to an 
increase in the number of state employees, some of whom direct vast industrial 
complexes. The top personnel in these enterprises have been referred to as a state 
bourgeoisie. 
Therefore, three fractions can be identified: domestic capitalists; managers of 
multinationals and top administrators of public enterprises. All the members of this 
class control production processes in the economy and the work of a number of 
subordinates. They can therefore be identified as patrones (literally patron, one involved 
in a master-servant relationship; patrons may be landlords, employers, political bosses). 
Furthermore, their financial reward is linked very closely to the success of the firm. 
Hence they all wish to preserve the status quo. They unite politically, supporting 
conservative regimes and opposing radical forces that propose significant social 
changes. 
"The three fractions have a common interest in capital accumulation and in the 
subordination of the mass population, and therefore, co-operate in what can be called a 
`triple alliance' between elite local capital, international capital and state capital. "386 
Starting from 1958, AD and COPEI in turns took the governmental responsibility, 
making sure that no significant changes would be undertaken in order not to undermine 
the existing nepotism. 
According to Austin (1990), social structures and kinship networks "sometimes restrict 
the social and economic mobility of individuals or groups. 9, '387 It seems to be true for 
395 Coronel, 1983, pp. 10-11. 
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Venezuela. Especially when it comes to education, financial resources and the level of 
income play an important role and hinder upward mobility. 
Desirable secondary and tertiary education involves high costs, because public 
institutions tend to have lower standards and an inferior quality of teaching. In contrast 
to Europe, people from middle or lower classes in Venezuela do not get to a good basic 
education, or further educational opportunity. Thus the social classes remain rigidly 
stratified. 
Having identified three groups of patrons, they cannot all be considered as belonging to 
the oligarchy. The so-called "new richs388, businesspeople, owners of medium-sized 
industries, managers, and upper-level public servants, are not part of the oligarquia. 
4.2.2.2 Mobility through political power 7 
As the economy was dominated by the oligarquia, the middle class tried to find access 
to mobility through political power. It was exercised by members of the middle class 
with the support of a wide sector of urban and rural workers. 389 "The polarity that 
developed between political and economic power blocs and the orientations of each 
s39o came to reflect the differences in their social origins. 
4.3 The impact of oil on society and values 
4.3.1 An accelerator of bipolar society ? 
There are certain facts that strengthen the thesis that petroleum actually fostered the 
existing cultural dualism and distorted the structure of production and employment. 
Because the economic change was mainly propelled by foreigners, foreign capital, 
imported know-how and organisational structure, it was not necessary to overcome the 
established power structure, nor to create a favourable attitude toward saving, work, and 
economic rationality. 391 
386 Cubitt, 1995, p. 182. 387 Austin, 1990, p. 63. 388 Hillman, 1994, p. 78. 389 Ahumada, 1967, p. 6. 39° Blutstein, 1977, p. 55. 391 Ahumada, 1967, p. 10. 
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Compared to manufacturing, petroleum production only offers limited employment 
opportunities. In 1997 for example, about 90,000 people were working in the petroleum 
and mining industry, while 1 million people were employed in the manufacturing 
sector. 392 
As higher salaries were paid in the first branch of industry, only a few lucky ones 
benefited - the contractors obtained disproportionate earnings due to the inefficiency of 
the administrative machinery, and the small middle class, whose main employer was the 
government, also received high salaries. 393 
4.3.2 The fascination of fast fortune making 
According to Carrera (1972) and Carias (1980) basic sociological changes, mainly 
negative ones according to him, occurred due to the development of the oil industry: 
Traditional Venezuelan values and ways of living, like modesty and the appreciation of 
labour, were discarded in favour of vanity and arrogance; complicity occurred between 
a corrupt Venezuelan elite and the foreign corporations to exploit the oil to their 
advantage; people were obsessed with attaining instant wealth, lawyers were not 
untouchable, and medical doctors performed unnecessary operations. 394 Carias put it 
this way in 1980, 
"Todos se afanan por hacer mucho dinero en poco tiempo para adquirir una 
vivienda cömoda y tener un vehiculo. "(p. 259) 
The petroleum boom set off the pursuit of fast fortune - easy to obtain, without work, 
and fast. Venezuela had to import a foreign workforce in these days, because 
Venezuelans tended to have a strong distaste for work. They preferred to make money 
by speculation and by selling land. According to Carias, this had a deep impact on 
lifestyle, especially in petroleum cities: hectic, expensive, and luxurious, forming fertile 
soil for adventurers, opportunists, and the bold from all over the world, and also for 
speculation and extravaganza. 395 
Especially during the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s the obsession to make money 
quickly and easily seemed to be internalised in the Venezuelan psyche. Otherwise it is 
392 IMF, 1998, p. 71. 393 Ahumada, 1967, p. 11. 394 see Carias, 1980, pp. 259,264-265; Carrara, 1973, pp. 80 ff. 395 Carias, 1980, p. 260. 
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difficult to understand why every week more than 4 million pounds were spent on horse 
bidding. 96 "Gambling in the Federal District lottery and seven state lotteries in 1973 
and on the two most popular kinds of bet at Rinconada racetrack in Caracas totalled 
well over Bs600 million, an average of about Bs120 for each Venezuelan over the age 
of twenty. s397 
This idea of seeking a fast-fortune was indeed poison to long term economic 
development and welfare, but is still prevalent in daily life. A Venezuelan manager 
critically remarked: 
"I think Venezuelans are opportunistic. They are not tüchtig, in a way that 
they go to work everyday and continuously work like ants, but they are 
opportunistic. They try to make money as quickly as possible and thus they 
tend to risk a lot. There are many gambling arcades - horseracing and 
s398 lotteries. 
According to Moran and Harris (1987) the desire to get rich quick-attitude is common 
in Latin America, because of the instability of the economies. This boom or bust- 
thinking expresses itself in speculation, manipulation or gambling. 399 This is definitely 
true for Venezuela, as could be shown. 
4.3.3 Love and hate - The level of Americanisation 
Venezuela is probably the most Americanised country of South America. The term 
Latin America is not used here, because Mexico is probably even more influenced due 
to its border with the USA and its trade relationship through NAFTA, which does not 
mean that they think positively of the USA. 
The relationship between America and Venezuela is not an easy one. Traditionally, 
Venezuelans are heavily dependent on American technology and know-how, also on 
their investment, and see them as a source of long-term credits. Thus they just have to 
accept them 400 
396 ibid., 1980, p. 261. 
397 Blutstein, 1977, p. 139. 
398 Interview with a Venezuelan manager who works in a German electronic equipment company. 
399 Moran and Harris, 1987, p. 377. 
400 See chapter on economy: Foreign investment and export-import composition. 
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4.3.3.1 Lifestyle 
There are many things in daily life that show a certain degree of American influence. 
Starting with architecture especially in Caracas, automobiles, fast food restaurants, and 
amusement arcades and ending with children's education, Venezuela tends to keep an 
eye on North American fashion trends. 
"Venezuela has a huge buyer's potential for consumer products and has 
always been oriented towards the USA, because of the oil wealth. Whatever 
was new on the US market, next day it was in Caracas, but not in Brazil or 
in Colombia. If a new Mercedes came out here today, you were able to buy 
it in Caracas tomorrow. "40' 
"The country enjoys the American way of life financed by spoilt money. A02 
Venezuelans who can afford it tend to buy imported products from the United States. 
4.3.3.2 "Esos Gringos" 
The other side is the perception of the gringo being deeply rooted in the Venezuelan 
mentality. The American is more or less accepted, because Venezuelans have to do 
business with him, but they are always afraid of getting ripped off. 
"The Venezuelan accepts the Americans, because to whom should he sell 
the oil otherwise. "403 
"Inwardly the American is admired, because he is so successful, but only 
inwardly. 
... Everybody knows, that Venezuela is a rich country, that has not 
really managed to make something sensible of its wealth, and one sees, how 
other countries, like the big neighbour North America, became big, 
successful, and powerful. ... One admires the gringos, but one does not 
speak it out loud. "404 
When the oil bonanza started in Venezuela, Americans were lured into the country to 
exploit the petroleum. They took all the oil with them not letting the country participate. 
As a consequence, Venezuelans tend to see Americans as conquerors, only working for 
their private profit not allowing anyone else to benefit. This attitude is fairly common in 
regions like Maracaibo in the Zulia state. Especially the area around Cabimas, in the 
401 See next reference. 
402 Observations of two German expatriate managers who used to live and work for German MNCs all 
over Latin America. 
403 Answer of a German-Chilean manager of a German textile machinery production company, when being asked what picture the Venezuelan has of the American. 404 Interview with a Venezuelan manager working for a German-based MNC. 
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north-east of Lake Maracaibo is extremely poor. Although it owns one of the biggest oil 
fields in the world, the people living in the community are poor. 
When an exploration and production company started setting up a subsidiary there a 
couple of years ago the community's president came up to the company and said: 
"What do you do for us ? The Americans have not done anything for us for 
ears, they took everything from us and we stand here with more than 25 ys 
empty hands. o 
The company was expected to provide jobs for local employees, to use local suppliers, 
and to pay taxes and royalties. They also agreed on donating a mobile medical centre to 
the community. 
It also happens that if a company "X" wants to set up a business in Venezuela, the 
municipality comes up and asks for a `little' donation. Thus it happens that the local 
baseball stadium is named "X". 
4.3.4 Venezuela: The land of missed opportunity 
"Venezuela is a privileged country, but has never made anything out of it. It 
is like the rich son, who has not achieved anything in life, because he never 
had to learn how to manage economically. "406 
While evaluating the interviews it was discovered, that Venezuelans mourn not having 
developed further since the flourishing 1960s and 1970s. It is also widely believed that 
they bemoan their fate but do not change anything to improve their situation 407 The 
Venezuelan philosopher Raul Soza found a simple but logic explanation by stating it is 
much easier to become rich or to be poor, but becoming poor is much, much harder. 
Expatriates claimed that Venezuela reminded them of Spain in the 1950s. They feel that 
Venezuela somehow missed the boat, whereas other Latin American countries like 
Chile or Argentina developed further, for example by becoming a member of 
MERCOSUR. Mexico, too, got it right by joining NAFTA. Even a country like 
Colombia is a step ahead of Venezuela in economic terms although it suffers difficulties 
due to political and geographical circumstances. 
405 Interview with the head of division finance and accounting of a German MNC who was responsible 
for setting up an operation in Venezuela. 
406 Interview with a German manager of the pharmaceutical industry who used to run the Venezuelan 
subsidiary of the German MNC. 
407 This could be counted as a strong indicator of a fatalistic attitude towards life and achievement. 
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"It is on the same level of development and mental maturity like Ecuador or 
Bolivia: a highly corrupt, but wonderful country.... Venezuela made some 
steps back. "4 8 
And they do not understand why Venezuela has made so little out of their great wealth, 
their vast amounts of mineral resources, energy producing potential, their climatic 
conditions ("Some products they could harvest three to four times a year, ... springtime 
all year round"), and their great beaches. 
The infrastructure is so bad that even Venezuelans leave the country for holidays. 
Possible reason for it: It is believed that the administration and political parties in 
Venezuela are corrupt: 
"The construction of roads and bridges cost double the price, they normally 
would have cost. That means: Somebody cashed the same amount of what it 
had cost originally. "409 
The high level of state paternalism during oil boom times had an inhibiting effect on 
innovation and creativeness. Everything that made life easy and comfortable was 
provided by the state. The nervous energy one needs to take things a step further was 
not encouraged. 
"Money makes people lazy, and money supports corruption, and that is 
basically the reason why Venezuela has failed over the last 10 years. "41° 
People still blame the state for not providing jobs and for being corrupt, instead of 
becoming proactive themselves. 
4.4 Machismo 
Morgan and Harris (1987) define Machismo as "virility, zest for action, daring, 
competitiveness, and the will to conquer. "4" According to Blutstein (1977), it is "the 
complex of beliefs and attitudes that came to define masculinity, stressed chivalry, 
virility, courage, and daring. 99412 
aos Interview with a Venezuelan expatriate working as Regional Director Latin America for a German 
409 medical company. Interview with a Venezuelan expatriate working in Sales in a German MNC in Germany in the 
410 electronic equipment industry. Interview with a Venezuelan expatriate working as Regional Director, Latin America for a German 
411 medical company. Moran and Harris, 1987, p. 377. 412 Blutstein, 1977, p. 53. 
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All the authors mentioned above believe that the machismo concept has been playing an 
important role in Venezuela's socio-political development. In the period after 
independence (1823-1958) it was a character trait of the caudillos. Even in 
contemporary politics, it can be observed that most of the Venezuelans still believe in 
the power and the strength of a single political leader, although it should be common 
knowledge that a single person is just not enough to govern a country successfully. New 
president Hugo Chavez is the living example that machismo is deeply embedded in the 
people's psyche, also called mental map. 
In business life it is expected that a man demonstrates courage, self-confidence, 
leadership, and forcefulness. 
Machismo also manifests itself in the handling of a relationship. 
Although Blutstein wrote more than 20 years ago, that a temporary liaison ending with 
desertion by the male is also common, there is still some truth in it 413 It happens quite 
often that the father leaves his partner and the children behind to date another woman. 
A reason for this behaviour can be found in Cubitt (1995). She writes, that a man has to 
demonstrate sexual prowess, father many children, and exercise tight control over any 
female kin in order to fulfil macho behaviour patterns 414 
Montoya (1999) takes it a step further, by calling Venezuela a matricentric society. 
His argumentation goes as follows: "Most of the homes revolve around mothers with no 
man, because they are unmarried mothers or because their husbands abandoned them, or 
because of a divorce. But for most of the Venezuelans, the mother is their only link with 
their ancestors. It is therefore a matricentric society. "al s 
On the other hand, it is not uncommon in Venezuela that women are highly placed 
managers. The former president of the national bank and the former minister of finance 
were women in fact. These are posts that are considered to be a male domain in 
Germany. Agreeing with Montoya (1999), "Venezuelan women conquer more and more 
places in society, those that were traditionally reserved for males. s416 
413 ibid., 1977, p. 69. 414 Cubitt, 1995, p. 111. 415 Montoya, 1999, p. 4. 
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According to Cubitt (1995), the counterpart of machismo is called marianismo, the 
submissive female role. "The ideal woman is gentle, kind, long-suffering, loving and 
submits to the demands of men, whether they be husbands, fathers, sons or brothers. 
She has an infinite capacity for humility and sacrifice and an abundant store of 
patience. ""7 This was felt by the author as well. 
Especially in more rural and more colloquial areas including bigger cities like 
Maracaibo, women were perceived as if they would enjoy identifying themselves with 
this particular role. It also means that men always have to pay for anything the female 
part would like to eat, drink, or possess. He is responsible and has to secure the financial 
side of the relationship 
4.5 Mentality 
4.5.1 The ease of life 
4.5.1.1 Facilismo concerning reliability, punctuality, and flexibility 
The characteristic properties of an industrialised society, like planning, punctuality, and 
endurance are on the verge at coming into existence! These traits never had to be 
cultivated in the past, because there was no need for them. The state after all, provided 
all that was necessary to survive. 
Thus it seems that in Venezuela everything is taken less seriously than in Germany. 
"We Germans have certain traits. We are punctual, reliable, and if we say 
Yes, then it is a Yes and not a Perhaps or a No, one can count on it. These 
virtues are not as marked as we expect them to be. If you are invited for 
dinner in Venezuela at eight o'clock, you can be absolutely positive that the 
head of the house, who invited you is not there, but might perhaps arrive at 
ten. ... It is a question of mentality. Or, if he says, Come and visit my house 
someday, and you do it, it would be considered bad manners. He just says it, 
without meaning it, and we Germans take all that so literally, and we are 
reliable, and we do the things we promised. It is not like this over there. "418 
Additionally it was felt by both German expatriates and Venezuelans alike, that 
Venezuelans possess a positive and optimistic attitude towards life in general. 
416 ibid., 1999, p. 4. 417 Cubitt, 1995, p. 111. 
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The reason why Venezuelans might not solve problems instantly is that they do not tend 
to see the issue as a big, big problem. Or to quote a Venezuelan expatriate based in 
Germany, 
"if the car had a breakdown, well, it was broken then. Or, no one of us 
(Germans) would ever exceed his credit card's limit. The Venezuelan does 
it without hesitation. For him, a credit card is an easy way of going on a trip 
to a foreign country, even today. ... It can't 
be that bad, life has always been 
going on. "419 
4.5.1.2 "No me compliques la vida !" 
The perception that Latin Americans tend to value leisure more than work, seems to be 
true for Venezuela. People are interested in spending their lives without getting into 
problems or any other sort of discomfort. They like to enjoy life without having to 
work. 
And there was a time where they did not have to. Noone insisted on punctuality or 
performance, people received money anyway due to heavy subvention. If you told a 
person "hey, why don't you do so and so, " the answer tended to be No me compliques la 
vida 1 Everything was so easy, but now the situation had changed, the big bonanza is 
over and the economy is under-performing and the state needs to reduce expenditure 
and subventions. 
Venezuelans got used to doing little and now find it hard to change. Compared with 
Colombia, Chile, and Peru, Venezuela had a generation that was provided with 
everything for more than 30 years, leading to peculiarities like indolence, high demands 
and pretentiousness. 20 This also serves as an explanation, why the people are not as 
driven by achievement as the Chileans for example. As one Venezuelan businessmen 
said to his German partner: 
"Oh, yes, we know that we have a high rate of unemployment, we have the 
Bolivar that is loosing value every month, we have an unstable government, 
but what is all that against this: At the weekend we take our car, drive 50 
kilometres to the beach, enjoy paradise-like nature, throw a fish-hook in the 
418 Interview with a German marketing manager working for a German MNC in cosmetics being 
responsible for the area management in South America. 419 ibid. 
420 Venezuelans are said to have fallen from the banana palm tree straight into the Cadillac. 
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water without a bait fixed to it, angle the most beautiful fish and fry them 
right on beach. s421 
On the one hand they do not like to be involved in work so much, on the other hand 
especially the ones who were lucky enough to receive some sort of education tend to be 
very proud, high-handed, arrogant, and self-assured - especially Caracenos. 
Venezuelans like to take their own decisions and absolutely dislike doing what they are 
told or being patronised, especially by foreigners. Everything that comes from a foreign 
environment is unlikely to be accepted unquestioned. 
It is also widely believed that Venezuelans lack the service mentality, which people 
from for instance Colombia or America have, because they never had to acquire it. 
There is a general suspicion and distrust towards strangers who come from abroad to do 
business in Venezuela. 
This phenomenon might be deeply rooted in Venezuela's history, as a Chilean manager 
argued: 
"500 years ago the Spaniard came and took everything away from him, now 
there is another one coming and wants to have something. No, this time I 
prefer to keep the knowledge to myself. "422 
On a private basis, people whatever class they originated from, are perceived as open 
hearted, friendly, and they like to get into contact with people, they have not met before. 
4.5.1.3 Hablando la geizte se entiende 
"If you get caught driving down a one-way-street in the wrong direction, 
you get a ticket in Germany. There won't be a discussion about that. Over 
there, you will have a discussion. ... It depends on how much you are willing to pay for it. Well, I mean, things will get sorted out ... . There is a 
dicho, 
saying hablando la gente se entiende. It means, if you talk together, you will 
come to terms. "423 
People like to talk to each other, and they are willing to find a solution everyone can get 
away with. On the other hand this attitude tends to form a constraint on business, as 
people also start to negotiate about deadlines, especially when it comes to terms of 
payment or delivery-dates. 
421 Interview with a German area sales manager Latin America of a German MNC doing business in the 
industry of chemical products. 422 Interview with a German-Chilean manager of a German textile machinery production company. 
423 Interview with a German marketing manager working for a German MNC in cosmetics being 
responsible for the area management in South America. 
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4.5.1.4 Importance attached to entertainment 
Venezuelans love TV. According to Datos (1993), TV ownership rates in Caracas were 
at 97 percent of all households and at 94 percent even for the lowest income 
households. 
More than 90 percent were colour TV sets. 424 In this respect, Venezuela is not a typical 
developing country anymore, because normally, per capita ownership of television sets 
is still relatively low 425 
Despite that, the programmes tend to "consist mainly of commercials or some stupid 
game or talk shows. s426 
Venezuelans also like to be on the streets. Vast amounts of money are spent in 
restaurants and bars, and restaurants tend to be crowded. It is also common for business 
people to take the client or meeting partner out for a proper meal. Working lunches as 
they are practised in Britain or the United States are fairly uncommon. 
4.5.2 Concept of time 
Venezuelan sometimes tend to forget about time if they are really into something, 
business- or pleasure-wise. Thus it happens that they arrive late a meeting, but they 
always have excuses. Even if the reason brought forward sounds unrealistic, one is 
expected to deliver one. Just coming in not saying anything is considered bad manners. 
They enjoy living in the "here and now", which explains their spontaneity and their 
tendency towards taking decisions quickly. 
4.5.2.1 Short termism 
What is linked to it, is the tendency to think short-term. A female Venezuelan engineer 
put it in the following words: 
"From hand to mouth. It is a question of mentality in this country due to 
geography and climate. There are fresh fruits all year long, over the entire 
year people harvest, one just goes and catches some fish, or, when I had to 
construct a canal at an area that was thought to be stuffed with gold, we had 
to cover the whole pit the same day, because the next day all the soil had 
disappeared, because people took it away to search for gold in it. 
424 Datos, 1993. 
425 Austin, 1990, p. 285. 426 Interview with a manager from the pharmaceutical business. 
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They do not think of tomorrow, because it is not necessary. They do not 
have winter, there is no autumn. All year long plants grow. "4 7 
4.5.2.2 Unwillingness to plan ahead 
The following story was told by a former German member of the Swiss Embassy in 
Caracas. 
"During the Caracasso in 1989 I started to hoard everything. I still have 
detergents from that time. ... If something is happening tomorrow, 
it won't 
do any harm to me. I wanted to avoid that I suddenly finding myself 
standing there having nothing. Thus I started to do little shopping trips 
straight after work, and kept an eye on where to find what. Then prices rose 
from one day to the other ... I went back to the office and said, 
listen, 
detergents you will find over there, milk powder you will find at that place 
for that amount of money. Just go there quickly and buy the stuff. Noone 
went there. They buy milk powder, when they run out, and if it is three 
times as expensive, they still buy it, because they have to. They live from 
hand to mouth. " 
Interestingly enough the person who told this story was a German. Now if we compare 
Germans to Venezuelans there is one striking difference in evolution. Germany had to 
suffer from two world wars and serious famine twice this century, while Venezuela has 
never ever been involved in any war, except the war of independence against Spain 200 
years ago. 
4.6 Differences 
4.6.1 A country of contrasts 
"Venezuela is a land of jungle darkness and bright city lights, full of 
contradictions and paradoxes. ' 28 
Although this quotation is more than 20 years old, nothing much seems to have changed 
since then. Infoamericas stated about Venezuela in 1998: 
"The contrasts of rich and poor, new and old, urban and rural all weave a 
s429 complex social structure that is different from any in the world. 
427 Interview with a female Venezuelan project manager working for a German multinational engineering 
and construction company. 
428 Allen, 1977, p. 7. 429 Infoamericas, 1998b, p. 1. 
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Like many other Latin American States, Venezuela is a country of contrasts: modem 
industrial businesses exist next to obsolete manufacturing plants, elegance and richness 
next to poverty, luxurious housing areas next to slums, sophisticated culture next to 
intellectual backwardness. 430 
4.6.1.1 Binomial wealth distribution 
All of Latin America seems to be very unequal in its distribution of income and 
wealth. 431 Compared to Southeast Asian countries and the more developed world, where 
the wealthiest 5 percent receive 16 and 13 percent of all national income on average, 432 
they get 25 percent in Latin America. 
According to staff estimates based on official household survey data for 1996 the story 
for Venezuela is as follows. While the top 20 percent of all households received just 
over half of total household income in 1996, the bottom 40 percent received less than 15 
percent of total income. About one third of all households reported monthly incomes of 
less than Bs 50,000 per month (about US$ 106), and another third reported incomes 
between Bs 50,000 and Bs 100,000. By contrast, about 1 percent of all households 
reported incomes above Bs 600,000 (about US$1.275). 433 
4.6.1.2 Regional differences 
"60 to 70 percent of business life happened in Caracas, although the money 
was produced in Maracaibo, because the oil fields are there. But all the 
administration, all the money was in Caracas. Maracaibo produced, so 
Caracas can live. This has not changed. "434 
Different sections of the country reflect quite different life-styles. Caracas for example 
is a modern, sophisticated, cosmopolitan city. Mortimer (1990) states, that its citizens 
contrast sharply with the llaneros, the persons of the interior plains and cattle-ranching 
areas, who continue to lead a rugged existence. 35 
430 Rother, 1972, p. 5. 
431 IADB, 1998, p. 7. 
432 ibid., 1998, p. 11. 
433 IMF, 1998a, p. 33. 
434 Interview with a Venezuelan manager working as regional director at a German MNC in the 
ass 
pharmaceuticals industry. 
Mortimer, 1990, ve0026/1. 
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It is believed that the mentality of the Andean peoples is marked by some sort of 
lethargy, that will not be found in centres like Lima or Caracas, but as soon as one 
reaches the provinces, starting behind the coastal strip, they are a hundred years behind. 
As a consequence it is almost impossible to describe a typical Venezuelan. "The 
different ways of thinking among Venezuelans can only be expressed by one word, a 
"a36 word which in turn, signifies all words: Diversity. 
As mentioned before population and life in Venezuela is concentrated on 5 to 6 centres: 
Caracas, Valencia, Maracaibo, Puerto Ordaz, and Baquisimeto. Except Puerto Ordaz 
they are all located in the northern part of the country, close to the Caribbean coast. 
This can be seen as a relict from colonial times, where the coastal regions were settled 
but not the interior of the country. And the region of Ciudad Guayana would not have 
developed if the state had not established the CVG to develop industry there. 
436 Ministerio de Desarollo, 1995, p. 26. 
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In the south there are vast regions of Amazonian rainforest, little infrastructure, and the 
area is sparsely populated with indigenous tribes. 
Even the 5 bigger cities vary in many respects. Climate for example: While Caracas is 
approximately 1,000 metres above sea level, Maracaibo is located at sea level. 
Thus temperatures rise up to 40,45 degrees centigrade, and therefore it is natural that 
workers tend to work at a slower pace and need to take a rest more often to recuperate. 
It is not necessarily because they are lazy. 
Another point of regional differences can be found in the levels of employment and 
criminality. According to a German expatriate manager who works and lives in Puerto 
Ordaz, there 
"is almost no criminality and a high level of employment. The infrastructure 
is good, and people have an income. In Puerto Ordaz there are 1 million 
inhabitants, shopping malls. s437 
This sounds completely different from the stories one hears about Caracas for example, 
where the police tell you not to stop at red lights at night in order to avoid people 
knocking at your car door and waving a gun at your head. 
4.6.2 Venezuela and Latin America 
Argentines are considered to be more European, due to the history of settlement and 
climate. Colombia and Venezuela are more or less close to the equator, thus not having 
the four seasons. This shows in their mentality as well. They are more cheerful and not 
as sterile and cool as the Argentines or the Chileans. One interviewee even called the 
latter groups "Prussian" in their attitudes. Argentina is said to be a European melting 
pot. In earlier days before the oil bonanza Venezuela was influenced by the Spanish and 
Germans as well, but it is now more "infiltrated" by the USA. This contrast even shows 
in the electric voltage. In Venezuela 110 Volts are used, in Argentina it is 220 Volts. 
437 Interview with a German expatriate manager who works for a German company doing business in the 
steelworks supplier industry and lives in Puerto Ordaz. 
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5 Preliminary view on business culture in Venezuela 
5.1 Education 
5.1.1 Evolution of the educational system 
There is no continuous development of the educational system in Venezuela. Its 
development is characterised by periods of advancement followed by stagnation. This 
spotty evolution was caused by a lack of direction, conflicting ideologies, and by 
political manipulation, hampering the evolution of effective universal education well 
into the 20`h century. 
Education was a function of the Roman Catholic Church during colonial times, being 
directed at a minority of cultured landowners and future clerics. "The notion of 
education for a privileged few reflected a rigid hierarchical social system that 
distinguished between the man of letters and the man who worked with his hands. s438 
It was not until 1870, that free public education came into existence. Guzmän Blanco 
issued a decree on education, recognising education as a threefold responsibility of the 
nation, the states, and the municipalities. 39 
Despite the fact that Venezuela had one of the highest per capita incomes and lowest 
percentages of rural population in the 1960s, its literacy rate is still low in comparison 
to the leading Latin American countries 440 
Generally, literacy rates, education and training levels in LDCs are low by Western 
standards 44' According to Duryea and Szekely (1998), the average Latin American over 
the age of 25 went to school for 6.5 years, ranging from 9.5 years in Argentina in 1996 
to 4.35 years in Nicaragua in 1993. In these statistics Venezuela can be found in the 
upper third out of twenty countries with a mean of 7.2 years of schooling. 442 
438 Blutstein, 1977, p. 79. 
439 ibid., 1977, p. 79. 
440 See Austin, 1990, p. 44; see also figure on population growth in the chapter on economic development 
in Venezuela earlier on in the thesis. 441 Austin, 1990, p. 44. 442 Duryea and Szekely, 1998, p. 9. According to IADB (1998, p. 40), the average years of schooling in 
Venezuela is approximately 6 years. 
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This figure does not take into consideration how many people attended school on a 
regular basis, nor does it consider whether pupils were actually literate after finishing 
school. 
Although school is compulsory from grade 1 to 9 or from 6 to 14 years of age, one big 
problem is the high rate of repetition and dropout among primary and secondary 
students. 443 According to the Ministeno de Educacion, 63.8 percent of the children who 
started school in 1988 and 1989 gave up between 1St and 6th grade (in 1995 and 1996). 
In 1992, almost one quarter of all 7th grade pupils dropped out. 444 Many children need to 
work while going to school to provide financial support for the family. According to 
Psacharopoulos (1994, p. 384) 14 (legal working age) and 15 year olds work 34 hours a 
week, contributing about 27 percent to household income. This again has a negative 
effect on educational attainment, as working children will have attended school two 
years less than non-working ones (4.7 years instead of 6.5). This might be insufficient to 
achieve life-long literacy. 
During la epoca saudi, Venezuelan literacy was improving a great deal. In 1950 the 
literacy rate was 53%, by 1971 it had climbed to 79%. This improvement was mainly 
achieved by the Adult Education Division of the Ministry of Education and its many 
different programmes, especially those directed at rural adults aas An institution called 
INCE was established, the National Institute for Educational Co-operation. It carries out 
training and apprenticeship programmes funded by the state. It is a good attempt, but 
one institution is not enough to satisfy the nation's increasing training needs. 446 Due to 
rising poverty, many children leave school for good not having made it to secondary 
level. Hence, they are so little educated that they cannot apply to INCE. 
5.1.2 Public education and State programmes 
In 1958 it was decided to double the student population. 47 A large number of working 
class youths strove to enter the universities for a simple reason: 
443 psacharopoulos, 1994, p. 378; Blutstein, 1977, p. 86. 444 see Marquez, 1996, pp. 114-115. aas Blutstein, 1977, p. 82. 
446 Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, pp. 102,397. 447 Stewart, 1986, p. 223. 
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They knew that only by acquiring professional credentials they could overcome their 
underprivileged status and open up new opportunities possibly creating social 
mobility. 448 
Money was spent on large buildings, but not on training staff. This resulted in a massive 
shortage of qualified teachers, obviously producing unqualified students. 
Even worse, it was a normal habit of professors to devote much of their time to several 
other jobs, different from research and teaching. 49 Due to the acute shortage of staff 
and to an unprofessional administration, it was fairly common that professors had chairs 
at different universities at the same time, and teachers were holding lessons at different 
schools, being paid a multiple of their normal salary. Needless to say, it pretty is 
impossible for a lecturer to attend three different classes in three different regions on a 
Monday morning at eight o'clock simultaneously. Thus pupils suffered most, receiving 
only 120 half days of education per year. 450 The sad result is, according to university 
professors in Venezuela, that Venezuelan pupils having attained a qualification similar 
to A-levels cannot write and spell properly. 
In Perez' Fifth National Plan (1975-1980) the importance of education and training was 
again emphasised 45' To meet the expanding need for specialised skills the government 
was engaged in a two-pronged programme in which Venezuelan students were being 
trained at home and abroad and trained technicians and administrators were being 
recruited in foreign countries. 
Another half hearted attempt to improve the education system can be seen in the 
academic grant programme, called becas educativas. It was supposed to provide grants 
to economically disadvantaged students. Unfortunately, the distribution of application 
forms was left to local politicians and interest groups. Being dependent on this informal 
power structure, many schools did not receive any application form at all 452 
448 Cubitt, 1995, p. 89; Ellner, 1986, p. 325. 
449 Ellner, 1986, p. 316. 
450 see Marquez, 1996, p. 136; this paragraph is based on an interviews done with Venezuelan managers. 451 Myers and Martz, 1986, pp. 441-442. 452 Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 350. 
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Coppedge (1994) states, that even the staffing of social organisations is frequently 
conducted along party lines. According to him, rumours exist "that even beauty contests 
are decided along party lines. "453 
There is a big discrepancy between private and public universities. The ones belonging 
to the second group are lagging behind, even in terms of infrastructure. Some are 
difficult to access, that is, only via unpaved roads 454 On the other hand there are private 
universities, up to Western standards. 
5.1.3 Private schools 
Certain high schools have started to become increasingly elitist. Private universities, 
such as the Catholic University or the University Simon Bolivar (USB), were soon 
ranked academically higher than the public UCV. While children coming from 
wealthier families could afford to enter a private institution, receiving superior academic 
training, pupils from the lower classes had no other than to go to a public university, 
and waiting for several years in order to be registered 455 
According to Cubitt (1995) class background constitutes "an important factor in the 
level of schooling achieved, partly because the higher the level the greater the cost ... 
and partly because the increased educational facilities are best in the well-to-do 
residential areas. "456 
5.1.4 Labour force - The need of professional vocational training 
According to a study done by Kelly (1994) international managers complain, that it is 
harder to find skilled labour than to recruit managers or professionals. 57 Five years later 
nothing seems to have changed, as the present research project comes to the same 
conclusion. 
In their study of human resource formation and competitiveness in Venezuela, Granell 
and Parra (1993) found out, that most plant operators lack secondary education. 
453 
Coppedge, 1994, p. 28. 454 This was the experience made of a German manager who works for a company producing educational 
equipment and training systems for science and technology. 456 Elmer, 1986, p. 314. 456 Cubitt, 1995, p. 90. 
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Some managers see in the nation's shortage of skilled labour a serious constraint on 
their capacity to be competitive, as it creates production and organisational problems. 
German expatriates put a lot of emphasis on the German dual system of the Lehre, 
where a profession is learned both by doing and by going to school, Berufsschule, paid 
by the government, while at the same time working at a company. One interviewee even 
said that this system guarantees the existence of German prosperity and welfare, as it 
strengthens the middle class, and thus ensures a high rate of employment. 
The reason for the shortage of skilled workers in Venezuela is self-evident. During the 
times of a protected, closed domestic market, the labour-force never had to be trained. 
They did not have to produce superior products, because there was simply no need to do 
so, due to import substitution and to artificial prices. The state always favoured 
prestigious education projects and never made a structured long-term investment in a 
sound basic education. Therefore, a system like the German Lehre has never come into 
existence in Venezuela. 
A Venezuelan expatriate manager in Germany finds a good explanation for this, saying 
that Venezuela did not invest in the right education because they chose the easier 
option. What they did was similar to outsourcing: During the times of the easy money, 
people got generous stipends to go and study in the United States. Unfortunately many 
of the students that got the chance to study abroad never came back. This phenomenon 
is widely knows as exportaciön de celebros (the export of brains). It was easier to send 
people abroad than to build up good universities in their own country. 
In many specialised areas advanced training programmes have not been established yet. 
Hence some sectors of industry and commerce have developed their own in-house 
training programmes, and research and development centres, although these are 
exceptions from the rule. In the case of expatriate companies, it is common to send 
people that are in need of training to `mother company' in order to obtain further 
qualifications. Most Venezuelan companies still think that it is a state's task to look 
after training ass 
The issue tends to be that in-house trained, and therefore better qualified employees are 
lured away by better job-offers from other companies. A machinist who works in Puerto 
457 Price Waterhouse, 1997, p. 55; Kelly, us1994, p. 291; Austin, 1990, p. 45; Borcherdt, 1980, p. 236; 
Kulinat, 1980, p. 252. ass Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, pp. 213,226; 398,425; Blutstein, 1977, p. 88. 
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Ordaz and gets the chance to be trained in Germany and also acquires some German, 
will be very attractive to other companies in Venezuela as well. Having returned, he is 
not likely to be willing to continue to work in the provinces any longer, but will almost 
naturally fancy a job in an air-conditioned office in Caracas - and he will get it. The 
widespread opinion, that Latin American company-worker relations are marked by a 
high rate of loyalty cannot be generalised. Due to the fact, that payment is still low and 
people need any money they can get in order to make a living, it is natural that they tend 
to switch companies according to who pays most. Asking a Spanish area manager about 
how to get workforce, he answered, 
"Either you teach them, or you buy them ready-made. You offer them a 
couple of Bolivares more and easily you get a skilled worker. " 
Or as a Venezuelan manager put it: 
"Every Venezuelan is a big opportunist. And because of the wages, he has 
to be ... Loyalty of the employees is not really there, if you offer a 
colleague, a secretary, a salesman, a bookkeeper 100 Dollars more per 
month. That is a lot of money. " 
In contrast to the difficulties companies experienced in finding technically skilled 
labour (blue collar), getting appropriately trained people in the administrative and 
technical engineering sector (white collar) was not as difficult. Apart from being better 
motivated, many of them had an international background and education. 
5.1.5 Education of managers 
People who can afford it send their children abroad, mainly to the USA or to Europe to 
go to university. The prestige one gains and the higher standards these schools have, 
attract many students who are willing to optimise their education in order to start a 
career in business. The positive side effect is that they come back, if they do at all, 
speaking a second language. On the other hand an international education involves high 
costs. Therefore, "who cannot afford it, stays at the same level. That is the reason why 
today's elite is the same as it was before. s459 Unlike in Germany, where it is possible for 
the lower middle class to obtain a sound education including university, the lack of 
financial resources in Venezuela means restricted upward mobility. 
459 Interview with a German expatriate who works as a marketing manager, area management South 
America. 
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At least in big companies or multinational firms, the present generation of managers, i. e. 
between 30 and 50 years of age, seems to be highly qualified, and according to a 
German manager who formerly worked as an expatriate manager in Venezuela, they can 
be assigned to work in the USA or in Europe as well. And of course they know their 
price. Highly educated people tend to be very expensive. As one of our German 
interviewees declared: 
"If you pay international prices, you can get exceptional people. 460 
The generation before, the pioneers and immigrants who built up companies, did not 
necessarily have a university degree. This situation can be compared to Germany after 
the Second World War. 
5.1.6 Tasks for the future 
As education is one of the society's socialisation mechanisms, values and certain ideals 
can be maintained, encouraged, or altered through it. 461 
Ordinary spending on education, selected nations 
Coukri Primary Secondary 
Mexico 1990 133 261 744 
United States 1986 3,281 6,638 4,812 
Brazil 1990 225 256 1,421 
Chile 1989 223 178 639 
Colombia 1991 76 118 442 
Venezuela 1988 104 281 1,162 
Spending per student, i. e. public spending plus support to private education in US$. 
Source: UNESCO 
Table 9: Ordinary spending on education, selected nations. 
(source: Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 207) 
460 Interview with a German expatriate who works as a marketing manager, area management South 
America. 
461 Cubitt, 1995, p. 89. 
Preliminary view on business culture in Venezuela 128 
Education provides the chance to make people start thinking that it is important to be 
educated in order to push the country's development further ahead and to understand, 
that the state cannot provide money and support for everything. 
Motivating people to do things that will result in the common good rather than simply 
putting one's trust in fatalism and state paternalism might lead to economic 
improvement. 
As Enright, Frances, and Saavedra put it, "natural resources ... do not create wealth 
by 
themselves. They must be developed in an intelligent fashion by people with the skills 
to produce, market, manage, innovate, and compete. "462 
The chart above shows that vast amounts of money are spent on tertiary education. 
Experts consider Venezuela to have the worst educational and vocational system in 
Latin America. 463 According to them, it is comparable with that of Haiti. Venezuela's 
A-levels are accepted hardly anywhere. Higher education is favoured over primary and 
secondary education. For the future it will be necessary to focus more on primary 
education in order to create a solid basis for further vocational education. 64 
462 Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 104. 
463 BfAi, 1998b, p. 5. 
464 see also World Bank, 1998, p. 26. 
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5.2 Attitude towards work 
According to Enright, Frances, and Saavedra (1996), Venezuelan employees tend to 
change companies rather often, thus inhibiting the accumulation of knowledge and 
experience by any particular company. 465 An opposed view is offered by Gomez (1994), 
when he generalises for the Latinos that they consider work to be an extended family, 
thus having a strong sense of loyalty to employing organisaations 466 Furthermore, 
Gomez suggests, Latinos would strongly value co-operation and group cohesiveness. 
So what observations could be made during the research project? Do the research 
findings allow us to generalise about the attitude Venezuelans have towards work? 
Depending on company size and level of foreign participation, differences concerning 
the attitude to work and loyalty to the company can be identified. As discussed before in 
the chapter on the Venezuelan economy, there are mainly two types of firms in 
Venezuela: either big ones, or small ones. The more owner-oriented and personal the 
company is, the more loyal the workforce tends to be. Especially in small firms with 
Venezuelan ownership paternalism still can be found. The atmosphere can be typified 
as friendly and pacifico, peaceful. 
On the other hand, how is the mentality of the Venezuelan workforce perceived by 
expatriate managers working for foreign owned companies? 467 It seems as if the 
Venezuelan generally is more relaxed about work and about the tasks one asks him to 
do, but once he is motivated and understands the importance of the job he has to do, he 
will work overtime, even on Saturdays and Sundays, showing a high level of 
involvement, motivation, and reliability, lacking the mafiana-mentality popularly 
associated with Latin America. A German manager running a subsidiary in the steel 
industry at Puerto Ordaz told the story of how they managed to move from high labour 
turnover to a high degree of loyalty. 
"There may be many reasons for it. They have a secure job. The company 
structure is clear. There is no doubt in decisions. Furthermore, the 
employees know that they do something very special, that not everybody 
465 Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 127. 466 Gomez, 1994, p. 37. 46' The following paragraph is based on interviews done with German expatriate managers, who used to 
work for and run companies in Venezuela. 
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else is capable of doing. What seems to be very important in many areas is 
the existence of a feeling of fellowship. To promote it, we give small 
parties, i. e. a BBQ, if it is an employee's birthday. s468 
The mentality of marana is still very immanent in for example Peru and Ecuador, 
though not in countries like Chile or Argentina. Venezuela seems to be somewhere in 
between. The more educated the workforce, the less they tend to postpone decisions and 
work to next day, week, or month. Many interviewees called them the new generation. 
However, two groups can be identified that still tend to display the mentality of 
manana: People with a low level of education469 and bureaucrats in public institutions. 
As one German manager who often had to deal with members of both groups put it, 
contrasting it nicely with Germany, 
"Germans that are being sent to Venezuela or live in the country, if they 
want to continue to live the German way, like going to an office, applying 
for an admission, paying 15 Deutsche Mark, like it is written down in the 
schedule of fees, they start to crack up, they won't survive their first year. 
Either they get a heart attack or they shoot any other person and themselves. 
You have to be a bit Latino or Venezuelan if you want to live there. ... You also cannot treat them like in Germany. Over there (in Germany) if you tell 
him once, do it this way, he says, ok, I do it this (your) way. The Venezuelan 
also says, Si, Si, I do it this way, but as soon as you turn around, he has 
already forgotten what he was supposed to do. You have to control, follow 
up, and check enormously. "470 
The common perception of German managers was that Venezuelans promise a lot, but 
will not adhere to it, or it will take them weeks to get things done. Thus expatriates 
considered it necessary either to stay at the subsidiary personally or to have somebody 
trustworthy there. It still happens that Venezuelans do not stick to deadlines as eagerly 
as Germans tend to. In order to make sure that operations run as they are supposed to, 
managers sometimes had to take measures that are fairly uncommon in Europe: 
"We sometimes have to work with telephone terror if they cannot deliver 
these weekly reports on time. "47' 
It was widely felt that the reason is to be found in the low level of education and in the 
consequences of the oil bonanza, where people just did not have to work. As the new 
468 Interview with a German expatiate manager who works for a German company doing business in the 
469 
steelworks supplier industry and living in Puerto Ordaz. I. e. blue collar workers, but also older generation managers. ä7l Interview with a German manager in the logistics industry. Interview with the director Of international sales and operations of a company in the sealing business. 
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generation did not experience the 1970s, changes in attitude towards work are more than 
likely to occur in the future. 
5.3 The impact of trade unions 
There is only a very small number of individual trade unions. Most of them are brought 
together in three umbrella organisations: Confederaciön de Trabajadores de Venezuela 
(CTV), Confederacidn de Sindicatos Autönomos de Venezuela (CODESA) and 
Movimiento Nacional de Trabajadores para la Liberaciön (MONTRAL) 472 
The largest and most influential one is the CTV, founded in 1936, having approximately 
1.5 million members in 1994, being closely related to AD, owning companies and 
banks. CODESA is considered to be linked to COPEI (the Social Christian Party), 
counting up to 60,000 members. 73 
The existence of so-called sindicatos is fairly common in factories. Their main task is 
not so much preserving salaries or wages, because the devaluation of the currency 
happens too quickly anyway, but in guaranteeing jobs for employees. This tends to pose 
a problem to companies who are willing to restructure their business. They cannot lay 
off people, because the trade unions simply forbid it. 
5.4 Labour market 
The labour market is highly regulated, and thus laying-off people is difficult, `adjusting' 
the workforce is expensive, and the cost of labour is comparatively high. 474 Firms are 
therefore reluctant to take on new employees. In consequence 47.5 percent of total 
workforce earns a living in the informal sector. 475 
Deregulation of the labour market might reduce the cost of labour in the formal sector 
relative to the informal one. This might lead to higher employment in the higher wage 
formal sector and a decrease in the lower wage informal sector. 476 
472 0. V., 1992, p. 107; to get information about the history of trade unions, see Zink (1977). 473 Schmid, 1999a, p. 6; Morrisson, 1994, p. 97. 474 Price Waterhouse, 1997, p. 20. 475 BfAi, 1998b, p. 2. 476 World Bank, 1998, p. 25. 
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5.5 A preliminary view of management in Venezuela 
5.5.1 Importance of researching international management with a focus on 
culture 
Cultural competencies are essential in international business and trade. They help both 
sales and technical people to avoid cultural blunders, and they can also be helpful for 
creating cultural synergy. 
"Cultural learning is a means for managers and other leaders to become more global and 
cosmopolitan in their outlook and behaviour, as well as more effective and profitable in 
their practices. i477 
5.5.2 Who are the managers in Venezuela ? 
It is impossible to answer this question in a universally valid way, but there are some 
points that can be made. Private companies tend to be owned by families. Depending on 
the firm's size, they are either listed on the stock market or incorporated. Although in 
some companies the executive level is left to professional, highly educated, and creative 
people, being recruited in a way similar to that in Germany, not necessarily originating 
from the company-owning family, key positions such as director of finance, director of 
administration, or members of the supervisory board tend to be staffed with members of 
the owner's family. 
5.5.3 Be a dolphin, not a shark or a carp ! 
Venezuelans managers expect their business partners to be creative, and capable of 
solving problems whatever nature they are. What they want is the dolphin, someone 
who can improvise, who can lead and who is full of ideas. They neither like carps, 
because they are boring, nor do they like sharks, because they bite. 
477 Moran and Harris, 1987, p. 24. 
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5.5.4 Management Attitudes and Business Values 
5.5.4.1 Emphasis of authority 
A manager of a German subsidiary in Venezuela noticed that whenever Venezuelans are 
entrusted with power, they tend to display it great deal. It is necessary sometimes, 
because if one does not, tasks usually take longer to get done. Especially people who 
formerly worked for public companies have the inclination to exert an authoritarian, 
somewhat paternalistic way of management, instead of a co-operative style as is 
increasingly practised in German companies. Venezuelans expect him to be the boss, 
who tells others which direction to take. 
The observation the German manager made seems to correspond with Stewart's (1986) 
opinion of management in traditional family-owned firms, where leadership is only 
exercised by the patron, the head of the company, and "all effective lines of 
communication to and from this leader are personal. "478 Management control also tends 
to be informal, and using first names is common. 
The main issue with authoritarian leadership patterns is that binding decisions are made 
exclusively by the leader. Hence, the organisation is incapable of deciding anything but 
the most routine actions when the leader is elsewhere. 479 This problem also occurs in 
bigger companies, where executive officers do not have the decision-making 
competence one would normally expect them to have. Thus they cannot decide 
autonomously and have to ask the patron to have the final say. It may happen, that quite 
a few meetings need to be held before the true decision-maker has been found. In that 
way, valuable time may be lost, and the negotiation process tends to take longer than 
people from Europe expect. 
Another characteristic of management by patron (MbP) is that the manager is 
considered to be a father figure who knows about the employee's private life and 
personal problems - at least in small companies. 480 
"Oh, yes. It is still that same old song about one big family. s481 
478 Stewart, 1986, p. 225. 
479 ibid., 1986, p. 225. 
480 The range, different managers were talking about was between 150 and 1,000 employees. 481 Answer a German sales manager gave, when asked whether he knew how a patron conducts towards his employees. 
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The most significant MbP-features are summed up in the following quotation, from an 
expatriate manager working in the steelworks' suppliers industry: 
"In Venezuela you have to show that you are the boss. Being boss means 
being father. On the one hand you have to put pressure on them, screw 
faster, on the other you have to know what happens to the people in private. 
"482 Who has problems and where, financial ones for example. 
This does not mean that they receive salaries that are above the average. 
5.5.4.2 Short term thinking 
Due to the crises in the early 1990s, many Venezuelan companies are still reluctant to 
plan and invest. These extremely unstable macroeconomic conditions and rapidly 
changing microeconomic settings generate a fire-fighting mentality in management, 
marked by spontaneity, unconventional behaviour. Not much emphasis seems to be put 
on long-term planning, as this is in any case impossible to do. Take inflation for 
example: salary has to be adjusted twice a month due to rapid devaluation. 
"How will it be possible then to develop a five-'ear-business-plan if you do 
not know what is going to happen tomorrow ? "A3 
Surely, it is a question of mentality as well, but it would be too easy to blame the Latino 
mentality for it in general. Thinking back to the times of import substitution and 
domestic market protectionism, it was expected and taken for granted that government 
would find a solution to all problems and issues, where and whenever it was needed. 
This stimulated a relaxed mentality in business strategy and planning. 
A second reason for the characteristic short-term view can be found when thinking 
about the petroleum bonanza. As mentioned earlier, fast fortune-making seems to be 
embedded in the Venezuelan mentality, having an impact on investment behaviour as 
well: 
"There are very few Venezuelans, who like to make long term investments. 
If they invest at all, they make sure they receive a return on investment after 
two or three years, then selling all the stuff to live a life without having to 
work. That is the mentality there in general. There are very few people who 
tackle the problem in a structured way willing to plan long-term. "484 
482 Interview with an expatriate manager working in the steelworks' suppliers industry. 483 Interview with an Argentine sales manager who is responsible for Central America and the Caribbean 
in the chemical industry. 
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Digging even further into Venezuela's history, remembering the mentality of Spanish 
conquistadores: going to Venezuela, robbing the country and then leaving with all the 
gold again, just to satisfy the hunger for short-term profit maximisation, could also 
serve as an explanation as to why Venezuelan business tends to be short-term oriented. 
5.5.5 Business Behaviour in Negotiations 
"It is uncommon for Venezuelan firms to negotiate technology acquisitions 
on a piece-by-piece basis, primarily because they lack a sophisticated 
s48S understanding of what they are buying. 
The following section deals with the peculiar features of dealing with private 
companies. It cannot be generalised to state-owned companies, because these are 
different, and they even differ from each other. On the one hand, there is PDVSA with 
its outstanding performance. When negotiating with them you get to deal with managers 
that are mostly trained in the USA. Therefore, their way of doing business is strongly 
influenced by North America, lacking the so-called typical Latin American mentality. 
Coming to terms only takes a short while, they tell you quickly what they can do and 
what they cannot do. They do not like to deal with partners, who give the impression of 
not being capable of doin what is expected of them. 
On the other hand, when talking to companies like CVG or Corpozulia, you really do 
talk to ejecutivos venezolanos (Venezuelan executives). There will be much talking, 
many promises, many letters of intent, but little decision-making. 
5.5.5.1 The human side: emphasis on friendship and honesty 
As Naim observed in 1989, it is much more useful to count on a good friendship than to 
rely on a written contract. 86 Critics might argue that Venezuelans do not like to read or 
write a lot. They prefer to talk because who writes, rests. Writing is something for 
artists. We want to do business. 
484 Interview with a German executive sales manager working in the web-fed presses industry. ass Enright, Frances, and Saavedra, 1996, p. 226. 486 Naim, 1989, p. 503. 
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It is important to establish a personal, yet still professional relationship with your client, 
being characterised by honesty and loyalty. A Spanish manager working for a German 
MNC put it this way: 
"Venezuelan clients like it if you tell them, with my product the problem 
cannot be solved. I would rather advise you to buy the product from 
company so and so as they deal with those things. You can put yourself out 
of business, if you desperately try to find solutions to a problem where you 
know that you cannot solve it. Therefore, honesty gets rewarded in a way.... 
If Venezuelans are pleased with the product and the service they receive 
they tend to stick to the supplier. It happens that if a competitor comes up to 
them making a better offer, they call you, saying Mr. so and so was here 
proposing a better price. Can you do anything ? We don't want to loose you 
as a supplier. 9487 
It can be seen, that by establishing trust, the supplier gets the chance to have a last word. 
How then can trust be achieved one might wonder ? 
The answer will be given by quoting an Argentine sales manager working in the feed 
additives industry. The example given also gives evidence, that Venezuelans do not like 
paper-work: 
"Generally speaking, people do not like to run around with lots of paper. If 
you tell the people ok, I do the paperwork and you just order and get the 
goods at this date, then you have already won a big bit of confidence. It 
happens that we do more stock management than our clients. You go into 
their warehouse, studying their stocks and ... say, ... if you don't order soon, 
you will run into difficulties. It happens that he orders without asking the 
price, because he trusts you that you will give him a competitive price. " 
Although negotiations can be tough, they tend to be relaxed, friendly, full of sympathy, 
and not as dogged, matter-of-fact, direct, and sterile as in Germany. 488 There is always a 
human side to it. People do not only try to reach an agreement, but they also try to 
approach the other in a personal way and to establish a personal atmosphere. 
This phenomenon cannot be generalised for all of Latin America. Business in Argentina 
and Chile is said to be more formal and pressurised, more pragmatic, but less emotional 
and lacking humour. It is sometimes even considered artificial and unnatural. According 
to a German manager, negotiating with Chileans and Venezuelans is as similar as doing 
business with Scandinavians and Greeks. 
487 Interview with a Spanish manager working for a German company doing business with light bulbs. 488 This account is taken from several interviews to create a fuller picture. 
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The importance of getting to know the business partner as a person, is not so much 
based on the Latin American mentality, but more on precaution. A Venezuelan manager 
argues the following way: 
"The social part and the personal acquaintance are at least as important as 
the hard facts. Because facts can lie. Any Venezuelan manager can show 
you wonderful figures about what his company can do, owns, promises, and 
you have to believe it. ... The 
figures can be faked. Anyway, you will find 
out when it is too late. Therefore, socialising is not only common for 
Venezuelan negotiation partners, but you as a potential investor want to get 
to know the human side of your business partner. Paper is patient, and that 
is why even today many deals are getting fixed on solely personal grounds. " 
Many facts are only obtained off record, when going sailing or playing golf together. 
The informal part afterwards seems to be as important as the official presentation 
before. 
Unlike Germany, where "Dienst ist Dienst, und Schnaps ist Schnaps", these two things 
seem to belong together in Venezuela. Although becoming less common, it still happens 
that deals are agreed at a location other than the office, e. g. at clubs, during dinner, or at 
social events, like marriages. 
It is believed, that partnerships last because of friendships, and not because of figures 
and revenues. 
If an agreement is unattainable, negotiations do not normally end abruptly. A German 
executive sales manager of web-fed printing presses mentioned, that whenever 
businesspeople he negotiates with invite him for a big dinner a red alarm light switches 
on in his head, because it could be a sign that they want to give something special to 
him. Reading between the lines, it means: You won't get the contract, not because you 
failed as a human, but because of other parameters. We still think highly of you as a 
person. 
5.5.5.2 Fast business, but to rush means to displace oneself 
Venezuelans do not like to be put under pressure in business. An Argentine manager put 
it this way: 
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"Latinos have fun during work, and they take it easier. I would say, we have 
countries in Latin America where no one dies of stress or suffers because of 
stress. s489 
What can be concluded is that people seem to be more relaxed about work. 
Another reason could be found in the fact that Venezuelans tend to be proud as 
suggested in the chapter about society and mentality. It is important to let them take 
their time to make up their mind: if not, they start believing that the other person tries to 
cheat on them. The result is that they lose trust in you. It is superfluous to say that it is 
nearly impossible then to re-establish the same level of relationship again, or to put it in 
the words of an Argentine manager: 
"Ten good deeds do not make up for one bad one. s490 
This does not mean that negotiations tend to take a long time. The opposite is often the 
case. Venezuelans like quick and spontaneous decision-taking, being in a way 
opportunistic. They know that good deals rarely occur in present times of economic 
imbalance and rising poverty. It is also a question of mentality: The Venezuelan dream 
of fast fortune seeking manifests itself in it somehow. 
If they consider a deal as a good opportunity, it might even happen that the contract will 
be agreed orally. The written part will be done at a later stage. 
It is also important to make sure that everyone who is involved in negotiations knows 
what the other is talking about. Especially when negotiating with foreigners 
Venezuelans need to feel that they are on the same level in terms of knowledge and not 
inferior. If they do not, they fear to make mistakes or to misunderstand the other party. 
Continuing the process of talking is difficult then, because Venezuelans tend to distrust 
the other easily, as soon as they start to feel insecure. 
When comparing the course of negotiations in Venezuela to the German or Anglo- 
Saxon way, big differences can be identified. For northern Europeans it is normal to 
receive a schedule before the meeting starts, telling you exactly what is to be negotiated, 
which milestones need to be agreed on, at what time the meeting will be finished. 
489 Interview with an Argentine manager working in sales for a German MNC doing business in 
chemicals. 490 ibid. 
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Nothing will be left to chance or fate. The Venezuelan course will not be fixed in 
advance. 
First of all, negotiations never start directly with business. Common topics are baseball, 
family or social events. 
"You need to empathise. You need to project yourself into the negotiation 
partner's mind. You don't start with (talking business) straight away. ... You 
need to talk about something completely different, about the beautiful 
beach, about the nice weekend. ... Approaching directly to be effective 
is not 
on. "491 
Then at some point in time Venezuelans will switch to the issues that need to be 
discussed, but it is hardly a continuous process. Breaks will be likely to occur in terms 
of taking coffee, or discussing last week's football match. 
There is some danger to it, because one never really knows when the process of 
negotiation has finished. As one interviewee put it: 
"it might be in the taxi just as you are on your way back to the airport. " 
5.5.5.3 Identifying the decision-taker 
Especially for foreigners finding the person who has the final say is difficult, because it 
happens that everyone tries to show his importance. Interestingly enough, spotting the 
decision taker quickly is an easier task for a Venezuelan, Spanish, or any other Latin 
American person due to their cultural similarities. Venezuelans like to show that they 
are responsible even if they are not. Thus valuable time is wasted if one identifies the 
wrong person as the decision-taker, because he does not have the power to seal the 
business. In this case even if things are agreed upon, the chances are high that they will 
get changed again. Once the dominant person is found, and he approves, one can be sure 
that no alternations will occur in the future. 
On the other hand, it is vital to give all people involved the feeling that they are 
necessary in the business process, otherwise they will try to make life hard for you by 
blocking your requests or by making you wait if you need favours from them. 
491 Interview with a German expatriate area sales manager. 
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Compared to Japan, where one can infer the hierarchical structures by looking at the 
order of sitting, it is not possible to find out the decision taker in this way in Venezuela. 
Again, one often needs to read between the lines. Like in heavy industries, where the 
dress-code is informal, the CEO might wear blue jeans and a short sleeved shirt, but he 
also might be the person who carries a pen visibly, that cost 400 to 500 US-Dollars. 
The issue discussed above will not pose a problem when dealing with small businesses, 
because the patron or gerente general will negotiate personally, as he does not like to 
delegate financial matters to subordinates. Furthermore, 
"he is the one who invites you for dinner, takes you to the pub, drives you 
around, provides you with work, he is also the one who fixes wages and 
prices. "4 2 
5.5.6 Business networking 
5.5.6.1 Importance of personalismo in doing business 
"Whoever wants to be successful in Venezuela or Latin America today, has 
to manage with the elements a local company also uses to be successful. It is 
not good enough to have good products and a handsome face, but when in 
Rome, do as the Romans do. It is important to build a social network. The 
social network is more important than in other Latin American countries, 
more important than in Chile, Brazil, or Argentina, where decisions in 
business are made with the head. In Venezuela a lot is still jabbered. s493 
Personal contacts at all levels in Venezuela are vital to success in business. 494 
The conviction is widespread, that it is only through personal ties that benefits can be 
expected. 95 When a supplier needs to be chosen, a contractor or a business partner 
needs to be found, personal ties and considerations of kinship or loyalty are valued more 
highly than cost or quality. Obviously certain standards need to be met, but if only one 
supplier has to be chosen, good connections will be decisive. Although this way of 
doing business is declining, as companies are forced to take cost efficiency more 
seriously due to the liberalisation of markets and the increasing influence of American 
management education, these connection-based decisions are still typical for 
Venezuelan business culture. 
492 Interview with a German manager in the blanket printing business. 493 Interview with a Venezuelan expatriate manager in Germany. 494 As mentioned in the chapter on bureaucracy, good connections are called palanca, the lever of a 
machine to get things moving. 
495 Stewart, 1986, p. 228; compare with the chapter on bureaucracy. 
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According to Cubitt (1995) this can be seen as a Latin American phenomenon, saying, 
that "despite the spread of values emphasising achievement and competition, 
personalism remains an essential feature of social relations in Latin America, probably 
because of the continuance of uncertainty and insecurity. s496 As even the fortunes of the 
affluent can vary a lot, due to political and economic instability, it is important to know 
people one can trust. Therefore much time is invested in keeping the informal network 
of business relationships functioning. 97 Therefore, visiting friends, socialising in clubs, 
and showing up at private or official events can be seen as important ways to keep 
oneself connected to and embedded in the network. This obviously takes money as well, 
but some day personal relationships might be more useful than high savings ! 
According to Nairn in 1989, the ownership of the great majority of industrial companies 
is concentrated in the hands of some 5,000 people. The concentration is said to be 
higher than in Brazil, but lower than in Colombia. 498 Therefore, "este pals es un 
panuelo", this country is a handkerchief, meaning, it is a small country. Thus, "si no 
conoces a alguien, seguro que conoces a alguien que lo conoce": if you don't know the 
person, you surely know someone, who knows this person. 
German managers especially interviewed as part of the research were surprised by the 
high level of personalism and the existence of strong personal connections between 
business people. 
It was also discovered that Venezuelans tend to think in groups, or to put it in the words 
of a Venezuelan manager, there is a Corporate Venezuela plc. They all meet. ... 
You are 
either part of the game or you are not. 
It is always "us" (in-group) against "them" (out-group). This has an interesting 
consequence for doing business. If you belong to "the family", your business partner 
will see you as part of the in-group and chances are pretty likely that he will not cheat 
on you and that you get to know people and insider information which you would not 
normally be able to obtain. If you are not part of the game, it will be difficult to 
establish or develop a fair partnership, especially when it comes to financial terms, 
because single- or family-egoism will prevail. 
496 Cubitt, 1995, p. 101. 497 Blutstein, 1977, p. 60. 498 Naim, 1989, pp. 505,507, see also Perez Perdomo, 1990, p. 559. 
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It is small wonder that this characteristic was noticed by Germans, as their way of doing 
business can be described as impersonal and rational. 
The issue that arises is the fact that every important pressure group wants to have a 
representative of its companies on important boards to maintain influence. Severe 
overstaffing is the consequence. 
5.5.6.2 A network to fall back on when running into difficulties 
"Personal contacts are extremely important. And if you have problems 
anywhere, for any problem you need ... 
it is good, if you have someone 
whom you can call and say listen, I have a problem here, could you sort it 
out for me ? And that is the reason why you need to be a member of 
organisations. That means you have to be in the chambers, you have to be in 
clubs. You have to get to know influential people where-ever you can.... 
And if you have problems with customs, you tell the Minister of the Interior, 
who is your colleague in a club, listen, they give me a hard time here. Any 
chance that you could solve it ?- No problem, I will. And the next day, 
everything will be sorted out. On the other hand, you help him as well. That 
is important s499 
In Venezuela, issues might arise in daily life that are completely new to Europeans. 
It might happen, that a policeman stops your car telling you that you crossed a red light, 
although there has not been a single traffic light for miles. Still he insists on it and 
threatens to confiscate your car. If the amount of payment is too cheeky, it is helpful to 
know someone higher up in the police. 
5.5.6.3 Family ties and compadrazgo 
According to Berlin (1996) great importance is attached to family affiliations in 
Venezuelan business environment to protect oneself from a poor system of justice and 
unstable circumstances in general. A manager on his way up spends time cultivating old 
ties and developing new ones. They are thought to play an integral part in being 
financially successful and are sometimes an incentive for leaving a company. 50° 
The tight network of family ties and contacts through all industrial sectors sometimes 
causes problems, because conflicting interests are likely to occur. 50' As it was shown in 
499 Interview with a German expatriate who works as a marketing manager, area management South 
America. 
soo Berlin, 1996, p. 884. so' Naim, 1989, p. 507. 
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the chapter about contemporary economics, large industrial groups exist, that originally 
were family businesses. Some of them still have a board of directors that is made up of 
relatives and close friends who can be trusted. 
Cubitt perceives the Latin American family as a "property-owning unit, whether the 
property is a business, estates, land or houses, so that these resources are controlled and 
acquired by succeeding generations through the family. s502 Even on a smaller scale the 
importance of family can be found. 
"If you employ someone, then after a short while, ... he will come up with the documents of his brothers and sisters, or cousins and tells you that they 
want to work as well. "503 
Despite the continuing influence of American media and educational values, Cubitt 
states that the family remains patriarchal and a key institution in society. This view 
cannot be fully supported, because many interviewees felt that due to rising poverty and 
worsening economic conditions, family ties are destroyed especially among lower 
classes: Most women simply have to work in order to contribute to family income. 
It is legitimate to strengthen family ties by compadrazgo, the ritual sponsorship of 
children by godparents, instituting a set of permanent, personal ties between parents, 
children and godparents. 
A compadre is the kin of a child. He is considered to be very important and is as 
powerful as a direct member of the family, although he does not necessarily belong to 
the family in a conventional-biological sense. Theoretically his duty is to observe the 
child's religious development, but in practice he also supports the child's general 
development as well. 
According to Cubitt (1997), this "establishes a set of permanent relationships between 
parents, godparents, and child or godchild in which the most important relationship 
excludes the child, for it is between parents and godparents. ... (It) is strongest and 
requires respect, warmth, and the obligation to help at all times. "504 
Compadrazgo in an expression to describe the network that can be built up through 
these links: 
502 Cubitt, 1995, p. 107. 503 Interview with the head of division finance and accounting of a German MNC who was responsible for setting up an operation in Venezuela. 504 Cubitt, 1995, p. 104. 
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`By making you a kin of my child, because you have a high position 
somewhere, and as soon as you are a compadre you belong to the family, 
"sos and so you are obliged to give `your family' a good deal. 
Cubitt considers compadrazgo to be an attempt to combine the best of friendship with 
the advantages of kinship by defining the two key words as follows. "Friendship has the 
advantage of choice - friends are chosen by the individual concerned - but it is also 
flexible and not necessarily lasting. Kinship is binding and permanent but permits no 
choice of personnel; the individual must accept the relatives he has"506 
5.5.6.4 How to maintain influence 
"A salesman, on a high level ... was in all clubs, where you had to be a 
member of. Tennis, Golf, I don't know what else, swimming, anything. He 
did business only in the evenings at the bar. He went to the office at half 
past eleven in the morning, checked his mail, then he went home again, and 
sat together with the people who had influence and who decided on 
contracts at the bar until 10 or 12 o'clock at night. 95507 
This anecdote was narrated by a German manager who used to work at a construction 
company that dealt mainly with the public authorities in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
flourishing time of state capitalism. It would not be fair to generalise this testimony to 
all private and public sectors in business, but it gives the flavour of how influence is 
maintained. Clubs are a place where people meet and talk, not necessarily about 
business, but all information that might be of interest is exchanged in order to make life 
and business easier and probably more successful as well. 
There is also a practical side to it as well. It is hardly possible to let your children play 
on the streets, because it is far too dangerous. Life therefore takes place in clubs. 
A Venezuelan expatriate working in investment banking in Germany said a foreigner 
should try to see this phenomenon from a certain angle. He should not consider it to be 
life in a golden cage or prison, but rather compare it to Berlin before the wall came 
down. People who had lived in West Germany in those days felt sorry for those who 
had to live in West Berlin, because they seemed like living in a cage as well. But if one 
505 Interview with a Venezuelan expatriate working for a German MNC. 506 Cubitt, 1995, p. 104. 
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actually asked inhabitants of West Berlin they might have enjoyed their way of live a 
great deal. 
5.5.6.5 Payroll relationship - How private companies maintain influence in 
government policy and politics 
"In Venezuela the basic relation between party leaders and the rank and file is that of 
patron and client. In return for votes and support within the local community the patron 
uses his influence to see that the client benefits at least enough to keep him from 
changing patrons'°sos 
It is a common phenomenon that members of the industrial groups, grupos econömicos, 
do not participate in political parties directly, but in order to maintain influence in 
shaping government policies to their advantage, they make substantial efforts and have 
developed highly effective mechanisms to influence government officials and the 
politicians who appoint them, often by having politicians on company payrolls. 509 Ply 
involvement is still very high in Venezuela, because, following Coppegde (1994) "30 to 
40 percent of the voting-age population are card-carrying party members. "51° 
As Latin American countries are characterised by high volatility, political instability, 
and large economic disparities, the cultivation of ties with influential people within the 
government is useful in that it helps business leaders to anticipate future events and 
threats, and to plan their businesses S11 These connections are sometimes also abused to 
get special projects and contracts approved or awarded. 
5.5.7 Overview: What it means for social interactions 
The following chart shows the implication of some core values for dealings with the 
authorities, for family and friendship, and for social interaction generally. 
507 Interview with a German manager who used to work at a construction company that dealt mainly with 
public institutions in the 1970s and 1980s. 508 Stewart, 1986, pp. 227-228. 509 Interviews with managers of multinational companies doing business in Venezuela; Enright, Frances, 
and Saavedra, 1996, p. 16; Naim and Frances (1994), p. 176. s'o Coppegde, 1994, p. 53. 511 Berlin, 1996, p. 849. 
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Cultural values' consequences in social interactions 
Core values 
I -Mistrust of all institutions 
I -Avoidance of unknown, untested persons 
-Heavy reliance on personal contacts 
o 
Where it 
Dealing with authorities 
"Authority viewed with automatic suspicion 
-Authority cannot be counted on 
-Emphasis on getting around the system 
-An obstacle to be circumvented 
-as the system is run by dunces 
-being incompetent stupid 
-having authority 
-Being clever and witty is appreciated: 
" to be able to flaunt authority 
-get away with breaking the rules 
-profit from the dullness of the dunce 
Family & Friendship 
"Family is keystone of society 
-Help is what friends are for 
"People always have time for each other 
-Caring exclusively for friends & family 
"Requests are not bad manners 
-Hint of a problem brings offers of assistance 
"Power & access are to be shared 
-It is always "us" against "them" 
"Emphasis of thoughtfulness & sincerity 
Social Interactions 
"Take time to great or acknowledge all individuals 
"Titles are used but informality prevails 
-Physical space close; touching common 
-Overdressing is never a problem 
-Send gifts in advance 
-Venezuelans are not snobby about Spanish 
but appreciate efforts 
Figure 12: Cultural values' consequences in social interactions. 
(source: Drake, 1997, ot. 10-21. ) 
5.5.8 Change Management 
Our research suggests that a change in management is needed in order to move from 
doing business in a closed, subsidised domestic market to managing companies in a 
global, competitive environment. 
A strategy of management change will therefore include issues such as patterns of 
ownership, organisational structures, and recruitment procedures. The ideal is, properly 
salaried managers running companies, leading to transparent cost structures, and 
achieving some separation of corporate governance and politics. 
One the other hand, there are some companies which are successful although their 
management is based upon traditional ways of doing business. 512 
The following figure compares dominant characteristics and the management traits that 
are needed. 
512 Naim, 1989, p. 500. 
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Dominant characteristics and emerging traits 
Traditional traits Emerging traits 
Profitability depends to a large extent on 
government decisions 
Profitability more dependent on 
markets and competitiveness 
Access to government protection and 
subsidies is main strategic focus 
Access to international markets and 
technology is main strategic focus 
Wide diversification Restructuring and consolidation 
Domestic orientation Growing international scope 
Highly leveraged, funding mainly 
through debt 
Increased capitalisation, funding 
local and international open capital 
markets 
Highly concentrated ownership Higher propensity for joint ventures 
and public stock offerings 
Family run Increased separation of owners and 
managers 
Emphasis on originating social group Emphasis on individual merit and 
Emphasis on "know who", "saber qui6n" 
achievement 
Emphasis on "know how", "saber cbmo" 
Stress on stability and status-quo Stress on change and innovation 
Belief in supernatural explanations Belief in rational explanations 
Figure 13: Dominant characteristics and emerging traits. 
(source: Naim and Franc6s, 1994, p. 169; Naim, 1989, pp. 496,503) 
As the economy will gradually open up, trading blocks will exert more and more 
influence, and multinational capital will expand on the national economy, widely 
diversified Venezuelan companies need to think about reassessing and restructuring 
their businesses to focus on core competence, value drivers, strategic business units, and 
centres of excellence in order to operate efficiently and competitively in an international 
business environment. The captive consumer, who in the past had no options in product 
selection, does not exist anymore, and formerly protected sectors, such as the food 
industry need to seek new players to reactivate the market and consumption, offering 
new products with a variety of prices. 513 
Outsourcing relevant units to service companies could hereby form an effective measure 
to strengthen the core business. 514 
513 Maracara, 1997, p. 6. 
514 This could also prepare ground for consulting activities in the fields of total business reengineering, 
workflow management, and core strategy. 
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Large business groups should also start thinking about investing capital in other Latin 
American countries in order to internationalise their business. 
Indeed according to Maracara (1997), sectors such as food, some mass consumption 
goods, cement, mining, metal engineering, banking, insurance, and telecommunications 
sis are seeking the effect of foreign investment. 
The professionalisation of management has already started in some fields of business, 
where the dictum "We want the best person for the job" is now heard. But still it is often 
the case that the best educated are the ones who can afford to study at highly rated 
business schools in the USA. Many expatriates believe that due to an increasing 
educational influence from the United States, professional management values begin to 
be implemented. Networking and relationships are still important but stress is 
increasingly put on cost reduction, and efficiency. Deals tend not to be exclusively done 
in clubs or during dinner in a restaurant anymore. 
The question might be formulated as "Will modem management be able to manage 
successfully in a traditional environment ?" One answer was given by a Spanish 
manager who met with his colleagues in Cuba to discuss their operations in Latin 
America: 
"We all made the same observation: many companies have difficulties, 
because they want to set up structures in marketing and sales that are totally 
Americanised not taking this Latin American component into account. This 
can be devastating. "516 
Although Allen (1977) stated that "the social and cultural structure continues to reflect 
the Hispanic tradition, but with increasing Anglo-Saxon influence, s517 it will be shown 
in the second section of the thesis, that Anglo Saxon management techniques are not as 
widely spread as one might expect. A level of professional management is reached by 
only a few companies and branches of industry at the present. 
515 Maracara, 1997, p. 6. $16 Interview with a Spanish sales manager of a German multinational company producing hospital 
equipment. 
517 Allen, 1977, p. 10. 
Preliminary view on business culture in Venezuela 149 
5.6 Bureaucrats 
5.6.1 Bureaucracy: Dealing with Authorities 
When Silva Michelena (1967) investigated in Venezuelan bureaucracy, he found that 
the main charges levelled at government officials were that they did not provide a 
genuine service, that they were technically incompetent, and that they had no sense of 
mission or they lacked commitment. 518 More than 30 years later, Infoamericas states, 
that "business does not trust government in Latin America. "519 
Furthermore, the public accused the authorities of not meeting goals on time, state-run 
enterprises of carrying an ever-increasing deficit, and social controls of being unable to 
halt violence and reduce insecurity. The `good side' was that in some industries market 
prices were fixed by the government's protectionist policies in order to promote local 
industry. 520 
This manifestation of `the bureaucratic phenomenon' in Venezuela is supposed to be 
caused by "the intrusion of kinship, friendship, or political influence in the selection of 
personnel and the general absence of technical standards in management . s521 The reason 
can be found in Kelly's survey in 1994. She states that: 
"There is no corps of public servants imbued with civic values or system for 
recruiting and training the bureaucracy. ... The public administration has not developed institutionalised forms of rewarding efficiency or punishing 
corruption. " (pp. 303-304) 
In the following discussion we will use Perez Perdomo's definition (1990) of 
"corruption in present day Venezuela": 
"The use of public funds for individual benefit; more specifically and 
frequently, a way of doing business characterized by collusion between 
politicians or public servants and private industry such that both parties 
obtain exaggerated profits" (p. 555) 
Corruption is a widespread phenomenon in Venezuela and is related to the state's 
several attempts to industrialise the country. In order to understand the reason why it is 
so common a look at its evolution needs to be taken: during the period of sembrar el 
518 Silva Michelena, 1967b, p. 86. "9 Infoamericas, 1998c, p. 2. 520 Naim and Frances, 1994, p. 177. 521 Silva Michelena, 1967b, p. 87. 
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petroleo, the state acted as a promoter, but also as a regulator of business initiatives, 
thus creating a legal framework with formal and complex procedures, over-regulation 
and rationing. 522 
Therefore, official ways of obtaining licenses or privileges tend to be quite time 
consuming. The best way of getting the bureaucratic machinery moving is to use 
parallel or informal networks and distributive mechanisms. It is not always necessary to 
have personal contacts, it is good enough to approach the person with a powerful 
recommendation. 523 If there is no chance to pay for the favour in immaterial terms, cash 
payment is used as the means of compensation. 
In order not to get involved, each party often uses an intermediary or agent, called a 
gestor, to handle the cash transaction. Gestores also co-ordinate things like import 
procedures at the customs. They sit outside the office on crates with a typewriter on 
their laps. In this situation in particular bureaucrats send out signals that are often not 
understood by foreigners. 
Two examples may be given: If one is importing aluminium cans, where one normally 
has to pay a 35 percent import tax, people at customs tell you that it is in fact `a special 
metal' and hence more taxes need to be charged. Or, electronic parts for example are 
pseudo-confiscated and have to be examined. Of course there is nothing wrong with the 
parts, it is just a way of telling the importer that a kind of compensation needs to be 
paid. Thus it is common use to pick a gestor, tell him the "issue", pay a couple of 
dollars, and the "problem" will be sorted out quickly. 
These dispatchers are also used to make sure that bureaucrats of public institutions treat 
a company's request in a smooth and efficient way: 
"Over there you fill out a form, you hand it in and then it lays somewhere, 
then you pay a muchacho, so that he pulls out the paper from the bottom of 
the pile and puts it on top again, and he takes care that it gets done. 99524 
Using a gestor is considered to be legitimate. According to other interviewees as well, 
gestores earn a living by dealing professionally with bureaucrats. This also involves 
doing irksome tasks like queuing up for hours in the sun, or handling all the necessary 
paperwork. 
$22 Perez Perdomo, 1990, pp. 558-560, and in the following; Brewer-Carias, 1995, pp. 164,179. 523 called palanca or padrino. Palanca is the lever of a machine, that gets things moving. 
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It can be seen that it is a small step from favouritism to corruption, because if one does 
not have a friend or a godfather, one needs to buy the favours. 
Some people, authors and businessmen likewise, distinguish between different levels of 
corruption. Small and everyday payments are not considered as an act of corruption, but 
as "a kind of compensation, regulated by habit, for the civil servant's low wage 
level"525, as a way to distribute public revenues. 526 
It goes down to the communal level. The following story was told by a manager who 
used to drive cargo through the country: 
"It starts with every mayor; if you want to drive through his village with a 
100 ton truck and he owns a bridge that goes over a river, he says, not over 
my bridge. It will break, because it is only designed for lorries under 50 
tons. Well, of course it is not true, and if you pay him appropriately, then the 
bridge will carry 100 tons without any problem. " 
Perez Perdomo (1994) calls it "one of the most serious threats to the functioning of the 
Venezuelan state, ... a deeply rooted trait in Venezuela and other Latin American 
countries, dating from the colonial period. s527 He also mentions, that the words corrupt 
and politician are actually used synonymously today. 
Another clue is given by Carias (1980) who states that "el politico no muere pobre. "528 
Due to the lack of an efficient internal control system in the public authorities, the issue 
of corruption cannot be solved at the present time. Sectors where the state continues to 
have influence are especially prone to corruption. 
Another issue that harms the welfare of the state is the strong relationship between 
politics, economy, and personal interest. 
It happens that employees working as civil servants for the largest public company in 
Venezuela tend to have jobs at several private companies in addition. Thus the chance 
that the person does his official job properly are fairly small. 
524 Interview with a German expatriate manager. 525 Perez Perdomo, 1990, p. 559. 526 Brewer-Carias, 1995, p. 177. $27 Perez Perdomo, 1994, p. 311. $28 Carias, 1980, p. 262, the translation of the saying is: "A politician will never die in poverty. " 
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5.6.2 The effects of bureaucracy on doing business 
Naim and Frances (1994) state that the influence public officials may exert on the 
fortunes of private firms is enormous: 
"In addition to the special permits required to conduct a wide variety of 
normal business activities, such as opening a new plant, acquiring a foreign 
partner, or advertising promotional discounts, the government also 
controlled both the prices at which many goods and services were sold and 
the costs of most of the inputs companies needed. ... 
Similar companies in 
the same sector ended up paying different prices for the same imports, or 
having different import quotas of the same product assigned to them. " (p. 
177) 
Especially during the times of RECADI (the Regimen de Cambios Diferenciales was 
founded in 1983 to establish a three-tiered exchange system) almost the entire private 
sector was dependent on certain public servants when purchasing foreign currency and 
applying for financial assistance. 529 It was vital to know the public official who took 
these decisions, in order to make him decide to your benefit, to make him give you a 
large loan at very low interest rates or to make him share information on competitors. 530 
If the other side, i. e. the competitor, had better connections than oneself, business life 
was extremely difficult and sometimes ended up in giving up the entire business or in 
bankruptcy. 531 
Sometimes prices were set for social and political reasons, i. e. to benefit urban 
consumers or domestic manufacturers. It is still in line with the view expressed by Allen 
(1977) more than 20 years ago, saying "politics is inextricably bound up with 
economics. ... Nothing happens unless it has the support of a key politicalfigure. "532 
Thus it was important to staff the management boards of companies with appropriate 
people, not necessarily the most able but those having the best connections to politicians 
and political decision making. If a minister sits on the supervisory board of a company, 
he is able to provide the firm with government contracts, often benefiting privately as 
well. 
In addition, as business conditions may change quickly, for instance discontinuities in 
government contracts, relations, and policies, and not only whenever there is a change 
529 Berlin, 1996, p. 850; Perez Perdomo, 1994, p. 324; Borcherdt, 1980, p. 236; Carias, 1980, p. 262. 530 See also Berlin, 1996, pp. 849-850; Naim, 1989, p. 503, according to him, "en el sector publico las 
relaciones personales juegan un rol fundamental. " 531 Interview with Venezuelan manager. 532 Allen, 1977, p. 258. 
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in government but also whenever the official responsible changed his mind, firms tend 
to concentrate on and favour short-term business strategies. 
The following figure gives some hints on how to act when dealing with bureaucrats. 
Dealing with bureaucrats 
Core values 
-Mistrust of all institutions 
"Avoidance of unknown, untested persons 
-Heavy reliance on personal contacts 
' e.. "ý ýw 
"Focus on your relationships 
-Discuss proposals informally 
"Treat each person as a special case 
-Take time to set the tone 
"Tact, indirectness, suggestion 
-Management is a people process 
-Private & business issues are inseparable 
-Negotiator profiles important 
-Respect status & influence 
-especially if low in competence 
-Pay attention to your title 
-Do not underestimate personal ties 
"Respect based on age & position 
-Direct rewards based on hierarchy 
-Decisions by highest in line authority 
Figure 14: Dealing with bureaucrats. 
(source: Drake, 1997, ot. 11,22-25. ) 
Generally in developing countries, government services tend to hinder managerial 
decision taking, in that they are inefficient, costly, and slow. 533 
Therefore having a large network of contacts is inevitable. Depending on the magnitude 
of the problem it is useful either to contact a gestor or to turn to someone who has 
power. One has to keep in mind, that the higher the level of the person one tries to 
contact, the more expensive it might get. 
Returning to the issue of winning government contracts it may also be the case that: 
"a politician approaches the company and says, you are dealing with issues 
here where you need an intercessor. You have to convince him. Either you 
know him well or you say, ok, we are willing to pay for this. 9534 
533 Austin, 1990, p. 60. 534 Interview with a German expatriate manager. 
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Before concluding Part I of this thesis it may be helpful to restate that we have tried to 
do two things. First we have exploited public data sources and several relevant 
literatures to give a multi-dimensional introduction to the topic of business and 
management in Venezuela, putting it into a social, historical, economic and political 
context. Second we have also used some of these sources strongly supported by a series 
of interviews mostly with expatriate managers with experience in Venezuela, to develop 
a preliminary characterisation of Venezuelan management and business life. 
In Part II we will `continue the story' by drawing on our field work in Venezuela, 
especially company visits and interviews with practising managers, and with others 
(consultants, officials, management educators) able to offer an informed testimony. 
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SECTION TWO 
Introductory Note 
As noted in the chapter "Sources of information", Section One was based on wide 
reading, data gathering, and the interviewing of some 45 managers and other relevant 
interlocutors in Germany. Part Two is based on different testimonies and sources, 
principally fieldwork in Venezuela, that is company visits and interviews. Interviews 
were conducted with multinational managers: with Venezuelan domestic managers in 
the fields of personnel, sales, production, investor relations, industrial relations, and 
purchasing, as well as with chief executive officers, presidents, industry participants, 
ex-government officials, university professors, executives of chambers of trade and 
industry, industry experts, economic observers, analysts, and business consultants, and 
this interviewing was variously done in the principal centers of Caracas, Maracaibo, 
Valencia, and Puerto Ordaz. Some seventy interviews were conducted with a variety of 
respondents as indicated in this paragraph. 
During his stay in Venezuela the researcher had the opportunity to stay with a German 
company doing business in the mineral extraction industry. Thus it was possible to 
spend periods as an observer in this firm to get an insight into challenging issues such as 
day to day problems in Venezuelan management or how to motivate employees to 
participate in the work processes, how Venezuelan employees react when confronted 
with both Venezuelan and German managers. 
Additionally, international survey data will be used to enable us to compare Venezuelan 
management with management in other countries, to support some of the hypotheses 
that are put forward. To be able to do these comparisons between Venezuela and other 
countries an existing questionnaire had to be used. That chosen was the questionnaire 
that had been used in the Loughborough study, cited by my supervisor in two of his 
later books (Lawrence, 1998; Lawrence and Edwards, 2000). 
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This Loughborough study is the same form as the Nene study (also in part the work of 
my supervisor and cited in the same works) and offers managers a variety of 
propositions regarding various aspects of management. 535 The managers are invited to 
respond on a five-point scale from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" with regard 
to 87 propositions about management. 536 As the original Loughborough survey was 
conducted in many different countries, the Venezuelan results will be compared to those 
of the UK, USA, Spain, and Germany, using statistical significance tests (i. e. T-tests 
and Bravais-Pearson correlation tests). The findings will be used to illustrate some of 
the arguments. 
It may be the case that some outcomes of Section One overlap with some findings 
presented in Section Two. This may show that the perception German managers have of 
Venezuelan management is true to at least some extent. 
535 The questionnaire is divided into the following fields: structure; networking; nature of management 
work; management qualities; work and leisure; hierarchy; decision making; management change; 
learning; short term/long term; creativity; ethics; and communications. 536 Lawrence and Edwards, 2000, p. 79. 
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Overview of Section Two 
The following section deals with an analysis of Venezuelan management. At first 
reasons will be put forward that strengthen the assumption that Venezuelan 
management should differ from management styles of other countries. The sectors of 
history, society, economy, and geography will be examined in such a way as to see how 
they have impacted on the way of doing business. In the chapter about consequences it 
will be shown how these features peculiar to Venezuela affect the business landscape of 
the private sector, the composition of the managerial class, and the tasks of a manager. 
A further consequence can be found in the absence of an industrial infrastructure. The 
section on industrial culture will explain how such factors influence the mentality of 
Venezuelan employees, leading to derecho adquirido, the desire to claim things, a high 
level of conflict avoidance, and to low commitment. 
Venezuelan management will be characterised in the last part referring to the theoretical 
framework established in previous sections. First of all different areas of management 
will be examined to give evidence of the existence of deficient professionalism. Then, 
introduced by the question of "What is left ? ", it will be shown what really matters in 
the Venezuelan way of doing business, and how a manager deals with different groups 
of people - managers and colleagues, workers, the public, and with bureaucrats and the 
state. Finally the unique character of power distance in the Venezuelan context will be 
discussed. 
The section ends with a discussion of the question whether Venezuelan management 
will change, converge towards an Anglo-Saxon version, or return to the old ways of 
doing business and being successful. 
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6 Business Culture 
6.1 Is business culture in Venezuela different ? 
This question might sound basic, but is it really easy to find an answer quickly ? We 
might say "yes, of course it is different, " because thanks to the cross-cultural studies of 
Theodore Weinshall (1977), Geert Hofstede (1980; 1991), Andre Laurent (1983), and 
Peter Lawrence (1980; 1986), to name only a few, we have reason to believe that 
management in fact is different all over the world. 531 
But to what extent does Venezuelan business culture differ from that of other 
countries ? And by whom has it been influenced most ? 
Taking into consideration the fact, that since the 1920s, when oil was discovered in 
Venezuela, many North-American oil companies have come to Venezuela, it could be 
possible that Venezuelan management is heavily influenced by the USA. 
If we take a further step back in history, the question might arise of "how strong is the 
Spanish influence at present originating from the colonial days ?" Has Venezuela 
managed to grow up or is it still a colonial offspring of the Spanish empire of the 15th 
century ? 
Or again what about the waves of immigration caused by European wars in the 20`x' 
century, World War One (1914-1918) and World War Two (1939-1945), or the bloody 
civil war in Spain (1936-1939) ? 
In the following chapters different reasons will be presented as to why Venezuela has a 
unique business culture. The following key factors can be identified: 
" historical reasons, i. e. the way in which colonisation occurred, the lack of 
Enlightenment of the broad population, and the waves of immigration; 
" societal reasons, i. e. the absence of the rule of law, the lack of education; 
" economic reasons, i. e. the impact of oil, state participation, and the high level of 
protectionism. 
" geographic reasons, i. e. climatic conditions and physical characteristics. 
537 Further reading on the evolution from homogeneity to diversity of management styles see Lawrence, 1998, pp. 119-130; ibid., 1995, pp. 50-75. 
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Having identified the reasons why Venezuela's business culture is different, the next 
part will show the effects these factors have had on various aspects of "Venezuela as a 
business entity": the structure of the business landscape, the composition of the 
managerial class, the tasks of a manager, and the absence of an industrial infrastructure. 
Then a closer look will be taken on the effects all this exerts on Venezuela's industrial 
culture. 
Hopefully having established a solid basis of understanding of Venezuelan business 
culture, we will try to give some insight into Venezuelan management. The question "is 
it different" will not be answered for a second time. The emphasis will rather be on 
HOW Venezuelan management differs from that of other countries, WHAT are its 
deficiencies, and HOW do managers in Venezuela contrive to be successful. Special 
attention will be devoted to the importance of human interaction in order to make up for 
the deficient professionalism. Finally, the question will be discussed whether there are 
any changes likely to occur in Venezuelan management in the future. 
Before we take a look at the reasons cited above, it may be helpful to explain the 
phenomenon of "a country's business culture". Critics might say that one single country 
can never have one single business culture, because far too many different sets or 
people live in that particular country. 538 This perception might finally boil down to the 
fact that every single person has their own business culture. 
So how can one identify the business culture of a nation with 23 million different 
human beings, as in the case of Venezuela ? 
In fact each country has something that Hofstede (1980) calls a "collective mental 
programming of people in an environment. "539 This programming is difficult to change 
and exerts a major influence on the human way of thinking. Factors that are important 
for doing business and management, like trust or the ability to take risks, are on the one 
hand dependent on individual experiences but on the other also dependent on values, 
traditional thinking, and collective dispositions that are deeply rooted in a country's 
culture. 540 According to Henecka human beings absorb the rules of their culture 
automatically via social conditioning and socialisation processes. 54' These cultural rules 
can be called a cultural map or mental map and form a collective cultural 
538 see for example Knapp, 1996, P. 60; Ralston, 1993, p. 271; Triandis, 1988. Hofstede, 1980, p. 25. 540 see Thomas, 1996, p. 43; Negadhi, 1987. 
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subconscience. 542 Mental maps are mental models that are influenced by family, 
education, society, and history. There are many things that have a strong impact on the 
mental model in Venezuela. They are visible when looking at managers running a 
company, or of fathers `leading a family'. 
The next sections deal with this mental map that underlies Venezuelan business culture 
and management. 
6.1.1 Historical Reasons 
6.1.1.1 Style of Colonisation 
Undoubtedly the colonising country gives the colony the social structure that applied 
during the time of discovery. The coloniser establishes a first societal base that can be 
considered as the concrete basement of a new house that will build itself bit by bit. But 
it will always be difficult, yet impossible to rearrange the construction of the cellar once 
it had been built. 
So who went to Venezuela in the early days ? 
Venezuela was discovered by a Southern European feudal country in the 15`h century, 
that was pre-industrialised: Spain. Hence, during the 15th and 16th century Venezuela 
was colonised by the Spanish of that time. Both, the discovery and the exploitation "was 
driven by the internal demands of an inward looking mentality, and thus not to the 
development of trade, but to extraction and exploitation. "543 As Spain was not 
industrialised in these days, they could not construct a proper economic system in the 
new world. 544 In fact, Spain was arguably the most traditional country in the whole of 
Europe. Supporters of the modernisation theory state, that in Latin America, the 
imported hacienda system was one of the major obstacles to industrial development, a 
"feudal institution blocking the spread of modem capitalism from the town to the 
countryside. "sas 
And it can still be felt in Venezuela that there has never been real, comprehensive 
industrialisation to this day. 
In later chapters the deficiencies in professionalism will be discussed in more detail. 
541 Henecka, 1985, p. 60. 542 Adler, 1991, p. 68. 543 Mowatt, 1998, pp. 12-13. 
544 see Boisot, 1993. 
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So perhaps one might say Venezuela was just unlucky to be discovered by the Spanish 
of the 15th century ! This is also the common perception of Venezuelan managers. 
Generally speaking, they do not sympathise with the Spanish, unless their ancestors 
originated from Spain. They tend to call the Spanish "conquerors". The vice president 
of a Venezuelan bank for example stated: 
"We were not colonised by the Spanish, we were conquered . 99546 
The tone gets more hostile, when some of the interviewees even speak of the Spanish 
disease. For example, the director of a Venezuelan economic journal puts it this way 
when talking about the reason for Venezuela's miserable economic situation: 
"That was the fault of the Spanish empire. It should not be called Dutch 
disease, it should be called Spanish disease. ... 
The reason why Latin 
America is underdeveloped, is because we have a tradition of Spanish 
institutions. 
... They 
discovered gold in Latin America and they remained 
"Sa7 rent seeking types of institutions. 
And the argument goes like this: The Spanish that came to the new world were looking 
for the quick buck, El Dorado, gold. They struck gold and silver in Mexico, they struck 
silver in Peru. They destroyed both cultures, they spread diseases coming from Europe. 
Even though some communities were established, they were set up as military fortresses 
rather than commercial communities. Cities were built in order to defend the routes of 
the gold from buccaneers and pirates. They were not interested in leaving the wealth in 
the country. The surplus from economic activity went abroad, i. e. it was shipped to 
Spain, thus depriving the local community of an opportunity to build up its own capital 
to achieve self-sustaining economic growth. 548 
Critics say it is still like this: The established Spanish families still ship out the money 
from Venezuela. 
The argument that the coloniser is more or less responsible for the development of the 
discovered country can be reinforced by two other examples: 
545 Cubitt, 1995, p. 33. 546 Interview with the vice president of a Venezuelan bank. sal Interview with the director of a Venezuelan economic journal. 549 This paragraph is based on several statements made by different Venezuelan managers and does not 
necessarily express the author's opinion; see also Cubitt, 1995, pp. 39-40. 
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Firstly, Canada was colonised during the 18th and 19th century primarily by the Scottish 
of that time. Secondly, the colonisation of the USA began with European immigrants 
with puritan values in the 17th and 18th centuries seeking religious and political 
freedom. 549 The United States were fortunate enough to be colonised by people that 
were `developed' by the standards of the time in terms of industry and technology. The 
people that went to the United States were largely educated, fleeing from religious 
persecution, and therefore settled in America and developed themselves as a community 
with puritan traditions; i. e. work is good, the harder the work the better. If I work hard, 
I will have a lot of achievement. It is good to share the profits. 
Ever since, strong emphasis has been placed on achievement in the United States. And 
it can still be felt. Human resource management in North America still follows the `hire 
and fire' mentality adhering to the policies of `grow or go', and `up or out'. The 
`American dream' to develop `from rags to riches' and the `pursuit of happiness' 
became deeply embedded in the people's psyche and were enshrined in the 1776 
Declaration of Independence. "Individuals will naturally strive for success and will not 
be happy until the success has been achieved. 550 North American institutions were 
therefore more advanced, more efficient, more developed due to ethical puritanism. 
The figure provided below compares two different concepts of basic motivations that 
prevail in the United States of America and Northern Europe on the one hand, and in 
Latin America on the other. It can be seen that the prevailing philosophy in Venezuela is 
a slightly different one. Its origin can be found in the feudal times: 
The fundamental problem was, that the Spanish replicated in Latin America the same 
fundamental institutions that were permeated by rent-seeking behaviour. The feudalistic 
structure was more or less imported via Columbus in 1496. Since then decision taking 
has been highly centralised. 
sag see for example Lawrence, 1996, p. 49. 550 ibid., 1996, p. 46. 
Business Culture in Venezuela: Reasons ýo? 
Motivaciones bäsicas 
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Figure 15: Motivaciones bäsicas. 
(source: Interview with A. Szilagyi, 2SP Consulting , 1999) 
What happened was that Columbus collected gold and silver and delivered it to the 
Spanish Throne. As a reward he received some rights and since that time there has been 
this virus embedded in the people's mind called derecho adquirido, acquired right. 
So the mentality, that was imported from Spain was, "if I get along with the 
government, I will benefit. " Thus the first motivation was not to achieve something by 
oneself, but to find a way to access governmental power to enjoy preferential treatment. 
The second motivation were connections, because they are needed to get in contact with 
the sources of funds. 
This was how the big landowners came into existence. It has been common practise that 
political leaders donated thousands of hectares of land to fellow countrymen and 
friends. Respectively, whole industries and concessions to produce certain products 
were distributed in the same way. 
Venezuela, like other Latin American states, still demonstrates a clear tendency towards 
patron-client relationships in which political leaders are linked to the masses in a system 
that distributes employment, favours, and protection in an exchange for labour, support, 
LOGRO 
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and loyalty. 55' The power of elites has been secured through the use of political 
patronage. 
The roots of this phenomenon can be discovered in the 18th century, where the patron 
was the landowner; later on it was employers, government agents, and political party 
leaders, providing jobs and opportunities for the loyal. 552 According to Stewart (1986) 
the immediate circle around the leader is the rosca, the personal group that has grown 
about the leader, often going back to university days. Forming a stable and identifiable 
entity, it moves into the bureaucracy with the leader and shares his fortunes. 
553 Hence 
Chavez' decision to insert more than 100 army officers into responsible posts in state- 
owned companies can be seen as a proof that patron-client relationships are still fairly 
common. 
This business practise was widespread in Spain as well. Until entering the European 
Union in 1986, Spain had monopolies in the sector of communications, matches, and 
tobacco among other things, that were given to families. Likewise for Venezuela. This 
means it was much more economical to come to terms with the ministers than to 
increase productivity. 
"For example I assemble cars in Venezuela. There are two or three 
companies that produce cars in the country. We go to the government and 
say, `hey, we have done so much for the country. Can you please stop the 
import of automobiles ? "'554 
Therefore the motivation of achievement comes only a poor third in Venezuela. 555 
Personal achievement has never been a virtue in Venezuela. Compared to the puritan 
values mentioned above, the following mind set has been common in Venezuela: The 
less I work the better, the more time I have to rest, the more time I have to enjoy life, the 
harder I work the more slaves I need. I am a count, I am a duke, and I don't share my 
wealth. My wealth is mine and your share is yours, and we don't build a community 
around these shares of wealth. 
So what are the consequences of the strong affinity towards power ? 
One important one is the fact, that the loyalty people have is not directed towards an 
organisation, but towards the leader, the chief of the organisation, the person who 
551 Hillman and D'Agostino, 1992, p. 67. 552 Hillman, 1994, p. 59. 
553 Stewart, 1986, p. 225. 
554 Interview with a Venezuelan management consultant. 
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exercises power, the person who decides, even if he is obnoxious and disagreeable. 
How this impacts on the industrial culture in contemporary Venezuela will be shown in 
a later chapter. 
6.1.1.2 The Enlightenment has never happened 
Different countries' management styles are influenced by reform processes in their 
different countries. 
After colonisation Latin America never experienced the European Enlightenment. To 
some extent the family groups and companies that established themselves during the 
times of the Compania Guipuzcoana still exist. The feudal structures of the middle ages 
can still be felt. Two examples may be given. 
The question of inheritance is often solved the old way: The oldest son gets everything 
and receives all the power, the sisters get paid out. 
Some servants for example still live in the houses of their masters as in the time of 
feudal society: They are accommodated in tiny rooms without light, bed, or window. 
Venezuela is a highly stratified society, in the sense that the people at the lower end of 
the scale have not discovered yet that they are equal human beings. They accept the 
patron-client relationship and with it the "exchange of dissimilar things. "556 The patron 
is the one who decides everything: food, marriage, work, and even life. The lower ones 
are used to the fact that they are inferior. They serve their masters or patrons, and 
receive a place to sleep and basic foodstuffs in return. This is the essence of what can be 
called clientelism. 
Furthermore, the common perception especially in lower classes is 
"I am poor, so I stay poor. ... You have to accept reality. "557 
The idea of Immanuel Kant of sapere aude, the essence of the European Enlightenment, 
to have the virtue to use your own mind and to take responsibility for your own doings 
and actions, has never been implanted in Venezuela. Venezuelans tend to forget the fact, 
that a country that wants to continue to develop needs to have people with development 
and growth aspirations. It is only the people that can propel changes in political 
development, social stability, and economic growth. 
355 see figure above. 
556 Cubitt, 1995, p. 104. 557 Interview with a Venezuelan personnel manager employed in the oil extraction business. 
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Venezuelans have the philosophy that success is something that is based on luck and 
external factors that cannot be influenced or manipulated by the person himself, i. e. 
through work. Two examples of this underlying mental map are given by the following 
expressions. The first quote originates from a Venezuelan personnel manager: 
"Become rich without working, via legal or illegal lottery. Just buy a ticket 
and become rich'"558 
or another quote from a management consultant who also owns a textile business: 
"Venezuelans think in this category: Luck. Success is not the result of 
constant work, deferred gratification, and savings, success is the result of 
luck. I win the lottery, I go to horse-racing. ... That is the mentality. Go to a horse-race and try to observe the visitors. They play every week. ... The 
simple population gambles the whole time, hoping to win the jackpot one 
day. "55 
Closely related to this phenomenon is the fact that Venezuelans don't see themselves as 
responsible for failures. The Enlightenment works both ways: be responsible for your 
life - success and failure. In Venezuela it works the other way round: When going to 
school pupils learn that they are the sons of Simon Bolivar, the libertador, and all the 
oil belongs to them. When watching telenovelas, daily soaps, on TV, they only see 
people becoming rich while taking advantage of others. When reading the newspapers, 
they learn that multinational companies and globalisation are responsible for the 
economic downturn of the country. They are conditioned to always try to seek the fault 
outside themselves. 
"If everyone of us would accept a bit more of responsibility for his own 
actions, Venezuela would transform itself into a completely different 
country. ... On each level a little bit more responsibility. For example: People complain about the rubbish in the streets. On the other hand you see 
them throw garbage out of a moving car. "56o 
The same is true for the French philosopher Montesquieu ("De 1'esprit des lois", 1748). 
His thoughts on the division of power into legislative, executive, and jurisdiction have 
not been implemented effectively in the Venezuelan system yet. 
558 Interview with a Venezuelan personnel manager employed in the oil extraction business. 559 Interview with a management consultant who also owns a textile business. 56° Interview with a female consultant, who used to work for one of the biggest Venezuelan foodstuff 
companies. 
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6.1.1.3 Waves of immigration 
Venezuela is a country that has been marked by significant immigration. Especially in 
the 200' century there was a huge increase in population. While only 7.5 million people 
used to live in Venezuela around 1960, only twenty years later this figure rose to 15 
million inhabitants. Venezuela's population growth outperformed that of all other Latin 
American countries. 561 
Especially in the first half of the 20th century there was a strong European migration into 
the Latin American countries. This was mainly caused by the different political crises, 
culminating in the two World Wars from 1914 to 1918, and 1939 to 1945, and the civil 
war in Spain lasting from 1936 to 1939. 
So what could have made people move to Venezuela in particular ? 
One important reason can be found in the fact that Venezuela has always been a 
relatively free country. During the 1950s Marcos Jimenez Perez started a political 
programme, an open-door policy for white immigrants to modernise the economy of the 
country. So he opened the frontiers to people that had an occupation and certain skills 
and were able to contribute something to the country's growth - doctors, engineers, 
mechanics, electricians, and small manufacturers. 
It is important to keep in mind that many Europeans entered the country, who were 
willing to start from scratch, as many of them had lost everything during the wars: 
Germans, Italians, Spanish, Hungarians, and Chechs. 
Another reason was the fact that until the end of the 1970s Venezuela was a country that 
was well off. The windfall gains in petroleum made almost any business start up a 
success, because the state had money and many sectors of industry had to be 
established. So people who were willing to get some work done found great 
opportunities and were rewarded most of the time. 
Interestingly enough the process of industrialisation started to happen in Venezuela in 
the 1950s, when many Europeans immigrated, mainly many small and medium sized 
business proprietors from Italy, Spain, and Germany. 
Another reason why many Europeans came to Venezuela may be the fact that it is the 
Latin American country that is closest to Europe in terms of geographical distance. 
In the last twenty years immigration has become more of an issue than it used to be. 
Only very few Europeans penetrate the country each year. The migration pattern has 
561 IADB, 1991, p. 272. 
Business Culture in Venezuela: Reasons 168 
completely changed. More and more immigrants from other Latin American countries 
enter the country: Colombians, Peruvians, Ecuadorians, and Cubans. Some analysts 
estimate that more than 2 Million Colombians live in Venezuela illegally. 
6.1.2 Societal reasons 
6.1.2.1 Lack of the rule of law 
"We don't have a referee. We don't have a functioning juridical system. 
We have a so called democracy on paper, but we don't have the rule of 
law. "562 
A "Rechtsstaat", rule of law, has never been established in Venezuela. The basic 
institutions of a normal modern state simply do not work. 
The related deficiencies are widely felt: 
" Venezuela has a massive problem with contraband. The government is too 
inefficient to take measures against the import of smuggled goods. As importers pay 
no taxes and duties for these products they are much cheaper than comparable 
domestic goods. "It is like an additional income for the family, " as the manager of 
an electronic products warehouse put it. Therefore people prefer to buy these grey 
imports at private households rather than spending much more money for the same 
products in proper stores. 
" The existence of a huge informal economy. Official estimates put this above sixty 
percent. 563 For example 50 percent of the retail is organised through the black 
market. More than 60 percent of all beer-sales are done via illegal distribution 
channels in Venezuela, i. e. households. 
" Bank fraud does not get punished. Many bankers became millionaires through this 
practice, especially during the years of the financial crisis in 1994 and 1995 (detailed 
in Part One), but nobody has been sent to jail yet. 
562 Interview with a Venezuelan management consultant. 563 N. N., 1999f, p. 4. 
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" The population is accustomed not to pay taxes because they were never prosecuted 
for tax evasion. They pay them only if they are made to. 
" People, especially the ones who live in barrios, usually do not pay for electricity or 
water, as they access these illegally. 
" The behaviour of customs and tax officers tends to be very unstable. Example: If 
you import buckets made up of plastic they cost a certain amount of import tax. As 
aluminium buckets are more expensive the customs officer tries to tell you that your 
buckets are made of aluminium and he therefore has to charge you more money. 
You either pay some compensation or you take him to court. The chances of 
winning the court case can be judged be reading the following point. 
9 Jurisdiction does not work. Laws contain many grey areas, and can therefore get 
interpreted in two ways. Therefore many managers say it is best not to get in contact 
with the law, because one has to expect a time and money consuming process that 
does not necessarily end successfully. Not all judges are untouchable in Venezuela. 
It is often a question of money that wins the trial. The juridical system has been 
destroyed during the last 40 years. It does not make any difference if you are right or 
wrong, or the law is on your side or you are against the law. It is a matter of 
knowing the right person, the right judge, in order to get away with it. 
"Our liberator Simon Bolivar ... said ... poor country, if the judges are 
corrupt. ' And that is true in Venezuela. ... Know your rights and know 
your duties. And if you exercise your duties within your rights you won't 
have any problems. But in Venezuela that is not true. "S" 
" Since the last forty years corruption has not been prosecuted. People never had to 
think twice before doing something illegal, because they knew they would not be 
prosecuted. 
"The Venezuelan government is a ... monster, a bureaucratic ten eyed 
monster. It steals, it is based on corruption. ... When the Japanese are 
caught in corruption, they just make harakiri or jump out of the window: 
when Venezuelans are caught in corruption, they flee to Miami. "565 
564 Interview with the socio director of an international consulting company. 565 Interview with the vice president of a Venezuelan bank. 
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" The police system does not work properly. If a policemen stops you because of 
speeding, you negotiate a price with him, instead of receiving an official pre-printed 
speeding ticket. On the other hand, the policemen cannot protect the citizens 
effectively. The Economist reports for example that since mid-July 1999, Caracas 
has been racked by a "spree of vigilante killings as crime-weary residents take the 
law into their own hands. ... Most of the victims have 
been accused of rape, robbery, 
or murder. These lynchings seem to enjoy popular support, ... because most people 
regard the country's legal system as a sick joke. Corruption is rife. Criminals who 
can pull strings with judges or police often walk free. " 566 
" People don't obey rules, laws, and norms and get away with it. 
"Red lights mean you have to stop, but that depends on a lot of factors. "567 
"Traffic lights are there, but they don't work. And if they do, they don't get 
respected. 11568 
" What is worse, no law seems to be strong enough to stop kidnapping in the border 
states. Cattle ranchers with a lot of money have been kidnapped for a high price. 
"There is an industry of kidnapping as with the mafia. If you pay, they will 
protect you. And many people do it. Not the Venezuelan nor the 
Colombian states nor police can effectively control the narcos. They are 
winning the war. , 569 
9 Due to the lack of law and order Venezuela is a highly dangerous country. 
Especially in bigger cities hardly anyone walks or rides a bicycle. The following box 
shows a newspaper article taken from a local paper of Maracaibo. It shows a number 
of abandoned cars that have or have not been recovered in the last hours of a normal 
day. Abandoned cars in this case means cars that have been stolen and later found by 
the police. 
566 N. N., 1999d. 
567 Interview with the director of an economic journal. 568 Interview with a manager an investment company. 
569 Interview with the vice president of a Venezuelan bank. 
Business Culture in Venezuela: Reasons 171 
A note on public security 
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Figure 16: A note on public security. 
(source: N. N., 1999c, p. D6) 
Mentioned above was the fact that people simply don't obey rules and norms in 
Venezuela. The question of why will be discussed in the following section on education. 
6.1.2.2 Lack of education 
There has never been proper investment in primary, secondary, or vocational education, 
and this has never been corrected by later immigration patterns. Therefore the existence 
of a general lack of education, knowledge, virtues, and values is widely felt. 
It begins in the schools. Young Venezuelans learn that they are citizens of a rich 
country, that they have the world's largest petroleum resources, that Venezuela holds 10 
percent of the world's gold reserves, that they have bauxite, aluminium, diamonds and 
precious stones being used for the production of highly sophisticated computer chips. 
Thus pupils believe that they are rich by nature and do not have to work for it, because 
it belongs to them and they have the right to benefit. This nourishes the mental map of 
acquired rights, derecho adquirido. 
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Compared with Japan, the educational strategy is very different. In Japan, pupils are 
taught that they live in a very poor country, because it has to import 97 percent of all its 
resources. The only thing that the Japanese can call their own is what they learn and the 
work they do. 
Therefore the attitude towards work is a completely different one. The Japanese are 
considered to be eager and hard-working, while Venezuelans tend to be more relaxed 
and more opportunistic in their relationship towards their employers. Further 
consequences will be discussed later in the chapter on industrial culture. 
Managers often complain about not finding an adequate workforce. 57° Many of them 
consider the act of getting trained people as one of the biggest problems they have to 
face in their daily business. Especially highly trained operators of machinery and 
mechanical technicians are very high in demand. The reason can be found in the fact 
that there is no middle technical education in Venezuela. Yet, in Colombia, Ecuador, 
and other Latin American countries they do have this type of education. Hence some 
managers even have to look outside the country for skilled workers. Thus it might 
happen, that when visiting a Venezuelan manufacturing plant, the lathe operators, the 
mechanics, and the painters are all Colombians. When asked what he would advise his 
children to do if they want to start a career in business, the vice president of a 
Venezuelan bank even said, 
"I would rather not have them in business. I would rather like my children to 
be successful clerks or mechanics than a lawyer or banker. I know it 
sounds strange. But we have too many doctors here in Venezuela, and we 
need skilful workers like your German mechanics. ... Here it is easier to "57l find a good lawyer than a good plumber or technician. 
A possible reason why people prefer to become academics rather than technicians might 
be the fact that Venezuelans have a strong desire to feel respected. The general manager 
of a company that sells photocopying and printing products argues the following way: 
" ... here a craftsman is not like in Germany, that has to go to the Berufsschule. In Germany, a craftsman is a respected person, they have 
maybe more studies than here. A craftsman is just a regular worker, a 
Turkish person. s572 
570 see also Herrera-Vaillant, 1997, p. 107. 571 Interview with the vice president of a Venezuelan bank. 572 Interview with the general manager of a company that sells printing and photocopying products. 
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According to a study released by the Industrial Education Foundation (Fundei) less than 
two percent of all Venezuelans have technical training. Venezuela's 100 universities, 
technical schools, training institutes, and other higher learning institutions, with 300,000 
graduates a year, are producing only 150 engineering graduates annually. 573 
Local preparation and the educational level are very low, simple, primitive and basic. It 
is fairly common that blue collar workers can hardly read or write. A lot of people know 
how to repeat things, that they have seen done but if there is a problem, they do not 
have enough knowledge to know or to imagine what are the causes of the problem. This 
is when things get stuck and the reason why maintenance is so poor. The president of a 
business centre suggested the researcher to make a statistic on the elevators of the 
different buildings he was visiting during his interviews, because: 
"You will find that it is very rare in any building that all elevators are 
working. "574 
Even doing the most simple things are complicated, slow, and inefficient. It applies not 
only to workers, but also to low and medium level managers. There is a severe shortage 
of qualified middle managers, because a lot of young people who have been privileged 
to get a good education either here or abroad try to go abroad. This combined with the 
fact that the domestic education system has been in continual deterioration for many 
years has had a deep impact on the development of the society: The lack of skills will be 
even more severe in the years to come. A manager remembered Camillo Lauria, a 
former minister, saying about 15 years ago, that: 
"the solution for this country (would be) to import 40,000 pregnant Swiss 
women. ... We don't have a serious base. ... Writing properly, you can meet 
people at university level who don't know how to write a letter. "575 
The problem of education has also turned the country into a moral crisis. As young 
Venezuelans do not learn about right or wrong, individual values, personal principles, 
like honesty, responsibility, pride in your job, high self esteem, and norms, it is hard to 
convey company values to the workforce - Values that don't apply outside the firm, "in 
this whole storm of unethicalness. ... We try to make our employees feel that they have 
a good working atmosphere here and we support them. But the minute they leave our 
sn Herrera-Vaillant, 1997, p. 144. 574 Interview with the president of a business centre. S75 Interview with the president of a business centre. 
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offices, they are subjected to humiliations, to pressures, because of the whole social and 
political decomposition. "576 
Therefore it seems to be a complex task to educate and motivate people because the 
moment they leave the office they have to deal with corruption, difficulties in health, 
and education. They do not enjoy security, they lack their own apartment, and even the 
most simple things, like uncontaminated drinking water. It is a widespread habit to steal 
electricity. The moral and economic issues can be called dramatic: 
"The upheaval in the personal lives of all our employees here is dramatic. 
Most of our employees can't buy our products. ... People don't know 
where they are going either. They have to take care of their basic needs 
right know. Even middle and higher level managers are dealing with these 
issues: Health care, education. They are trying to resolve ... the basic "577 needs. 
So the sociological issue that arises is that all the things people do in order to survive 
outside the firm cannot be done inside the company, except to its detriment. 
Therefore a lot of training and conversation happens in-house. It is not only 
professional, vocational, or technical training that has to be provided, but it also 
includes the delivery of basic human values. Venezuelan managers try to develop the 
people within the companies with the risk of rotation. 
There are also some national institutions such as INCE, but they do not satisfy the 
national demand on training. Other Venezuelan firms have agreements with foreign 
multinational companies, for example Siemens, who offer training in the technology 
sector. Non-Siemens employees get the chance to learn how to operate the different 
telecommunication systems. Obviously Siemens hopes to sell more of its products via 
these training courses, because companies are more likely to buy goods they know how 
to work with than the ones they just know from advertising or catalogues. 
All the issues discussed above, like the general lack of an educated workforce, the 
difficulties employees have to face in their daily lives, and the declining belief in basic 
values need to be kept in mind when talking about Venezuelan management style in a 
later chapter as all these facts exert a strong influence on how to run a business in 
Venezuela. 
576 Interview with the manager of a commercial chain that sells electronic products. 577 Interview with the manager of a commercial chain that sells electronic products. 
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6.1.3 Economic reasons 
6.1.3.1 Attractiveness of Venezuela as a commercial market 
Compared to other Latin American markets Venezuela is relatively unattractive. 
Brazil has more than 160 million inhabitants, Argentina represents more than 50 percent 
of the Latin American market in terms of buying power, and even Colombia has almost 
double the population size of Venezuela. So Venezuela is a relatively small market that 
has only little buying power. Due to the current economic and political situation, 
consumption is even decreasing at the moment. Some managers estimate that Venezuela 
has 80 percent of potential in consumption power. 
Although Venezuela has a comparatively good infrastructure, foreign companies prefer 
to invest in other countries, because of the strong informal economy in Venezuela, 
smuggling, and the lack of justice and integrity with the system and the law. 
This makes it also hard for Venezuelans to set up businesses successfully. It is also a 
reason, why there is little competition in Venezuela. 
Even Colombia is more attractive in terms of investment although guerilla warfare 
exists, because investors say that it is easier to anticipate the plans of the Colombian 
guerilla than the plans of the Venezuelan government. 578 
As a consequence of these insecurities, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter for example, an 
investment bank eliminated Venezuela from its investment portfolio in early 1999.579 
6.1.3.2 The impact of oil business on Venezuela's economic culture 
"This is a total oil country. °sso 
"PDVSA is the engine of Venezuela. "58' 
"There is a definition that Venezuela is an oil company with 23 million 
employees. "582 
The economy and national values are distorted by oil wealth, and its collapse. The 
Venezuelan economy is still driven by the oil industry and also by the transformation of 
raw materials namely iron ore and bauxite. All the big producers are still in the hands of 
578 N. N., 1999h. 
579 N. N., 1999g, p. 6. 
580 Interview with a manager of an engineering company whose clients are oil firms. 581 Interview with the general manager of a subsidiary of a German multinational chemical company. 582 Interview with a manager of a business centre. 
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the state, who tie private suppliers to them, that are highly dependent on these 
traditional industries. 
"Our decisions are led by the good or bad decisions of the government. 
They hit us directly. They are especially strong, because we are not an 
exporting country. 99 percent of our products are made for domestic 
consumption. We are very dependent on the government. "583 
The following figure shows one of these typical companies. 
Oil related private industry 
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Figure 17: Oil related private industry. 
(source: Company publication from Cci CA., 1999) 
It can be seen that the main client is PDVSA, the state owned petroleum company. 
Venezuelan economy has been built around the rent that came from the oil industry. As 
a net importer of finished goods and services it can be considered to be more `rentist' 
than productive. 
Therefore economic development, welfare, and stability are closely linked to the oil 
price. Hence, the economy is dependent and therefore vulnerable. According to Cubitt 
(1995) natural resources are unreliable because forces outside society's control can 
destroy the basis of the economy. 584 
S83 Interview with the manager of a steel trading company. 584 Cubitt, 1995, p. 36. 
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The following quotation from the manager of a private transportation company serves 
as a good example of the above contention: 
"Since we dedicate ourselves 100 percent to the oil industry, we had almost 
200 employees. ... What happened ? ... Right now with the current 
recession we have about 30 employees. Why ? Because since we work 
totally for the oil industry and the same has been shrunk due to the oil 
"sas budget that they are making, it has enormously reduced our work. 
The phenomenon that whole economies are based on the export of raw materials to the 
USA and Europe and the import of manufactured goods from those states applies to a 
number of less developed countries. In the case of Venezuela this can be seen as a 
consequence of the hacienda system too. 
What is worse Venezuela has never been properly industrialised due to the windfall 
gains of petroleum. Until the 1920s Venezuela was strong in the primary sector, 
exporting coffee and cocoa. The normal evolution of a society would then have 
generated a secondary sector with manufacturing and producing industries. Due to the 
oil revenues since the 1920s there had always been enough money to import anything 
that was needed. Since the economy was based on extractive industries for export, it 
could import the necessary capital and consumer goods, inhibiting the development of 
manufacturing industry in Venezuela itself. 
Thus Venezuela has no industrial tradition. It directly moved to the service sector. 
Former landowners became bankers, who never had to found or develop manufacturing 
industries. 
"We are not made for the industrial revolution. "586 
Other Latin American countries somehow managed to establish a certain industrial 
basis. This has been true for countries like Chile, Mexico, Brazil, or Argentina. The 
process of industrialisation, e. g. railway system, started in Argentina around 1900. 
Venezuela has also been perverted by oil wealth. The easy money spoilt the economic 
culture. A paternal-like state paid for everything: cheap food, cheap housing, water, 
electricity, transport, cheap telephone costs, free health, free education. Everything was 
585 Interview with the manager of a transportation company. 586 Interview with the director of an economic journal. 
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subsidised by petroleum. This phenomenon can be described as paternalismo, 
paternalism. 
Thus Venezuelans have become accustomed to getting rich quickly without having to 
work for it. They prefer to earn a quick buck than having to work for it. The less they 
have to work, the better they feel. It is widely felt now, that the oil industry has become 
more a curse than a blessing. Everything came about too easy, so that nobody cared 
about getting a good education or preparing himself properly. For some managers the 
time has come to wake up: 
"I think it is about time, that Venezuelans learn how to work, what it is to 
work. I think it is time once and for all that Venezuela tries to reconstruct 
the country as the Germans did in 1918 or 1945.9s587 
Unfortunately the will to work hard is not easy to develop, because the "rent seeking 
mentality is somehow internalised in the culture", as the country's former minister of 
development said in an interview with the researcher. 
6.1.3.3 The politics of business 
Most Latin American countries adopted a system of protectionism. 
"Our country has always been introspective in that sense. s588 
So the providers of goods and services manufactured in Venezuela did not have to 
compete hard in order to make their profits, because they were protected by the state 
back in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when the economic and productive infrastructure 
of the country was shaped. Since then there have not been major investments in the 
productive side of the country. Thus one is left with a productive infrastructure that was 
designed for the 1960s. It is hard for many Venezuelan producers to compete against 
foreign corporations or prices from the USA or even other Latin American countries. 
Domestic companies never had to be competitive internationally due to a high level of 
protectionism. 
"We never had to train the muscle called competition. 589 
"There is a fantastic lack of competitiveness in Venezuelan companies. "590 
587 Interview with the vice president of a Venezuelan bank. 588 Interview with a manager of a commercial chain that sells electronic products. 589 Interview with a management consultant. 590 Interview with a manager of a business centre. 
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The controls they have on imports also eliminated the need for companies to be more 
quality-, price-, and/ or service-oriented. Consumers consider Venezuelan products to 
be "quite deficient in general. "591 When asked what the Venezuelans think they are 
competitive in, a common reply was the failure to be competitive in any sector of 
industry apart from petroleum. 
There is still a high involvement of the state in setting up the rules for the economy, that 
are constantly changing, as many managers critically affirm. The state is considered to 
be the fundamental block that is now impeding the development in Venezuela. The state 
was a result of the large windfall gains in petroleum and is very inefficient. For 
example, there are hospitals in Venezuela that have 1,300 drivers and only one 
ambulance. The Caracas University Hospital has more blue-collar workers on its payroll 
than the Caracas Electrical Utility Company. There are 1,700 different pension systems 
that currently exist for Venezuelan government workers. At the moment, many state 
workers such as college professors presently receive a pension equal to their full pay at 
the age of 45.592 Even compared to other Latin American countries the public sector is 
large and it is not focussed. Venezuela has one of the most excessive public payrolls in 
South America. We have to keep in mind that the country went from having 360,000 
state employees in 1968 to more than 1.5 million people in 1999.593 Policy making 
happens without continuity. As the petroleum revenues have constantly poured into the 
country since the 1920s, the state believed in seeding the oil and preferred to share the 
wealth rather than investing it properly, and never felt the urge to develop a long term 
economic vision for the country. And it would have been difficult because the 
governments were not allowed by law to stay in office longer than 5 years. 
From the 1920s onwards there has been one government programme after the other to 
the point that the society became very dependent on government income. Rowan (1999) 
writes critically, "in a country based upon rents, and therefore filled with preferences, 
corruption, and depression of... economic ... variety, all sectors of the society have been 
affected by rentier consequences. The Venezuelan `private sector' has little experience 
591 Interview with the director of an economic journal. 592 N. N., 1999e, p. 1. 593 Izard, 1996, p. 692; IMF, 1998a, p. 71. 
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in wealth creation. Many of its `businesses' are based upon the political rent distribution 
system which has caused the national problem. "594 
As one can see in the figure below, the government is in the middle and everybody is 
depending on it for their share. Venezuela can be considered to be a hand-out nation. 
The first in the line gets more than the second and a million times more than the last. It 
is important to note that it is not a network. The members of the different groups don't 
mingle, they do not talk to each other that much. This means that the thing that makes a 
business grow is the fact that the company has a government subsidy or protection. 
Rent-distributing economic model 
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Figure 18: Venezuela: Rent-distributing economic model 
(source: A. Hirschbold, 2000) 
Regarding import licenses for example, Venezuela does not have a formal regime. 
However, hygiene certificates from the ministry of Health and Agriculture are required 
for most pharmaceutical and agricultural imports. The government has made use of 
these measures to restrict agricultural and food imports to protect domestic sorghum 
producers. Imports of used automobiles, used clothing and used tyres remain 
prohibited. 595 
Workers 
594 Rowan, 1999, p. 120. 59S examples taken from Herrera-Vaillant, 1997, p. 158. 
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If the firm has a problem with its workers, it is usually the government that intervenes 
and deals with these issues. For many years this model produced tremendous, wonderful 
growth. But it is a model that does not renew itself. It is not dynamic. So about 1970 it 
ran out of energy. It was no longer capable of producing the improvements that were 
required. 
The state's influence on daily business is still very strong. Rowan puts it this way: "Like 
skin cancer, politics has clawed its way into the so-called private sector, silently and 
effectively doing its harm, while on the outside, the face of business has a fine, healthy- 
looking tan. "596 For many simple things one has to get a permission from the state. This 
generates corruption again. Success in business often depends on state favouritism in 
many cases. If a company gets in the right position politically, it can be very successful. 
"If it loses its patrons, it fails or goes away. Companies come and go, succeed or fail, 
based not upon products and services, price and strategy, but on one key factor: Are 
their patrons in power or not ? 99597 
6.1.4 Geographic reasons 
Venezuela is located 5 to 10 degrees north of the equator. People therefore have to face 
extreme climatic conditions, e. g. heat, draught, and heavy rain during the wet season. 
Because Venezuela lies in the tropics, the four seasons do not exist. Therefore they 
don't have to prepare themselves for the winter and don't have to think nine months in 
advance. This might sound simplistic, but it serves as a reason for the lack of long term 
planning. The physical characteristics of the country, like the Lago di Maracaibo, the 
biggest lake in Latin America, high mountains (The Andes), and the Amazon Forest in 
the South contribute to the fact that distribution channels in Venezuela are deficient and 
not easy to establish. On the other hand, countries like Switzerland have unfavourable 
geographic settings as well, but have managed to develop an effective infrastructure. 
596 Rowan, 1999, p. 120. 597 ibid., 1999, p. 120. 
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6.2 Consequences 
6.2.1 The business landscape of the private sector 
There only exist very few large and many, many small and medium sized companies in 
the private sector. The following chart shows the biggest private employers in 
Venezuela. The largest Venezuelan private company in terms of workforce is Polar, a 
domestic brewer with more than 17,000 employees. Second comes the privatised 
telephone company CANTV with 15,751 or 7,000 workers depending on the source of 
information ! 598 Banco Provincial employs roughly 10,000 people. Interestingly enough 
Polar is the one really big company that can be placed in the secondary sector that is 
rather underdeveloped in Venezuela. 
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Figure 19: Biggest employers in Venezuela, 1998. 
(source: Business Venezuela, 1999, pp. 56-58; Dinero, 1999, pp. 38-39) 
There is some production of basic foodstuffs, but in terms of manufacturing and 
producing goods like machinery or consumer products Venezuela has been traditionally 
weak. The main reason certainly is due to the fact that there has not, as already 
598 Business Venezuela, 1999, pp. 56-58; Dinero, 1999, pp. 38-39. 
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indicated, been a proper industrialisation yet. Hence, export except for oil has never 
been a strength. 
Seven out of the ten biggest firms belong to the service sector: a telephone company, 5 
banks, and one company of the electricity sector. The two remaining companies belong 
to the traditional steel manufacturing sector: SIVENSA, Siderürgica Venezolana, and 
SIDOR, Siderürgica del Orinoco. According to the data tables only around 30 
companies employ more than 2,000 employees in Venezuela. 
Following the statistics from OCEI, the Central Office for Statistics and Information 
Science, it can be seen, that 75 percent (or 9,431 units) of all registered businesses in 
Venezuela in 1996 employed between 5 and 20 people. Only 6 percent of all businesses, 
which amounts to 782 companies employ 100 or more workers. These firms are called 
"big companies" in Venezuela. 
Size of companies in Venezuela, 1984-1996 
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Figure 20: Size of companies in Vene, ucla, I984-1996. 
(data source: OCEI, 1999) 
The figure also shows the development of the number of companies in Venezuela since 
1984. It shows that there is no significant growth in companies that employ more than 
20 people. The only variable is "small companies" (5 to 20 employees) contracting or 
expanding according to the economic situation of the country. The number of 
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companies was especially low in 1993,1994, and 1995. This being caused by the 
banking crisis and a relatively low oil price. 599 
Another fact that is significant for the Venezuelan business landscape is the high level 
of informal economy. It accounts for more than 60 percent of the GDP. 600 It is believed 
that only 2.6 million people are employed formally. 1.4 million of them work in the 
public sector, the rest works equally in industry or in the service sector. This also means 
that only 2.6 million people pay taxes - quite an insignificant number. 
Structure of employment in Venezuela, 1999 
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Figure 21: Structure of employment in Venezuela, 1999. 
(source: Internal presentation of a multinational chemical company) 
Who owns the companies ? 
Between 80 to 90 percent of the companies are private and family owned. Family 
conglomerates are still commonplace, especially in the state of Zulia with Maracaibo as 
its capital: 
"We have a newspaper here, also an insurance company ... and a metallurgy 
plant. ... I manage a real estate company, shopping centres, cement business also, which I am not actively involved in, but occasionally. ... We 
5" see also chapter on banks in section one. 600 N. N., 1999f, p. 4. 
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are busy in many different areas, sectors. You could call it a conglomerate 
or a financial group. "601 
Only very few companies are publicly traded. They are managed professionally by 
people who do not belong to the family, yet these firms are still family owned. 
There is only very little foreign ownership and only in certain sectors; for example, 
telecommunication, automotive, cement, and food. 602 After the collapse of the banking 
sector in 1994 and 1995 foreign participation was encouraged, with the result that by 
1999 foreign banks had a 42 percent share of total Venezuelan banking. 603 
Only domestic markets are served, and little cross-border investment occurs. Under the 
33 leading transnational companies in Latin America the Organisacibn Diego Cisneros 
(one of the biggest family-owned Venezuelan business conglomerates, having 
engagements in retailing, food and consumer products, broadcasting, information and 
communication) is the only Venezuelan company. 604 
6.2.2 Composition of the managerial class 
Most of the time these family conglomerates are run by members of the family. 
"My father was president of the company, so I took over when he passed 
"6os away about ten years ago. 
"(The companies) ... are inherited from fathers to children. s606 
If we take the famous shipping company H. L. Boulton & Co., for example, we can see 
that the president of the board of executives and president of the company is Roger 
Boulton. Dr. J. Howard Boulton is senior vice president. William H. Boulton is second 
vice president. Henry L Boulton is principal director. Alberto, Lukas C. and William A. 
Boulton are also directors. 
It happens frequently that key positions are staffed with family members for various 
reasons. For security reasons the financial part is often managed by a member of the 
family. Many cases of kidnappings have occurred in Venezuela. Once it was discovered 
601 Interview with the manager of an electronics company. 602 ECLAC, 1998c, pp. 63,124. 603 Salomon Smith Barney, 1999, p. 3. 604 ECLAC, 1998c, p. 148. 605 Interview with the manager of an electronics company. 
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that an employee had passed on information to a group of kidnappers about the 
company's group finances so that the kidnappers knew exactly how much money there 
was. 
Some managers are of the opinion that Venezuelan employees need to be constantly 
controlled and supervised and it is best to exert control via family members, because 
they are the only ones one can trust. For some this is the reason why many of these 
family businesses have developed so well. 
"The father is the president, the son is responsible for the production, the 
daughter runs the laboratory, and the mother looks after the money. , 607 
Another reason lies in Venezuela's protectionist past. People are promoted not because 
of merit, having work experience, or proper education, but because they have strong 
family ties. The number for personnel rotation at the middle management tends to be 
high, because there exists only a small chance of entering the top management of the 
same organisation. The following quotation gives some idea of the different alternatives 
an ambitious outsider might have to face: 
"From the beginning on it was made very clear that I was only allowed to 
become a manager of a department, the higher positions were reserved for 
the family. Either you marry a daughter of the family or you change your 
family name. Both things were not alternatives for me. "608 
Promotion at high level is rare or it ends up being only for family members or for those 
people related to the top executives. As the top positions are reserved anyway, 
Venezuelan companies tend to invest too little in the professional development of their 
middle management. People end up having more years of experience, but not 
necessarily more years of knowledge and professional development. 
For the executives of large family firms it is quite common to hold several international 
university degrees, most of them acquired at prestigious business schools in the USA. It 
is very popular to send the children to Wharton or Stanford. Managers who graduated 
from these schools tend to be very proud on their achievement and it is common 
practise to hang the diplomas and certificates up the office walls, certainly to show 
visitors that they are true professionals with strong academic credentials. This is to 
make others believe that Venezuela "no longer is a banana country. If somebody comes 
606 Interview with the maintenance manager of a transportation company. 607 Interview with the general director of a chemicals trading company. 608 Interview with the manager of a company related to the steel industry. 
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up and tells us how to bake bread, we can do it now. We have been to the universities, 
for instance myself. I am an engineer and I have two masters degrees. One in 
engineering and one in business administration and finance. "609 This statements reveals 
two other things: Venezuelans in general are very proud and want to be treated as 
coming from a Western country. Secondly the state's expenditures on tertiary education 
are quite high, while basic education is neglected. 610 
The importance attached to a sound higher education especially in Latin countries can 
be reinforced by looking at the Loughborough survey. The different countries' 
responses to the proposition 
Higher education and intelligence are important in enabling managers to see 
things clearly and to make rational decisions 
says it all: 
Venezuela and Spain representing Latin cultures had the highest mean scores (agreeing 
strongly), 4.09 and 4.02. At the other end of the scale was the British sample with 2.99. 
The UK as well as the USA and the German sample show a statistically significant 
difference when compared with the Venezuelan sample. 611 
Generally speaking there are two types of managers in Venezuela. One group are the 
professional managers, people who have been trained either in Venezuela or outside the 
country, working for big enterprises in the private sector. A second group is made up of 
the owner managers, who run all these many, many small companies. Most of them 
have not been trained professionally and lack academic education. 
What is the origin of the managers ? 
This question might sound basic, but its answer is quite astonishing: 
Not Venezuelan. There are few real Venezuelan managers. They are mainly foreigners. 
"You will hardly find a Venezuelan who doesn't have European roots: 
Spanish, Italian, German or Hungarian or whatever. ... The biggest firms here are in the hands of immigrants. "612 
60 Interview with the director of a Venezuelan bank. 610 Statistical evidence can be found in Enright, Frances, and Saveedra, 1996, p. 207. 611 see also Appendix X. 
612 Interview with a management consultant. 
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"The typical Venezuelan entrepreneur is not Venezuelan. There are very 
few purely Venezuelan companies. If you have a closer look, they are 
Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, East European, North European. , 613 
So how come there are only few Venezuelan managers ? 
This is the consequence of the reasons discussed in the previous chapters: state 
protectionism, windfall gains of oil, rentist mentality, lack of education and 
enlightenment, impressive population growth. All these facts are hindering the 
development of an entrepreneurial spirit in Venezuela. Some managers feel that the 
government has not really supported private industry for the last 30 years. Private 
entrepreneurialism tended to be controlled along socialist lines (for example the 
telephone company was not allowed to increase the prices, pharmaceutical products and 
clothes had to be sold cheap) than fostered or stimulated. Thus very few management 
positions have been created in industry over the last decades. 614 If demand is small, 
supply is small as well. Thus compared to countries like Colombia, Peru, or Mexico the 
number of able Venezuelan managers is low. 
Immigrants on the other hand came with empty hands to the country. Many of them lost 
everything during the various wars in Europe and learned that the only thing no one can 
take away from them is their knowledge and their brains. Obviously all these people 
have a Venezuelan passport and speak Spanish at home, but they still have a strong 
European roots. 
"My logistics manager is a German. She has been here for more than 20 
years and has got a Venezuelan passport, but she is German. The assistant 
is a German-Venezuelan, born here, ... the second assistant from this department is Portuguese. She was born here, is 35 years old, Venezuelan, 
but Portuguese blood. My finance manager is a funny mixture between 
Lebanese and Cuban-Spanish origin. My marketing manager is a pure 
Spaniard. My personnel manager is of Czech origin. My medical director 
is Sicilian. I repeat: all Venezuelans. "615 
Given this cultural mixture, business people tend to be friendly and open towards 
foreigners. "We are not xenophobic. "616 
Another reason why Venezuelan management is dominated by foreigners is the fact that 
many Venezuelan families send their children to schools in the United States or Europe. 
613 Interview with the general director of a chemicals trading company. 614 This can also be concluded when looking at the development of medium sized and big companies; see figure 29 "Size of companies in Venezuela, 1984-1996. " 615 Interview with the president of the Venezuelan subsidiary of a German multinational pharmaceutical 
company. 
616 Interview with the vice president of a Venezuelan bank. 
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Many of these students do not return to Venezuela, because they prefer to start a career 
in the USA -a more competitive environment but with higher salaries, better 
infrastructure, and more professionalism. This phenomenon is widely known as 
exportacidn de cerebros, the export of brains, or lafuga de talento. 617 
The ones who return may have studied in the USA, but are European at heart. 
It could have been shown that top management posts are mostly taken by European 
immigrants of the 20th century or their children. Estimates say that around 70 percent of 
all middle and high managers are of European origin. According to a study from 
FEDECAMARAS 68 percent of the registered managers were not born in Venezuela. 618 
This phenomenon can be found neither in Mexico or Peru nor Spain. 619 
But there are also managers who originate from families that have a tradition of almost 
500 years in Venezuela. As the Enlightenment never occurred in Venezuela or any 
comparable movement, these strong families originating from colonial times are still 
influential. They are called "Amos del Valle" and are landowners whose properties 
were then transformed into manufacturing companies, i. e. steel works, or banks. 
Moving down the companies' hierarchies, one discovers that starting at middle 
management level people become increasingly more Venezuelan: darker skin or foreign 
traces go back more than 100 or 150 years. 
6.2.3 Tasks of a manager 
Normal rules of business success do not seem to apply in Venezuela. 
According to general business practise in Europe, companies normally gain their 
income through two sources: revenues resulting from innovation, and from market 
penetration. 
The first group includes innovation processes, product innovation, process innovation, 
and organisational innovation. Secondly, market penetration means new markets or s 
larger share of existing markets. 
Furthermore, income can be generated by means of an increase in productivity or 
through investment. 
617 Garbi, 1991. 
618 This study is 10 to 15 years old, thus dated, but it still serves the argument. 
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The rule that profits should come from innovation and more sales does not work for 
Venezuela. Furthermore companies do not enjoy income from financial deposits 
because the firm's capital and profits get transferred immediately to Zürich, New York, 
or to off-shore banks. 
"The entrepreneurs are rich, the companies are poor in Venezuela. , 620 
In Venezuela, income results from various other sources: 
" Monopolies 
" Protectionism 
" Subvention from government 
" Tax evasion 
" Corruption 
" Natural resources 
" Low wages 
First of all many sectors of the economy, especially before foreign investors started to 
enter the country, were monopolised via commerce, trade, and distribution channels. 
The distribution of medical products for example is in the hands of a single family, 
which owns two distribution companies. Thus they can make a profit due to their 
monopoly. 
Secondly, income has been achieved via a high level of protectionism. Domestic 
production was supported via high import taxes and tariff barriers. Venezuelan 
companies oriented their prices close to the prices of foreign products. This of course 
leads to inefficiencies in the production process, higher prices, and bad quality. 
Thirdly, as the government adopted the scheme of sowing the petroleum, the sectors of 
agriculture and industry were highly subsidised. 
Fourthly, companies try make an indirect profit by avoiding taxes. 
A lot of business success is not the result of competition, best pricing, good quality, or 
the punctuality and reliability of delivery, but are the result of corrupt practices. This not 
only harms the efficiency of any given company, but it undermines the productivity of 
619 According to a partner of a Venezuelan consultancy. 620 Interview with the director of an institute for social studies. 
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the whole nation, because it destroys all the efficiency gains that are made through 
market processes and competition. 
The money that is gained through the exploitation of natural resources cannot be 
considered as a real income. The revenues resulting from petroleum extraction have 
more of a rent character. 
Finally income is realised through comparatively low wages. According to a study of 
the United Bank of Switzerland, the lowest salaries are paid in Nairobi, Moscow, 
Prague, some Asiatic countries, Mexico, and Caracas. 621 
This has an impact on the tasks of a Venezuelan manager. He does not search for 
innovation processes or ways to enlarge regional markets, but rather he tries to optimise 
and maximise these other sources of income. So he thinks about how to evade taxes, 
how to strengthen his monopolistic situation, or how to receive subsidies from the state. 
Thus he is not close to the market but close to the ministries where the subventions are 
distributed. The former minister of development put it in the following words: 
"Here it is very important to have good connections to be able to retain the 
rent. That is an ability that has to be developed to be more opportunistic 
than to be productive and competitive in the market. That is the 
fundamental trend and also an explanation for the Venezuelan crisis. "622 
Thus, the most cyclical but effective business strategy is to appear uninvolved in 
politics "while corporate tentacles secretly reach into the bedrooms and bank accounts 
of judges and politicians. Play the game while pretending the opposite. ... The appeal of 
rent is simple. Unearned income is preferable to earned income. 99623 
Venezuelan managers do not seem to be concerned with efficiencies in the way that 
European managers are. The tasks of a modern manager, for example, strategic 
thinking, the implementation of modern communication styles, teamwork, new 
production processes and models do not seem to arouse their interest. These things are 
not important to Venezuelan managers because traditionally they do not earn their living 
from these things. 
According to a management consultant, what a manager does to be successful in 
Venezuela is different from general practice. The different way also dictates different 
621 UBS, 1997, p. 27. 622 Interview with the former minister of development. 623 Rowan, 1999, p. 120. 
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tasks. The underlying mental map was discussed in a previous chapter. The following 
figure conveys his opinion: 
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Figure 22: Mapa mental - Ways to success. 
(source: Interview with A. Szilagyi, 2SP Consulting , 1999) 
Due to the cultural conditioning of the feudal times and la epoca Saudi, i. e. "if I come to 
terms with the Spanish crown, in contemporary Venezuela the government, I will 
benefit, " or "let's try to get a hold of these funds, so we receive some rent; " the values 
of hard work, decency, and achievement are not highly thought of in general. 
Venezuelan managers discovered that it is far easier to be successful if one works with 
attributes like connections, corruption, networking, favouritism, and abuse of 
governmental power. So very frequently managers in Venezuela choose the easier way 
in order to achieve success in business. Hence, when Lawrence and Edwards (2000) 
write about American management that it "is imbued with a bias for action, s624 the same 
applies for the Venezuelan way, but in a completely different form. 
In combination with the first three sources of income, viz monopoly, protectionism, and 
government subvention, it means the following in practise: Help the potential next 
government in its election campaign, i. e. invite the designated president to use your 
624 Lawrence and Edwards, 2000, p. 23. 
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private plane. They come to power. You are the producer of some mechanical pumps. 
Via your good connections to the new government, a law gets established that bans the 
import of those pumps via high import duties. So overnight you become the monopolist 
for pumps. 
"This is the way the whole economy works. Many entrepreneurs have lived 
out of the government's shadow. , 625 
Again, normal rules of business do not apply. Managers search for the power, because 
via this power they can achieve success without having to think about restructuring their 
internal processes, or implementing new marketing strategies. Rowan argues the same 
way by stating, "the lack of management skills is directly related to the irrelevance of 
knowledge in a culture based upon rents. s626 
But there are some exceptions. It is not all doom and gloom. There are certainly some 
companies that are managed in a modem way, especially those that are foreign owned, 
for instance some of the banks. There, people start to think more about productivity, 
efficiency, innovation, and market orientation. 
But even if domestic companies want to be innovative and sophisticated, continuous 
growth is made difficult because of a volatile government and a fluctuating economy. 
As the rules of the game are changing frequently it is difficult to grow a business 
continuously. It is more important to be highly flexible to respond quickly to unforeseen 
circumstances. It seems as if some Venezuelan managers are proud of having acquired 
this capability: 
"Europeans are not prepared for unexpected situations. They tend to be very 
systematic. Here we are prepared for the unexpected all the time. 
Paradoxically, the expected disturbs us. s627 
According to Venezuelan managers one has to atrincherarse to be successful. It means 
a manager needs to be able to adjust, to dig in the trenches and wait out the storm. 
"You have to be flexible and understand the different cycles and be able to 
adjust to the changes and adapt to the different ups and downs of the 
625 Interview with a management consultant. 
626 Rowan, 1999, p. 120. 627 Interview with the director of a publishing company. 
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economy. I think that is where the secret is. If you are able to grow and you 
are able to contract with the economy. , 628 
Another manager called it the "capacity of adapting to change. "629 A third one called his 
firm "an accordion type of company. When there is a lot of work, it expands, and when 
there is little work, it contracts. "630 
Managers also have to be on top of creativity. An American-Venezuelan personnel 
manager of a petroleum company stated, that in Venezuela managers need to be more 
creative than in the USA, because they face more problems in a day. 
It is widely felt that the government and public institutions exert a strong influence on 
doing business on a daily basis. Getting permits from all institutional levels tends to be 
quite time consuming and stressful. 
Another task of a Venezuelan manager that is different from European management and 
very time consuming is apagar fuegos, extinguishing fires. These fires can be things 
like: a permit that does not emerge from some governmental office, people that did not 
come to work, a spare part that has not been able to come through customs. 
This leads to the next paragraph that deals with issues of doing business. It also answers 
the question, what makes business hard in Venezuela. 
6.2.4 Absence of an industrial infrastructure 
It starts with simple things. Things that seem normal for Northern European and 
American managers do not work in Venezuela, like telephone billing or daily mail. 
The Venezuelan postal service, Ipostel, is considered quite inadequate. It often takes 
more than a week to deliver letters within Caracas. Sending packages and parcels via 
Ipostel is not advised, as they can disappear without a trace. 631 
If people want to send letters from Venezuela to Brazil for example, it happens that they 
ask visiting relatives or friends from Europe to take the mail with them and post it in 
Europe to make sure that the letters will make it to Brazil, a neighbouring country ! 
628 Interview with the manager of an electronics company. 629 Interview with the general director of a newspaper. 630 Interview with the general manager of a construction company. 631 see Herrera-Vaillant, 1997, pp. 108-109. 
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Another possibility to avoid Ipostel is to rent postal boxes, run by companies operating 
out of Miami or apartados (post-office boxes). In addition many companies take 
advantage of private postal services. Private courier companies deliver the mail then to 
Venezuelan households. Many businessmen make use of this costly alternative, 
although there are problems involved in this procedure. It happens that the mail takes 
more than 6 weeks to arrive, because any incoming package is treated as an import and 
has to go through customs with all the associated forms and clearance procedures - even 
letters! So if the customs officer cannot be bothered to get on with your mail, you will 
not receive your mail. As for customs procedures, Venezuela does not rank high. 
Corruption and antiquated procedures, which commonly delay the clearance of 
incoming goods, are frequent. 632 
There also exist some companies who employ courier services. Door-to-door delivery is 
offered by "employing" travellers who carry mail as part of their luggage allowance, 
thereby avoiding delays in customs. 
The joke about German hell and Venezuelan hell says it all, as told by the director of a 
business journal: 
"Two evil persons, one German and one Venezuelan are condemned to hell. 
Many hundred years later, they meet and the German says `Well, I am 
suffering everything, fire, heat, and pain. ' The Venezuelan from the 
Venezuelan hell says, `Well, I am doing very well, because in my hell, 
when the fire extinguisher works, there is no gas, and when there is gas and 
the fire extinguisher does not work, the guy who is the devil who lights the 
gas does not come, so I have never been burnt in 500 years. ' That is the 
difference. While the German hell was very efficient, the Venezuelan hell 
did not work. This is a joke, but it really illustrates the situation quite 
well. "633 
Many managers blame the fluctuations of the economy, recession and inflation as 
hindering middle term planning. As the economic cycles are so insecure and 
unpredictable, it is difficult to seriously plan for expansion. Expansion is considered to 
be a very delicate issue. 
632 Herrera-Vaillant, 1997, p. 158. 633 Interview with a director of an economic journal. 
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Although Venezuela's road network is better than in most of the other Latin American 
countries, the country is not well connected to its neighbours. This hinders continental 
trade and expansion. 
But even just doing business on a domestic level is problematic. For safety reasons it is 
impossible to work later than 6 o'clock in the evening, because especially in businesses 
like textiles, the personnel is mainly female. Because public transport is not available in 
the evening and the streets are very insecure, manufacturing businesses close their 
production facilities at sunset. 
This puts them at a big disadvantage compared to their American competitors because 
they can work three shifts, thus they can produce threefold with the same capital 
expenditures. 
Secondly, the cost of capital is very high. Interest rates vary between 40 and 50 
percent, 634 making it almost impossible to develop a business in terms of growth: 
"For a company to grow in this country, it's a headache. ... There exist no 
possibilities for growth. "635 
Another big issue is the social structure of Venezuela. It is required by law that at the 
beginning of each school year mothers need to go to school personally to register their 
children. If they don't do it, the kids are not allowed at school. It can take hours or even 
days, and during that time the women cannot go to work. 
The service sector poses problems also. In case of illness, getting to see a doctor can 
take weeks, and if you get to see one, it is most likely that you have to take care of your 
own medication, or bring your own vaccine and syringe. Most of the employees cannot 
afford to buy medicine, therefore it is up to the boss to help his subordinates. 
Some interviewees speak of a "collapse of the public services". One manager said the 
consequence of this is that Venezuela is "developing a whole working class that is 
under-prepared, and under-trained to deal with anything resembling modern 
economy. "636 
634 N. N., 1999f, p. 4. 
63$ Interview with the president of an engineering company. 636 Management with the director of an economic magazine. 
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6.3 Industrial culture 
Another way of expressing the findings of the section about the reasons why 
Venezuelan business culture differs from others is the fact that Venezuela never 
developed a Western industrial culture, one that is based on science and rationality. It 
seems as if Venezuelan managers and especially Venezuelan employees are grown up 
kids. In many instances the researcher experienced a high level of immaturity and 
naivety and a severe lack of professionalism. This does not necessarily have to be bad. 
An Argentine manager working in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry prefers the 
Venezuelan way compared to the Argentine management style: 
"I come from a country like Argentina where everybody foams over with 
intelligence. Here in Venezuela people are very nice and easy to live with. 
The naivety results from the fact, that the Venezuelan government 
subsidised everything in Venezuela. People had a very easy life and they 
did not have to be hyper-intelligent to survive. s637 
A mind's play: 
As mentioned in the chapter on education and the rule of law, we learned that 
Venezuelans generally do not like to follow rules. Now how can the naivety be used to 
influence peoples' public behaviour in a positive way ? 
Let us take the case of the metro of Caracas. People tend to behave there. They behave 
like gentlemen. People follow the instructions very clearly and they don't damage the 
installations. They keep everything clean and tidy. Why ? 
When the subway in Caracas was created, two paradigms were combined: The museum 
and the temple. In a museum and in a temple you behave yourself, even if the temple 
does not belong to your religion. There are works of art in the metro. The stations are 
designed by distinguished architects. Most of the people do not understand the works of 
art, but this is the important part: they do not have to understand it, because you respect 
more the things you do not understand than the things you do understand. That is the 
secret of religion, too. You do not comprehend the trinity: that is why you adore it. 638 
The hypothesis of the existence of naivety will be strengthened and illustrated by a few 
examples that struck the author most during the field work stage in Venezuela. 
637 Interview with an Argentine manager of the Venezuelan subsidiary of a German multinational 
pharmaceutical and chemical company. 63$ The paragraph is based on a testimony provided by the director of an economic journal. 
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Although Unions do not play an important role in the Venezuelan private sector, bigger 
companies have to deal with Unions regularly. One manager of industrial relations 
revealed during an interview when asked whether he talks business over dinner or not, 
that he prefers to deal with the Unions at breakfast time. 
"I do more breakfasts than dinners because my negotiations fundamentally 
have to deal with Unions. ... And sometimes 
important decisions have to be 
taken and if they are drinking then we do not make serious decisions. In 
"639 the morning they are not drinking. 
Another incidence that reflects childishness at national level is the following story. A 
manager imports TV sets. At the harbour he gets told by the customs, that they need to 
take a sample and if they are not allowed to do that, he will never see his freight again. 
When asked how many samples they need to take, the answer was two TVs. When the 
container was opened in Caracas by the manager, seventeen television sets were 
missing. 
This `missing numbers' is a perfect example of the lack of objective rationality and the 
dominance of emotions. 
"If we take the model of reason and emotions, then we can see that here the 
heart is bigger and the head is smaller. In Central Europe most of the times 
the head is much bigger and the heart is much smaller. People even have a 
relatively negative attitude towards emotions. Many decisions are only 
taken on a rational basis. "M0 
Another example is the fact that business meetings always have to be reconfirmed. If 
you agree on a meeting date and you show up without reconfirming a day before, it 
happens that your partner has not got a clue that you are coming. 
6.3.1 Derecho adquirido 
In this section it will be shown how the acquired rights argument, derecho adquirido, 641 
manifests itself in the industrial culture. 
"If I have a good year in terms of business, and I give a bonus at the end of 
the year, I have to give this bonus again next year to my employees too, 
because they have received it before. This is one of these derechos 
adquiridos, they already have a right for it. "M2 
639 Interview with the manager of industrial relations of a brewing company. 640 Interview with a management consultant. 641 See chapter on the "Way of colonisation". ßt2 Interview with a management consultant. 
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Therefore many companies watch for these types of bonuses, because it means, when 
these benefits are given to employees once, they can turn into part of their salary and 
have to be given the following years as well. This can have a snowball effect and in case 
the employees have to be laid off, it can get very expensive for the company. 
The problem lies in the fact that the whole nomenclature is based on rights and not on 
duties. The Working Law tends to be very protective and it is common place that people 
who get fired try to sue their employer. 
The president of an insurance company in Caracas answered the question whether 
loyalty was a problem or not with the following words: 
"Always. You don't know an employee until the day you fire him. "643 
6.3.2 Desire to claim things 
As the rent-seeking mentality is deeply embedded in the Venezuelan psyche, one can 
find its traces in daily business as well. 
If a company offers a 10 percent discount for fast payment, Venezuelans will claim the 
discount, i. e. take off the 10 percent, but pay weeks later. 
Venezuelan customers and clients prefer to get served by the "presidente" or the 
"gerente". This has to deal with the fact that they want to be respected and they like to 
feel important. It is very important for Venezuelans to be socially accepted and 
appreciated as human beings. 
The simple consequence is that even an employee who would be on the professional 
level of an analyst in Britain, is called "gerente" (manager) of something, even if he has 
not got a secretary or any subordinates that work for him. Thus the Venezuelan proverb 
of muchos caciques y pocos Indios, too many chiefs and not enough Indians, fully 
applies; but then again only in the sense of enjoying the rights and not having to put up 
with the duties as well. 
Venezuela can be described as a society marked by parent-child relations. On a national 
level, the people expect president Chavez to fix everything like a family father. It is the 
state's task to make sure that everyone enjoys life. It is still widely believed in the 
643 Interview with the director of an insurance company. 
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population that the state has enough money to take care of all Venezuelans. People just 
don't see the point that it is not only the fault of corrupt politicians, but that they are 
also responsible for their own personal development. Instead they refuse to take 
responsibility and constantly blame somebody else for their misery. 
At a much lower company level, Chavez' position is assumed by the firm's boss. 
Employees expect him to have precise answers to their problems, because they are too 
lazy to think or to work out an idea by themselves. They also feel that they are weak and 
cannot exert any influence on the environment that surrounds them. This phenomenon is 
called externalidad de control, the externality of control. 
"Venezuelans tend to think more of a boss that says what you have to do, 
and not leave you on your own to decide what to do. 4 "M 
This can be understood as a direct consequence of the lack of education and 
enlightenment. 
Venezuelans tend to be very proud but not ambitious. Some interviewees call it a Latin 
arrogance. 
This shows for example in the general lack of a service mentality. Shop assistants don't 
offer their help. They are not well informed about the product either and receiving a 
Buenos Dias and a smile when entering a store is something a customer needs to wait 
for very patiently. The manager of a supermarket chain explains it with the following 
words: 
"The employee believes he is doing the customer a favour. "bas 
In fact it can be noticed that the Venezuelan per se does not sell a product, but he waits 
until people buy it from him. 
The fact that people are not service-oriented manifests itself the in the way a telephone 
company reacts to complaints: 
"I am a telephone company. I did you a favour, I gave you a telephone. So 
why are you here to complain about your bill ? "64 
Another example for a certain kind of arrogance can be inferred from the following 
pattern of conduct that has been described by various interviewees. Once a Venezuelan 
employee gets promoted and grows a little in the organisation, he starts to abuse his 
644 Interview with a manager of an investment company. 645 Interview with the president of a supermarket chain. 646 Interview with the director of a company that publishes information on the economy. 
Business Culture in Venezuela: Consequences 201 
newly gained power by treating the lower ones badly. For example he wants his 
subordinate to clean his shoes. Therefore upper management has to keep an eye on him 
to check whether he uses his authority correctly or not. 
Generally, Latin people like the flavour of power. Managers also had the impression 
that their employees tend to confuse private life and business. They overuse power to 
obtain personal favours. This behaviour can also be observed in the public sector. It is 
common practise that political parties use their political power as a means to gain access 
to public sector jobs for their members and supporters. 647 
6.3.3 Conflict avoidance 
"Probably the avoidance of conflict is a character trait. You try to avoid a 
conflict, because if not, then let us really have a big one, and then let us 
have a personal one. Let us may be shoot each other. So if we really want 
to have a conflict, let us make it a nice, big, heavy one. g "M 
Conflicts at the workplace are generally seen as harmful, threatening, and something 
that should be avoided. 
The Loughborough study leads to the same conclusion, i. e. the existence of a high level 
of conflict avoidance. The proposition: 
A manager should constantly challenge how things are done rather than deferring 
to hierarchy and precedent 
was not accepted by the Venezuelans (mean of 2.91) being statistically significantly 
different when compared to the British (4.16 !! ) and the US-American sample (3.93). 649 
As Venezuelans tend to personalise anything, criticism is something that always directly 
hits the person per se and not the work he or she has done. Therefore it is hard to find a 
Venezuelan who admits a mistake, because this would put him in the position of getting 
told off and taking the blame. Hence, it is never their fault. There is always somebody 
else to blame. 
If there is no one else to blame, it happens that Venezuelans reinvent the truth. The 
expression El vaso se partio, the glass broke itself, serves as an example to show that it 
64' Colitt and Lapper, 1999, p. 14. 
64$ Interview with the director of a company that publishes information on the economy. 649 see Appendix XI. 
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was somebody else's fault, i. e. a poor quality of the glass is responsible for its damage. 
The expression of I broke the glass exists, but gets hardly ever used. 
Another nice example, that also shows a certain level of arrogance, was told by the 
purchasing manager of an oil company. When the agent of a shipping company was 
asked why one of the crates was soaked after being shipped over from Europe, he 
answered: 
"Quien sabe, donde se mojö. " (Who knows, where it wet itself) 
The good thing of this high level of conflict avoidance is the fact that strikes rarely 
occur. Workers can be described as pacificos and strive for harmony at work. Whenever 
the researcher came up with the question "What do you do, if your employees go no 
strike ?" answers always pointed in the same direction. For example: 
"Look, in the 39 years that we have been around, we have never had an 
employees' strike. ... It is a Venezuelan phenomenon. ... They are 
peaceful. "65° 
On the other hand, a Venezuelan general director of a newspaper called it "the most 
important thing ... to avoid getting 
into" strikes. The maintenance manager of a logistics 
company even said, when asked how he resolves problems and conflicts in the 
company: 
"Thank God I have not had conflicts or problems. "6s1 
So both sides, employees and employers, try to slide around problems, strikes, and 
conflicts proactively. It is believed by the managers that employees only go on strike, 
take this "drastic measure", because nobody has paid attention to them. Therefore it is 
up to the employers to make sure that their staff feel comfortable at work. 
The motivation for employees to avoid conflicts is a different one. As described in the 
chapter discussing the colonisation experience, loyalty is not directed towards the 
organisation, but towards the company's leader, because through him people hope to 
acquire benefits and power. Therefore it is important to come to terms with the boss. 
Hence it happens in business meetings that people do not discuss their different views 
on an issue. They rather prefer to keep quiet and nod their heads, because any kind of 
confrontation is considered as irreverence against the hierarchy. 
650 Interview with president of a supermarket chain. 651 Interview with the maintenance manager of a transportation company. 
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In Germany there exists something that can be called "a culture of conflict", the Kultur 
des Konfliktes or Streitkultur. For German employees it is important to utter criticism 
once in a while to make a point, to stand up for the truth, and not to appear to be 
spineless. In Western cultures conflicts are often discussed publicly. They are 
considered to be a productive element of management. 652 In Venezuela this kind of 
culture does not exist. Discussions at the workplace are much more personalised, the 
emotional component plays a much stronger part. 
Additionally, evidence can be added by looking at the Loughborough survey. The 
proposition: 
A manager who frequently challenges how things are done is less likely to be 
promoted 
was rejected by the German sample with a mean of 1.68. This reinforces our claim of 
the existence of a German Streitkultur. Venezuelans' behaviour was significantly 
different in the statistical sense (mean of 2.91). 
If you are right, you might loose a friend. People do not want to hurt anyone. They are 
very sensitive. The consequences of an improper way of criticism are explained by the 
general manager of a company that sells office equipment: 
"Even if you are right, even if they are wrong, if they did the worst things 
possible , 
if you are really going to hurt them and bitch at them, then you 
have to fire them. ... 
They take it as an insult, if you yell out loud in an 
improper way, and from that day on, you will have lost the loyalty of that 
person, you are going to get sabotaged. If you get to this point, it is better 
"653 to fire them. 
So if there are things to criticise it is important to choose the right tone and the 
appropriate words. Disagreement should never be expressed in plain terms, nor in front 
of others. Subtlety is more valued than straight criticism. The downside is that it is 
easier to cause confusion than clarity. 
652 see Berkel, 1984, pp. 1-30. 653 Interview with general manager of a company that trades printing material and photocopiers. 
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The tendency always to blame someone else does not only occur on a company level, 
but at a national level as well. Papers blame the International Monetary Fund, the price 
of petroleum and the globalisation of business for Venezuela's woes. 
6.3.4 Commitment 
As the Venezuelan worker feels powerless and intellectually inferior, a low level of 
discipline, commitment, creativity, and imagination exists in general. This also harms 
motivation, eagerness, and the will to achieve things. Many managers complain about 
the general lack of a sense of duty, responsibility, and reliability. 
"I don't know if it is heritage, but Venezuelans and Latinos in general tend 
to be very problematic when it comes to work. "654 
"You have to tell the people, do this, do that. Workers are less creative. "655 
One always has to control and constantly supervise. Managers feel that they always 
have to be on top of things at all levels, because Venezuelan workers do not have the 
urge to do things quickly. This makes delegating work difficult, too. 
"If you tell your employee on Monday to do something, either you repeat it 
on Tuesday or he will have forgotten it. "656 
Many interviewees consider it difficult in Venezuela to get a job done. One has to exert 
close supervision and a detailed follow-up of the actions that should be taken or to get 
middle management and workers do what they are supposed to do. But even then it is 
practically impossible to get people do their duties punctually. The Venezuelan worker 
is often described as somebody who can sit still for a whole day without getting any 
work done at all. 
The will to work out a detailed solution to a problem is not very common in Venezuela. 
People enjoy fixing an emergency problem if it can be done quickly, but if it involves 
long term commitment, Venezuelans tend to lose interest and enthusiasm. This fire- 
fighting mentality helps to resolve immediate issues in a superficial way, but many 
times these solutions tend to be short term oriented and simply not good enough. They 
are very creative with things they haven't got a clue about. This can be very dangerous 
sometimes. 
654 Interview with the president of a construction company, mainly in the sector of petroleum. 655 Interview with the personnel manager of a petroleum company. 656 Interview with a management consultant. 
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The lack of commitment can be considered a serious problem: 
"Middle management and professionals of the lower parts of the 
organisations ... 
just tend to forget that they have a responsibility and that 
they should be proud of their job. s657 
Some managers also complained about the fact that they have to supervise operations 
that would normally be controlled by the middle management, such as monitoring the 
cash flow, checking cheque payment, control over the payment of goods and services. 
When wondering why Venezuelans tend to be less committed to work than employees 
from other countries, e. g. Germany, Great Britain, or the USA, Hofstede's study (1980) 
on cultural dimensions is helpful. Venezuela scored extremely low on the dimension of 
individualism (12 points) compared to other countries: USA 91, Great Britain 89, 
Germany 67, Spain 51, Argentina 46, Chile 23.658 
Although the study is more than 20 years old, because Hofstede did the survey in 1968 
and 1972, Venezuela can still be considered as a highly collectivist country. Cultures 
that show this trait put a strong emphasis on groups in general. The collectivist prefers a 
tightly knit social network that integrates him emotionally into a big family, clan or any 
other group. 659 Societies that are extremely collectivist, like Venezuela, are especially 
loyal to one particular group: the family. Indeed, this phenomenon is called familism. 
Therefore it happens that Venezuelan employees are more loyal to the family than to the 
company. This can cause a high rate of absenteeism, especially if families do not 
appreciate the importance of a family member's work contribution. 
"If the supplier does not deliver on time, I am sure that he has a good reason 
why he has not delivered, and one of the most common problems here ... is that people do not go to work Monday mornings. It is very, very common. 
Work absenteeism Monday mornings is terrible. "660 
A brewing company made an in-house survey concerning the problems that caused 
absenteeism from work. A common reason put forward by the employees was the 
following: 
657 Interview with the socio director of a consulting company. 658 see Appendix I. 
659 Hofstede, 1990, p. 12. 660 Interview with the president of a construction company, mainly in the sector of petroleum. 
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"I miss work, because my wife, my partner tells me to go with her 
somewhere else and not go to work. "661 
So the Venezuelan worker does not miss work because he is lazy, but because he values 
the concerns of his family more highly than the obligation to work for his employer. 
Family bonds are very strong in all of Latin America. For a manager this means that he 
has to make the employee feel at home. Only if he starts to believe that the company is 
part of his family, and his family thinks the same, can full commitment and loyalty be 
achieved. Therefore as a manager one cannot separate the worker from his family: 
"I have to pay attention to both of them. "662 
Another fact that shows that Venezuelans value the time they spend with their families 
more than working time can be seen in the employees' conduct 10 years ago. During 
that time banks started to pay high interest rates. What happened was that many people 
chose to get fired to invest the redundancy pay and the liquidaciones, a bonus an 
employee receives when he withdraws from his job, at high interest. Even people who 
had been working at the company for many years left the office, because they preferred 
being on the dole to having to work. Another anecdote was told by a former manager of 
a construction company. He discovered that construction workers only worked until 
they earned enough money. If they get paid a decent amount of money per day, it 
happens that after two weeks they leave for four days and spend all the money and then 
come back. 
In other words people work to live and not the other way round. 
This brings us down to the question of loyalty. Managers consider their workforce as 
loyal in general. But many of the interviewees mentioned that in contemporary 
Venezuela, loyalty has become an issue. Due to the country's poor economic situation, 
employees especially low grade and blue collar workers have started to develop a 
somewhat opportunistic view. They will leave the company, if there is somebody else 
who pays a little bit more. It should be kept in mind, that ordinary workers typically 
spend up to 25 percent of their salaries on transportation. Furthermore, the infrastructure 
of transport is poor. People have to get up at 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning to queue up 
"' Interview with the industrial relations manager of a brewing company. 662 Interview with the industrial relations manager of a brewing company. 
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for a crummy bus, spend two hours in the bus and arrive at work at seven. The way 
back is the same thing and during the months of heavy rain and no proper canalisation 
system matters get worse. Having to undergo this whole process twice a day is a 
daunting task and harms motivation. 
The underlying problem that is much more severe is the fact that companies get tired of 
training their workforce, because they are in danger of loosing the most educated and 
trained people to competing companies. On the other hand, because unemployment 
rates are very high at the moment, people tend to be more industrious and loyal than 
they used to be. It happens quite often that one will find a taxi driver who is a lawyer, or 
a shop assistant selling arepas, filled rolls made of maize, who is a medical doctor. 
How to treat and motivate the workforce in Venezuela will be discussed in a later 
chapter of this thesis. 
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7 Venezuelan management 
7.1 Deficient professionalism 
"Productivity is a challenge. ... There is no time pressure in general. "663 
A lot of virtues that count in European or American management are not important in 
Venezuela, due to the things we have discussed earlier on. A mentality of finding funds 
and rent seeking does not promote virtues like efficiency, productivity, effectiveness, 
and achievement. 
Lack of competition has allowed businesses to grow without the need for sophisticated 
management. Usually managers, especially of smaller and medium-sized companies are 
people with limited training in the management area. The director of an economic 
journal put it this way: 
"I would like to have people like Bill Gates. He is greedy, but efficient. Of 
course he is a bandit, ... but that is capitalism. ... Here they have bandits, but they don't have efficiency. s6" 
Characteristics of German management like Fachkompetenz, the emphasis on Technik, 
or Termintreue are hard to find in Venezuela. 665 
Even compared to other Latin American countries Venezuelan managers feel less 
professional. 
"Here, in Venezuela important business chains exist, but the ones that exist 
in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile are light years ahead of us when it comes to 
professionalism. "666 
Although managers from the USA have been in the country since the 1920s Venezuelan 
management does not seem to be influenced by them too much. Whereas American 
companies are distinguished by their high degree of formalisation of systematic 
667 procedures, the Venezuelan counterpart has a less professional, less orderly approach. 
66' Answer of an American general manager who runs a Venezuelan-owned 5 star hotel in Maracaibo, 
when asked about the education of the workforce. 664 Interview with the president of an economic journal. 665 Further reading on management in Germany: Lawrence, 1980. 666 Interview with the president of a supermarket chain. 667 Lawrence, 1996, p. 72. 
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7.1.1 Business tools 
Management is not as professional as in Western Europe or in the USA. Things like 
outsourcing, downsizing, or vertical integration are generally neither known nor 
practised, only by a few big companies, for instance Polar, as discussed previously. 
There are only a few activities that are out-sourced, e. g. maintenance or market research 
If it is done at all, it happens spontaneously: 
"We do market research occasionally. It is not as organised, not as common 
as we would like it to be. ... I think we are one of the 
few retailers that do 
It. , '668 
Modern tools of business in the areas of finance (venture capital, stock exchange 
listing), computing (SAP, internet, intranet), marketing (research, data) are practised or 
available very seldom. Due to the lack of competition Venezuelan companies were 
never forced to operate efficiently. The outcomes are widely seen in contemporary 
business. For instance, there is a generally low level of automatisation, often resulting in 
severe overstaffing. Due to the lack of formalised procedures and careful recording, cost 
control tends to be an issue. 
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Figure 23: Negotiated volumes of Latin American stock exchanges. 
(source: Salmerdn, 1999) 
608 Interview with the president of several retail stores. 
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Company funding is a problem due to underdeveloped capital markets. The chart given 
on the previous page puts the Venezuelan stock market into the Latin American context. 
There are few financing options: share holders' equity or commercial banks with 
unbearably high interest rates due to a high inflation rate. The first alternative is out of 
question most of the times, because the capital is still abroad. 
7.1.2 Organisation 
The organisation of a company in Venezuela no matter the size tends to be formal. Any 
company has an organisation chart, a mission statement, and company rules and 
manuals. Many companies, especially those related to the petroleum sector, had to 
introduce a flowchart, because of market demands, such as ISO 9000 quality control. It 
also happens that PDVSA inspects companies it does business with and forces them to 
restructure their processes. Therefore formalisation procedures come into existence 
because companies are forced to and not because companies feel the need to become 
more structured. 
Organisation chart of a private company 
g(ýD 
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Figure 24: Organisation chart of a private company. 
(source: Company publication: Cei C. A., 1999) 
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The chart given on the previous page shows the typical organisation of a firm that is 
related to the petroleum industry. It can also be seen that it is family-run and all the 
important positions are staffed with family members, i. e. presidency, general 
management, purchasing department, and the department of finance and administration. 
But there also exists another reason for the existence of internal flowcharts. 
Venezuelans are perceived to be in need of order, although its execution is totally 
superficial. People begin to realise that they have to bring more discipline to the 
organisation. 
What Lawrence and Edwards (2000) wrote about Italy in this respect, seems to be 
applicable to Venezuela as well. Italian managers tend to the disorderly. "They are 
recognizing a tendency towards expressive disorder and acknowledging that it needs to 
be controlled by strong hierarchies and clear cut roles and rules .,, 
669 The tendency to 
formalise processes and the existence of informal rules that prescribe the rights and 
duties of employees and employers are characteristic for countries that score high on 
Hofstede's dimension of uncertainty avoidance. 670 Both countries, Venezuela (76 
points) and Italy (75) can be found on the upper half of the the uncertainty avoidance 
dimension. 671 
Additional evidence can be provided by the Loughborough Study. The Venezuelan 
sample achieved their highest mean score on the following three propositions about 
hierarchy: 
1. A clear cut hierarchy is essential to the proper functioning of any organisation. 
2. The hierarchy rightly denotes rank and status. 
and 
3. The hierarchy is necessary to achieve coordination 
showing statistically significant differences for all three propositions when compared to 
Germany, for the last two when compared to Britain, and for the second one when 
contrasted to the USA. The Spanish sample shows similar results to the Venezuelan 
669 Lawrence and Edwards, 2000, p. 64. 
670 see Appendix IV; Hofstede, 1993, p. 141; ibid., 1992, pp. 309 If. 671 see Appendix I. 
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one, reinforcing the fact that managers of Latin cultures put a strong emphasis on 
formalistic structures and hierarchies, favouring centralism over egalitarianism. 672 
But norms and rules established by the organisation chart are there mainly to be 
bypassed. Formalised chains of communication exist, but managers follow an open door 
policy. 
"There is an established chain of communication, ... but ... we are a 
company that is very informal when it comes to communicating and we do 
not shut the door to those that are below us. s673 
A flowchart is understood to be flexible, not so rigid that it cannot be moved around or 
changed. It is more of an environmental map that gives people an orientation than a 
dogma. A subordinate can bypass it any time, if boycotted by his boss. 
The Loughborough Study also provides some statistical evidence that Venezuelan 
managers put emphasis on structure and authority, for whatever reason: To bypass it or 
to fall back on it whenever it provides support. 
The following two propositions dealing with the item structure gave the Venezuelan 
sample the highest mean score out of all national groups in the survey: 
Structure is important for fixing the authority relations between organisational 
members. 
and 
Structure is important in showing the relationship between the 
posts/functions/departments of the organisation, 674 
In the first case, the contrast with the British and also the American group is statistically 
significant. The Venezuelan response to the second proposition differs even more 
strongly: With a mean score of 4.39 out of 5.00, which means almost total agreement 
with the statement, the Venezuelan sample is statistically significantly different to ALL 
other countries at the 0.05 level, i. e. UK (mean: 3.60), USA (3.78), Germany (3.67), and 
even Spain (4.00). 
Interestingly enough, the survey also gives evidence of the fact that although 
Venezuelans believe in the necessity of structure and order, they don't understand a 
672 see Appendices VIII and IX. 673 Interview with the president of a supermarket chain. 674 see Appendix VII. 
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company's structure as something inflexible. It is not seen as a dogma that cannot be 
changed. Regarding the following proposition, Venezuela scores the highest mean, a 
4.39 again, while the other countries, especially Germany (3.76) stay significantly 
behind: 
The structure of a company may well change as the strategy changes. 675 
Another proposition fuels the fact that Venezuelan managers prefer informality and 
informal communication and make opportunistic and irregular use of formal systems. 
The following statement is agreed most strongly by the Venezuelans compared to 
countries like the UK, the USA, Germany, or Spain: 
Senior management uses the formal communication system primarily as a control 
device. 
7.1.3 The quick buck and planning 
In Venezuela in general there is no long term perspective, only a short term focus. In 
most cases, planning has never been part of the decision-making process. Short termism 
and opportunist behaviour is often valued more highly than long term business 
relationships, e. g. with banks, " ... big corporations tend to be unfaithful wives. Once 
they see another bank and they offer more services they will leave you after a long 
relationship"676 This derives from the fact that Venezuela experiences a constant 
change in economic rules. Therefore the cycle of harvesting has to happen quicker, 
mark-ups have to be much higher, and amortisation times have to be shorter. Thus 
general management generally focuses more on short term profit maximisation than on 
long term growth. 
This perception of time has severe consequences for planning and managing the 
workforce. The general manager of a5 star hotel commented: 
"Instead of doing a6 month plan I do a one day plan. ... Basic level, this needs to be done before you leave on Friday. Do everything what you want 
to do, but this is the only thing I want. "677 
673 see Appendix VIII. 
676 Interview with the vice president of a Venezuelan bank. 677 Interview with an American general manager who runs a Venezuelan-owned 5 star hotel in Maracaibo. 
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It seems as if people plan on a day-to-day basis trying to get through the day rather than 
thinking about strategy. 
The reason can be found in different definitions of time horizons. In Germany, short 
term means one year, mid term three to five years, and long term five to ten years. In 
Japan, three years are considered to be short term, five to seven are mid term, and 
fifteen years are called long term. In Venezuela the definition is a slightly different one: 
"For us 6 months is not short term, not mid term and not even long term. It 
is science fiction. "678 
Long term planning and detailed strategic planning is considered to be a complete waste 
of time, because in an economy that is so volatile the only thing people know is that it 
will be different in the future. Once a manager received an invitation to join a workshop 
organised by a renowned company offering financial services. The title of the seminar 
was: 
Strategic planning for the next 45 days. 
Statistics, numbers, balance sheets and so on are hard to obtain from competitors, if 
there are any. The generation and availability of business related information is very 
limited. In general, statistical information is considered to be not trustworthy. What can 
be considered as very disturbing is the fact that even the information provided by the 
commercial register is often outdated. Very general information on the main 
macroeconomic and microeconomic trends can be gathered easily via the internet, i. e. 
the homepages of the banks (Banco Mercantil, Banco Central de Venezuela) or the 
statistical office (OCEI). But when data is needed about a specific branch of industry, 
there is only a very little statistic base that can be consulted by companies. Many times 
firms are forced to use statistical information gathered by themselves. This happens 
through unofficial channels via private contacts. 
There is a general lack of transparency, not only when it comes to statistical data but in 
business in general. This makes benchmarking very difficult and hinders strategic 
planning. 
Venezuelans know that information is important. Therefore they like to keep it to 
themselves and do not like to make it available to the public. Public servants for 
example tend to have acquired the habit of taking all the studies they have got in their 
678 Interview with a management consultant 
Venezuelan management 215 
bureau with them when they leave office, no matter the source, i. e. own investigations, 
subcontracted studies, or surveys by affiliated departments. This leaves the institution 
blank. Successors have to start gathering information from scratch, many times 
evaluating the same issues again. 
Another fact that can be considered quite striking is that companies invest very little on 
research and development. The following chart compares Venezuela with some Asian 
countries, i. e. Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Venezuela is the only country that 
spends less than 0.5 percent of GDP on R&D. Japan spends more than five times as 
much: All Asian countries show a positive trend in investing in research and 
development since 1980, while Venezuela's figures lack this positive development. 
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Figure 25: Spending on Research and Development (1980-1995) in percentage of GDP in Venezuela and Asian 
countries (source: Frances, 1999, p. 148). 
This has to do with the people's mentality. They do not have the attitude of "let us grow 
today so we have more in the future". As in colonial times, money that has been earned 
in Venezuela does not necessarily stay in the country. People prefer to invest it abroad. 
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7.1.4 Business strategy 
Most of the managers of medium-sized and small companies have to dedicate their 
energy to resolving immediate operational problems and emergencies, apagar fuegos, 
instead of working on strategic plans and trying to add and create value to the 
organisation. The president of a steel supplier company compared the job of a manager 
to the work of a juggler: 
"You have to make sure that all balls are kept moving, otherwise they will 
fall down. As soon as you stop keeping one plate in action, it will fall. You 
have to try to keep the plates in pace so they constantly turn. s679 
Obviously in the case of a manager, the balls have to be substituted by employers. It is 
difficult to keep the whole system running, because it involves several departments. 
Many times workers do not stick to deadlines or are incapable of resolving a minor 
problem that will then slow down the whole process. 
The existence of a fire-fighting mentality when it comes to managing a company and 
the need to constantly supervise can be shown by looking at the results of the 
Loughborough survey as well. In response to the proposition: 
Management is essentially about the operation of systems and standard operating 
procedures (SOPS) that are already in place 
the Venezuelan had the highest mean score out of all the national groups. When asked if 
Management is primarily about the setting of objectives and the monitoring of 
plans for their achievement 
the Venezuelan mean score (3.79) was only topped by the Spanish sample (3.90) but 
showing no statistically significant difference. 
As managers are highly involved in handling daily operations, it is no surprise that 
Venezuelans agreed strongest (mean of 3.91) on the following proposition compared to 
other countries: 
Above all the manager needs specialist knowledge and relevant experience. 680 
The UK sample even rejected this proposition by reaching a mean of 2.85.681 This is due 
to the fact that British management is more based on generalism and preferably deals 
679 Interview with the president of a company from the steel suppliers' industry. 680 see Appendix X. 
681 Reminder: Five point scale with "1" _ "strongly disagree" up to "5" = "strongly agree". As "0" does 
not exist, "3" is the dividing line, not "2.5". 
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with strategy or business development. Comparing the means of Spain, Germany, the 
USA, and the UK to the Venezuelan score, ALL differences are statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level. 
Almost all companies in Venezuela only compete on a domestic level. Thus they do not 
feel the need to reach global excellence and high technical standards. Concepts of 
strategic planning such as business process re-engineering are not usually well known. 
It is seen as something far away even for big organisations and it is not applied in small 
companies due to lack of knowledge. 
Venezuelans also tend to lack the powers of analysis and the ability to think 
systemically. It is not to be confused with the term "systematically". Systemic thinking 
has to do with the capability of integrated thinking, mentally grasping a system 
completely. In order to understand and solve contemporary problems of a complex 
environment, it is important to understand the whole system. Issues will not always get 
solved on a short term basis without having resolved the problems of the whole system. 
People lack the ability of combining variables and putting them into an environmental 
context. Furthermore they do not understand their interdependencies. People tend to 
focus on their functions and tasks without realising how their acting might affect others. 
7.1.5 Concluding thoughts 
Venezuelan management of small and medium sized companies tends to be 
unprofessional, somewhat inefficient, and not competitive. 
On the other hand it can be observed in a few big companies that Venezuelan 
management starts to become more professional; partly because family-owned 
companies begin to shift management responsibility from family members to 
professional managers. Professional management is very young in Venezuela and can 
be described as well educated, modem, and having traces of American influence 
because of attendance of American business schools. 
However, Venezuelan management is not as strongly influenced by the American way 
of doing business as one might expect. It can rather be considered to be independent and 
unique. When compared to countries like the UK, the USA, Spain, and Germany by 
using the Loughborough Study containing 87 propositions to which managers were 
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invited to respond on the classic five-point scale from "strongly disagree" ("1") to 
"strongly agree" ("5"), Venezuelan management style comes closest to the one of Spain. 
The results of this exercise are shown in the following: 682 
0 36 statistically significant differences as between the Venezuelan and the 
German managers. 
0 37 statistically significant differences between the Venezuelans and the British. 
0 39 statistically significant differences between the Venezuelans and the US- 
Americans. 
" 27 statistically significant differences between the Venezuelans and the Spanish. 
Survey-wise it is fair to say that Venezuelan management comes closest to that of 
Spain, but it would still be wrong to assert that it is similar to Spanish management, in 
part because one has to keep in mind that no less than 31 percent of all the propositions 
contained in the Loughborough Study showed statistically significant differences 
between these two Latin countries. 
7.2 What is left ? 
People and relations between people -a traffic of influences. Contacts and a good 
network are considered to be the key to succeed in business in Venezuela. 
"If you don't know anyone, you are in trouble as a fact. "683 
Due to all the deficiencies and inefficiencies in Venezuelan business culture, people 
have to rely heavily on personal contacts, personalism, compadrazgo, matraca (very 
Venezuelan expression meaning "one has to pay an official"), and palanca (the lever of 
a machine to get things moving). 
These patterns apply for almost any activity on any level in any business. 
"If you like things done, you either need to pay for them, and/ or you have 
to know somebody who can expedite the process, without paying, but it is 
another form of corruption. "684 
The managers who were interviewed all criticised this practise, i. e. ... you have to play 
the game. ... Who pees against the wind, wets his trousers685 ... but also agreed that 
682 for analysing the different samples the software SPSS 9.0 for Windows was used. 683 Interview with the socio-president of a consulting company. 684 Interview with the vice president of a Venezuelan bank. 685 Interview with a management consultant. 
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knowing the right people, not necessarily involving payments, is vital in order to 
succeed in business. 
Knowing people works in both ways and it usually helps to get things faster and easier 
than normally. In fact, managers have to use these resources most of the times in order 
to get something accomplished. 
Many expatriate managers noted that this kind of practise is equally important in all 
countries in the world, but it is handled in a more subtle way in Europe. The 
phenomenon of personal networks exists generally in Latin American countries, but is 
considered to be very pronounced in Venezuela. 
Personal contacts are cultivated through networking. In many cases this happens via the 
membership in leisure clubs, children visiting the same good pre-schools, or private 
elementary schools, or old-boys networks since former university days. 
Another phenomenon is the existence of unofficial clubs where informal contacts get 
institutionalised. These secret meetings came into existence 10 to 15 years ago. Their 
members are highly successful and influential businessmen, a microcosm of the 
economic reality of the country, 686 who meet secretly in their private homes to discuss 
the further business development of the country every month. It works like an unofficial 
think tank on the highest level. There are unofficial instances where a lot of information 
gets exchanged and it is decided how to act in public, especially how to deal with the 
political world. 
"Relations are very useful. ... They are the most important point, so 
everything works. In our monthly meetings one notices, that these 
connections are the ones which propel Venezuela's economic 
development. s687 
These clubs also exist on a Latin American level, but their members meet less 
frequently. It is considered to be fairly difficult to become member of these 
establishments because there is a strong sense of unity and cohesion between their 
members. This peculiarity is called the `in-group' phenomenon and occurs mainly in 
cultures that are collectivist. The behaviour towards outsiders of the group is marked by 
a high level of subtlety and a tendency to mistrust unknown people, 
686 Interview with one of its members. 687 ibid. 
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66 
... outside of this circle, it is very difficult to establish trust. s688 
The elite only talks to the elite. It is impermeable for the rest of the society, i. e. for the 
other 98 percent. 
It seems as if two socio-economic systems operate within one nation's borders. This 
phenomenon is called dualism, a term being frequently used by modernists to explain 
apparent contradictions in society and to describe the coexistence of the modem and 
traditional in the less developed countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 689 
Therefore Venezuela can be considered to be a society with a rigid social structure, 
allowing for almost no mobility. It is a very equal one for the lower classes, but very 
unequal in vertical terms. 
The behaviour patterns mentioned above can be understood as a consequence of forty 
years of corruption and cronyism behind the facade of regular elections and stable 
government. 690 Politicians have taken advantage of the trust people gave them. This 
explains the fact, that Venezuelan managers like to tell the official version to strangers. 
At all levels management can be characterised by the words: informality and secrecy. 
The importance of personal relations shows in the way of appointing managers as well. 
"Because I became involved in personal negotiations with the newly 
appointed chairman of Banco X. He is a personal friend and wanted 
somebody whom ... (he could) ... trust. "691 
Especially where politics are involved, people occupy positions because of connections, 
relations, or favouritism, and not because of merit. 
This practise is widely accepted, even though people know that this has a negative 
impact on a company's performance and efficiency. Intact personal relationships are 
valued more highly and sometimes are seen as more important than company 
objectives. 692 
"You get very close and informal, networks are very important, and 
sometimes your results are sacrificed. "693 
688 Interview with the president of an insurance company. 689 Cubitt, 1995, p. 33. 690 Colitt and Lapper, 1999, p. 14. 
692 
Interview with the vice president of a Venezuelan bank. 
see also Hofstede, 1993, p. 84; Thomas, 1996, p. 40; Trompenaars, 1993, p. 92; Hofstede, 1991, p. 64; 
693 
Adler, 1986, p. 19. 
Interview with the president of a chain of stores selling electrical products. 
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This stands in direct contrast to management in the USA or Germany, where quite often 
personal relations are sacrificed only to gain ones' ends. The German expression über 
Leichen gehen, stick at nothing, but literally walk over dead corpses, serves as a good 
example. But in Venezuela, understanding people is the critical factor. 
7.2.1 How a manager deals with people 
It can be concluded from the above that it is important to relate to people in Venezuela. 
Managers believe that in order to be successful one has to have the ability to make 
relationships and having relations with people, the ability to attract people and to be 
able to communicate, to be liked, to get on with people, and to interpret ones' relations 
with people in the right way. The personal touch is considered to be decisive. 
In this whole process conversation becomes a strategic tool. Successful managers 
believe a lot in dialogue and solving issues or conflicts through talking in a friendly 
manner. Hablando se entiende la gente, meaning, by talking, people understand each 
other. 
As discussed in the chapter "What is left ?" Venezuelans tend to distrust others. Thus 
the ability to create trust and confidence is of major significance. 
Another important fact is to treat the people in a correct manner. It has something to do 
with charisma. Be easy with people on the one hand, but make them do what you want 
them to do on the other. As discussed before Venezuelans tend to be very proud and 
need to feel respected. To any violation of their personal feelings they react very 
sensitively and they sense hostility quickly. Things tend to be taken more on a personal 
than a professional level: 
"In more developed societies, maybe human beings are not so oversensitive, 
they treat them well, they treat them bad; I am here to get something ... and if the person that is serving you has a bad face, it does not matter. In our 
country it is different. Here, there exists the serenity of a smile, of good 
service. "694 
It is very important in Latin American countries in general to have an integral approach 
to human manners and a certain degree of sensibility. 
694 Interview with the industrial relations manager of a brewing company. 
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It is a vital element of management to have sufficient tact and to use the right words to 
convey one's ideas without offending the other side. 
"You cannot be like the normal Anglo-Saxon WASP executive, giving 
orders. That does not work. "695 
A consequence: Managers don't have to be specialists in certain fields as for example in 
Germany, where a high level of Fachkompetenz is expected. 696 Technical knowledge is 
not the decisive factor in Venezuela. Managers believe that any management job 
basically has the same principles: The principles for handling people are similar, if not 
the same. 
The Venezuelan manager tries to come to terms with people, because through 
generations he has learned that this is the key to mastering difficulties in an imperfect 
society. One management consultant critically remarks in this context that he has 
observed the German society over the last couple of years. He noticed that there are 
societies that become so perfect, so that people don't need each other any longer. 
Conversation and dialogue start to play a decreasing part. 
In Germany for example if the neighbour asks for help it is considered as an imposition. 
In Venezuela people are happy if they can do others a favour, because they know that 
the earth is small and round and turns and perhaps they might need help tomorrow as 
well. 
On the one hand this behaviour might be viewed as opportunistic and calculating, but on 
the other it has become a habit to help others. In Venezuela there is something that can 
be called calor humano, human warmth or human touch. One can feel it. 
If the manager's secretary is ill, the clients call the office and ask about her condition 
and whether the bureau has called her at home to see how she is. 
Venezuelan managers are proud of the dominance of soft skills and consider themselves 
to be more humane than their German or US-American counterparts. 
In the following chapters we will try to show how a Venezuelan manager deals with 
different groups of people. The group of "workers" will be evaluated most fully as it can 
be considered as the core of management in Venezuela. 
695 Interview with the president of an insurance company. WASP = White Anglo Saxon Protestant. 
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How Venezuelan managers deal with people 
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Figure 26: Ho\ti Venezuelan managers deal with people. 
7.2.1.1 Managers and colleagues 
Foreigners should be introduced by a third party or by someone who commands respect. 
It is possible to get in contact with almost any person, because Venezuela has a small 
population size, where only a few hundred thousand actively participate in economic 
life. So basically everybody knows, who everybody else is. In general people know with 
whom they are dealing. The chances of knowing someone, who knows somebody else, 
who then again knows the person one wants to talk to are very high. The fact that 
Venezuelans like to communicate in general makes it quite easy to get in contact with 
(business)people. Building relationships can be considered to be fairly easy. Although 
these bonds are more superficial and not as deep as in say Germany or Switzerland, they 
tend to be reliable. 
When the foreigner has been accepted, people are helpful at all levels. In fact, managers 
spend quite a significant amount of their time on doing favours for other people. 
696 Lawrence, 1980. 
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If both sides know each other, informality prevails. There is no formal way of doing 
business. Although especially in Caracas businesspeople tend to dress formally and to 
shake hands, they like to relax and to be personal. The way of doing business in general 
can be described as more relaxed with no signs of pressure or stress. In addition, there 
are many national holidays, and long weekends known as puentes, bridges. 
Even for a normal weekend, it is very difficult to contact decision makers in the 
afternoon on Friday, and before noon on Monday. 697 
It seems as if Venezuelan managers are less ambitious and eager than their foreign 
counterparts. They tend to value their free time more highly than work. Statistical 
evidence is offered by the Loughborough Study. The only country rejecting the 
following proposition was Venezuela (mean 2.70): 698 
For the senior manager work will inevitably invade leisure time. 699 
The responses of the USA (4.08), Germany (3.94), the UK (3.79), and even Spain (3.61) 
are diametrically opposed and are significantly different in the statistic sense. The 
analysis of a second proposition points in the same direction: 
The current demands made on managers' time lead to serious disruptions on their 
home lives 
was accepted by all five countries, but was accepted least strongly by the Venezuelans 
(3.30). Additionally the differences with Spain and Britain were statistically significant. 
Colleagues are treated as equals. This shows in the decision taking process. At senior 
management level it is a consensus of experts with somebody taking the decision at the 
end of the day. Equals have to be convinced. Diametrically opposed to that is decision 
taking at lower levels. Here the style can be described as autocratic and commanding. 
7.2.1.1.1 How managers treat business partners 
This is not easy to answer, because different possibilities exist. There is good, but also 
evil, but there is also an appropriate means to avoid costly failures: business 
networking. As a newcomer to Venezuela, one has to be careful when selecting business 
697 Herrera-Vaillant, 1997, p. 107. 69$ Reminder: Five point scale with "strongly disagree" up to "5" = "strongly agree". As "0" does not exist, "3" is the dividing line, not "2.5". 6" see Appendix XI. 
Venezuelan management 225 
partners, because many Venezuelan companies look for the "quick buck. 9970° They tend 
to prefer short term, big profit relationships in the associations they have with foreign 
corporations. 
"Sometimes, when US franchisers come here, and they look for a financial 
group in order to make business relations, and while the American is 
thinking of developing a franchise system and a business plan over the 
years and growing in the country, the Venezuelan counterfeit is looking for 
a quick buck. 99701 
There is a proverb in Venezuela for this, saying that every day a stupid person is born, 
who discovers him, can have him. Often Venezuelans, who are vivo, i. e. crafty or wily, 
try to take advantage of unsuspecting foreigners. 
The typical Venezuelan trade is speculative. It does not follow the laws of supply and 
demand, but of opportunity. 
According to Venezuelan managers, expensive experiences can only be avoided by 
seeking information, references, and checking all the details relevant to the people or 
potential partners that a firm might choose to do business with; i. e. does the group have 
a proven reputation, do the people have a certain upbringing and education? It is also 
recommended to get to know the people you do business with on a personal level first. 
Even Venezuelans take precautions and want to know more about their potential 
business partners or business acquaintance. 702 
These measures that are necessary in order to set up a healthy business and show once 
more the importance of networks and personalism in Venezuelan business. According 
to Adler (1993) personalism is considered to be a necessary ingredient for good decision 
making in the whole of Latin America, whereas in the USA decision making tends to be 
impersonal. 03 
If reliable business partners are found, people try to reach win-win situations when 
negotiating. The idea is that both sides trade, sacrifice, and win. A management 
professor put it this way: A deal has to yield profit for all parties involved, otherwise it 
is not a deal. 
700 see chapters on the "colonisation", "the impact of oil on Venezuela's economic culture", and "planning". 
701 Interview with the Vice President of a Venezuelan bank. 702 Herrera-Vaillant, 1997, p. 106. 703 Adler, 1993, p. 504. 
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Using the results from the Loughborough survey, it can be seen that the Venezuelan 
sample agrees most strongly (mean score of 3.70) with the following proposition: 
In practice decisions are usually a compromise between what one ought to do and 
what one can get away with. 
In addition the difference to the USA is statistically significant (USA mean score: 2.95). 
Therefore, Venezuelan managers like business relationships with foreigners not to be 
one-sided. As discussed before, Venezuelans are proud and therefore like to be treated 
as equals by their foreign counterparts. 
If one remembers that Venezuela is a country marked by dualism and heavily graded 
differences in status, and puts this finding into context with aspirations of equal 
treatment, then a paradox arises. 
This perception is fuelled if Hofstede's dimension of masculinity is taken into 
consideration. According to Hofstede's study, Venezuela is the third most masculine 
society being only topped by Japan and Austria. 704 But if one takes the consequences of 
this `masculinity' on a country's management style as defined by Hofstede (1980 and 
1991), contemporary Venezuela seems to be more closely related to the features that are 
typical for feminine countries, e. g. resolution of conflicts by compromise and 
negotiation rather than fighting them out, desire to be treated `as equal', solidarity, and 
quality of work life instead of an emphasis on equity, competition among colleagues, 
and performance. 705 
Doing business is about negotiating. Venezuelans never close their minds to this task 
even if it involves several days of talking to come to an agreement. The following 
excerpt from one of the research interviews shows how an attorney treats his clients and 
then further down one can see his perception of time related to the importance of quick 
decision taking: 
Attorney: "Many times I ... hold a decision until I have had a more calm 
conversation. I called the client and I tell him: `Alex, let's go 
have a cup of coffee, because we had some differences yesterday; 
let's talk it ... <over> ... again now that we are more calm and see 
704 Hofstede, 1993, p. 103; see Appendix I. 705 see Appendix V, or Hofstede, 1991, p. 96; ibid., 1980, p. 296. 
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if we come to an agreement. ' Our style is not to impose.... No. 
`Let's talk: "' 
Questioner: "And what do you do if you have to make a quick decision ?" 
Attorney: "I consult. " 
Questioner: `If you don't have time to... " 
Attorney: "I try always to consult, at least with some of the managers or 
partners, there is always time. Unless, it is something like: Let's 
leave because the office is on fire. " 
Further evidence supporting the assertions about negotiation can be found in the 
Loughborough Study. The proposition: 
Today decision making increasingly involves negotiation 
is strongly agreed by the Venezuelans (mean score of 4.09), showing a statistically 
significant difference when compared to the German sample (3.55). 
Usually, negotiating does not follow any agenda or written schedule. German expatriate 
managers especially observed that their Venezuelan counterparts often show up at 
business meetings without being prepared and without any supporting or back up 
material. Their style can be described as informal, spontaneous, and natural. By talking 
about things that do not relate to the actual negotiation they try to romper el hielo, break 
the ice, beforehand. 
When asking Venezuelan managers how they would characterise management styles of 
other cultures, it was difficult to get an answer due to the fact that most of the 
companies do business solely on a domestic level. Hence they only have contact with 
either Venezuelan managers or occasionally expatriate managers who are not 
necessarily representative of a country's management culture. 
As Venezuelans can be considered to be very helpful, they attempt to answer all 
questions. In this context, it happens that Venezuelans see the countries of Europe as 
similar in business mentality: 
"If you take Europe, ... you have ... the European Community, they are all 
more or less countries with the same characteristics. There could be 
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differences, but not so marked differences as the ones here (in Latin 
America). "706 
Nevertheless, a Venezuelan industrial relations manager working for the biggest 
Venezuelan petroleum company pointed out interesting findings about different 
negotiation styles: Americans get down to business directly, read the contractual terms 
and then draw the line. Germans are considered to be quite similar, additionally they try 
to explore the opposite side's ground before. The Chinese treat their counterpart with a 
lot of respect. Many times they make the others believe that they do not understand 
what has been said. They just play with it as soon as they disagree. 
The Argentines are believed by the Venezuelans as to be very direct. After a short phase 
of small talk to break the ice, they get down to business. 
The impression the manager had on Americans coincides with the view Lawrence and 
Edwards (2000) hold on American meetings. According to them, the meetings are 
"quite overpowering in their purposefulness. There is not much humour, problem 
dissection is perfunctory, but the purpose is always to move things forward. s707 
7.2.1.1.2 How managers treat suppliers 
When Venezuelan managers were asked about the quality of their relationship with their 
suppliers, the answer was mainly positive. Generally the relation is considered to be 
good, very familiar, and very pleasant. When negotiating people usually agree on an 
intermediate price that both parties can be comfortable with. 
Problems are there to be solved. Many times the suppliers are brought to the factories, 
so they can see what the issues are. On the other hand it shows that problems cannot 
simply be solved by describing them at the phone. It involves talking and convincing 
the partner. The problem has to be demonstrated and properly explained to them. 
Otherwise people will not buy into the issue. If this happens, it is rather unlikely that 
they will participate in working out a solution. 
706 Interview with the industrial relations manager of a brewing company. 707 Lawrence and Edwards, 2000, p. 20. 
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On the other hand, it was said by managers that one has to be very careful when 
selecting a supplier or when deciding who gets the contract, because the suppliers 
network themselves as well, i. e. agree beforehand who gets the contract this time. 
As was explained by the head of a purchasing department, it is important to be close to 
the market, to keep informed about what is going on in the suppliers' firms. From time 
to time he shows up at the companies spontaneously without informing them about the 
visit beforehand. Through this he tries to get the flavour of the whole atmosphere and 
has a look around, i. e. what the company does at the moment, or who are the people 
who set the tone. Via chatting he tries to find out indirectly about their relationship to 
other suppliers, or whether the managers know each other. 
Although many managers said that suppliers are chosen objectively, according to the 
principles of quality, price, and responsibility, persistently trying to keep the personal 
contact out of business, there were others who told a completely different story. 
Negotiations are basically made on friendship. 
"Why do I contract Alex ? Well, because Alex is a friend, or he is my 
cousin, or he is married to a niece of mine that works for the 
organisation. s708 
As many Venezuelans tend to do business with their friends, newcomers can be put to at 
a disadvantage. 709 
It should be added, however, that several interviewed managers assured the researcher 
that this practise of choosing suppliers is starting to change. 
7.2.1.2 Workers 
As suggested earlier, Venezuelan employees are considered problematic when it comes 
to work. 710 Many times it is difficult to handle them in the correct way to get the most 
out of them. 
So how do successful managers lead their workforce ? 
It was found out that managers need to possess a decisive character trait: El Don de 
Gentes. 
708 Interview with the socio-president of a firm of solicitors. 709 Herrera-Vaillant, 1997, p. 106. 
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7.2.1.2.1 Don de Gentes: What does it mean ? 
A clear definition of the expression "don de gentes" does not exist. Every manager that 
was asked to comment on it, defined it in his own way. 
"I use a style of management that is known as management through 
friendship, human management, la gerencia humana, because I truly 
believe in that. ... 
With people, you have to worry and care about them, you 
have to understand them, and you have to know how to understand them. 
... It 
is a management oriented towards people. "71' 
"El don de gentes means, have a knack for the people. ... How 
do I treat 
people in the daily conversation. "712 
"I would translate it with ability to judge human nature, but actually it 
means more, ... how to 
lead people ... to have leadership qualities as 
well. "713 
"To have the character trait don de gentes is very important. We expect this 
from our employees. Don de gentes means stability, kindness, fine 
treatment of clients and colleagues. "7ta 
"I would say don de gentes is having sufficient tact and using the right 
words, that if something that has to be put right between two individuals, 
to choose your words and convey your ideas without offending the other 
side. That is an important element in Venezuela. "715 
Human management means that employees who have a certain leadership level and 
influence over people understand that they work with people and through people. As 
persons, employees are perceived as very dynamic individuals, that are not the same 
every day. Human management tries to interpret the changes the individual undergoes 
so he can be understood. 
710 see chapter on "lack of education" and "commitment" 
711 Interview with the industrial relations manager of a brewing company. 
712 Interview with the German manager of a Venezuelan subsidiary from a multinational pharmaceutical 
company. 
713 Interview with the general manager of a management consultancy. 
714 Interview with the executive president of a trading company representing international goods. 
715 Interview with the primer vice president of a shipping company. 
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Don de gentes also deals with the questions of- 
" Can you empathise with the workforce ? 
" How can you tell them ... 
" ... that you give them the direction ? 
" ... that you are intuitive and just ? 
" ... that you think about their interests too ? 
" ... that you don't only try to make your name, 
but that you also protect the 
team ? 
7.2.1.2.2 Why is it important ? 
Due to their upbringing and the underlying cultural maps, Venezuelans tend to be 
sensitive, arrogant, and lack professional maturity. They explicitly dislike to be treated 
like machines. As they spend many hours a day in the office or at the workplace, they 
need to feel comfortable, they have to feel at home. If they don't feel treated well, they 
are going to do everything to compromise the operation or to sabotage the job. 
As it is typical for collectivist countries in the Hofstedean sense, people tend to think in 
groups. If a Venezuelan considers himself as an outsider, because he feels that he cannot 
participate in the process of decision taking (but most of the time is not willing to grasp 
the buck), he will show a lack of commitment. On the other hand, if he considers the 
company to be part of his family, he is willing to go through hell and high water for the 
firm. 
Don de gentes also implies treating any person with respect no matter what the 
individual's professional level. Employees like to feel that their opinion is taken into 
account. This has its cause in the fact that Venezuelans have the urge to feel accepted 
and respected due to their inferiority complex. 
7.2.1.2.3 Where does it show ? 
7.2.1.2.3.1 In the way of leading of people 
Don de Gentes means leading by example, knowledge, character and also being able to 
understand people. They have to be treated on a personal level. Understanding people 
includes trying to help them with their personal problems, not only professional, but 
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also private ones. The following story was told by a public relations manager of a 
brewing company. It shows the Venezuelan style of human resource management: 
Venezuela's culture has some special considerations. Some of the workers are married, 
others are not married, some are married and have another woman. This type of thing 
brings inconveniences to the worker. A worker who has a woman and a wife might 
come up to the human resource manager and complain about the fact that his salary is 
not high enough to support two women. While in Europe you would never dare to 
bother the personnel department with those kinds of issues, and even if you were brave 
enough, they would probably turn you out of doors, the Venezuelan counterpart behaves 
differently. Human management means in this case: Let us sit down to talk and see what 
is going on. How can the worker be directed ? What can be done, so he does not 
continue living like this. But if he likes to have two women, he has to work somewhere 
else, so he can make more money. 
In this case management of employees does not only imply leading professionally, but it 
means guiding human beings through life, educating them, and conveying values. It 
implies daily training that has to take place in the company, also because the workers 
face a hostile environment outside the firm. Therefore, people have to be led by 
example. 
Statistical evidence can be provided by the Loughborough Study. Venezuelan managers 
score higher than their colleagues in other countries when subscribing to the following 
propositions: 
1. The development of their staff is prime responsibility of a manager 
2. Managers should set an example by committing time and resources to the 
development of their staff 
and 
3. It is the role of senior management to determine the boundaries of ethical 
behaviour for their subordinate managers. 
While the Venezuelan mean is 4.06 for the first item, it is a breathtaking 4.45 in the 
second case, resulting in a statistically significant difference when compared to the UK 
(4.15) and the German sample (3.53). Concerning the last proposition, Venezuela and 
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Germany are the only countries that agree with this statement by reaching a mean above 
3, i. e. 3.27 716 
Conveying the right values and virtues is sometimes very difficult and time consuming. 
"If we are a company that believes in people, then we have to treat people 
right. Treat them right means to rescue them when they have problems. " 
ý7 
The downside of this can be found in the negative impact it has on the selection of 
personnel: 
"Nobody makes me hire somebody that has six children. I simply would not 
consider somebody like that because then I would have 6 or 7 more 
s718 problems. 
It does not imply that workers can get away with everything. On the one hand, 
managers are helpful and let employees take time off to solve their personal problems. 
On the other it is made sure that workers know that they have to do their job otherwise 
they might lose it. 
In order to overcome the problem of an uncommitted workforce, a manager has to make 
the employees feel that they do their duty, because they want to do it and not because 
they are forced to. This cannot be achieved by force, authority, or iron discipline, but by 
leading through example, participation, a lot of talking, interpersonal contacts, and gift 
of persuasion. 
"One cannot say `this has to be done. ' One always has to say, why it has to 
be done. s719 
Again evidence can be found in the Loughborough survey. When managers were asked 
about their opinion on the proposition whether 
A refusal of a request should be accompanied by an explanation not an apology 
the Venezuelan mean score was the second highest among the countries in the survey 
with 4.39, only surpassed by the Spanish sample (4.51). This also suggests that one has 
to speak the appropriate Latin language as mentioned above. As people have to buy into 
716 Reminder: Five point scale with "1" = "strongly disagree" up to "5" = "strongly agree". As "0" does 
not exist, "3" is the dividing line, not "2.5". 
719 Interview with the industrial relations manager of a brewing company. 
718 Interview with the president of a construction company servicing the oil industry. 719 Interview with the president of a main franchising company. 
Venezuelan management 234 
a decision in order to follow a command or a refusal, the issue needs to be explained to 
them. An excuse does not constitute an explanation. 
Managers need to have el toque personal, the personal touch. While management in the 
USA or Germany is much more oriented towards goals, specific objectives, and rather 
neutral or merely professional relations between employees and colleagues, Venezuelan 
management has to do much more with personal relationships. So the difference is the 
following: While a German employee does his duties because he was told to do so, a 
manager in Venezuela has to try to make the Venezuelan workers do their job, because 
they consider him to be their friend. 
"If you build a strong relationship with a person, you try to understand some 
of his personal problems. You are a priest and they tell you all their 
problems. Then you are going to get much more performance from your 
people than if you just pay them. "ý ° 
With authority alone a manager will not achieve anything. It is the argument that 
counts. If a decision has been made by a manager, people accept it, because they think it 
is right and because it is approved by the group. If the group does not support the 
decision, the manager will fail to succeed. It is the group that gives the manager the 
power, not the title or the post that was assigned to him. Power becomes only a 
secondary product of the manager's personality: 
"You may lay down the law ten times, and everyone says Yes, but they all 
do No. ... Your processes won't work anymore. Everything goes wrong, 
people ignore you ... Here, it is not about hierarchy. Here, no one cares 
about authority or hierarchy. "721 
Once they are convinced and have bought into the problem they work satisfactorily. It 
does not imply that one can give up supervising and controlling them. 
7.2.1.2.3.2 In the selection of personnel 
When recruiting employees informal contacts and personal recommendations play an 
important role. When new labour and basic workforce are needed, employees from all 
levels are asked to recommend people they know, i. e. friends or relatives, and 
participate in the selection process. This is common practice in Venezuela and 
720 Interview with the general manager of a printers trading company. 721 Interview with the general manager of a management consultancy. 
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considered legitimate. Hence, a first screening is done by the employees. Afterwards the 
personnel department checks whether the person is qualified in terms of knowledge, but 
often more important, they put a strong emphasis on the social and economic fit. The 
following statement shows once more the deficits of Venezuelan society. 
"We hire people that have values: loyalty, honesty, and discipline. 99722 
In most cases, managers and supervisors are recruited in-house, hardly any outsiders are 
hired. 
The way of selecting personnel reinforces the fact that it is very difficult to find job 
advertisements in newspapers or magazines. Employment offers are not in general made 
public. 
What leads to problems is the fact that Venezuelans tend to confuse friendship with 
work. They think they can obtain things, for example a wage rise, much faster than 
others. No wonder people think this way, because in the last forty years the whole 
political system was based on favouritism, clientelism, and preferential treatment. This 
is generally known by the public and Venezuelans react sensitively to these matters. 
Therefore management has to make sure that everybody is treated equally. For this 
reason, some companies only have a single entrance door for workers, executives, and 
visitors, and parking areas without assigned lots. 
7.2.1.2.3.3 In the way of criticising employees 
People need to know where they stand in terms of their performance. It is important to 
assure them in their work when they did a good job. A pat on the back by the boss is 
valued like a little honour. Showing content and satisfaction happens in a direct way. 
Behaviour in case of discontent is somewhat different. No matter what the problem's 
severity the worker wants to be respected. Managers have to proceed very subtly, 
indirectly, and carefully. 
The German president of a Venezuelan subsidiary from a multinational pharmaceutical 
company put it this way: 
"With my German logistics manager I can talk in German, think German, 
and argue German. With the Spanish and the Italian I can speak in Spanish. 
And with the rest I need to talk Latin. "723 
722 Interview with the industrial relations manager of a brewing company. 
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One can tell a Latin off as strongly as one can reprimand a German, but it has to happen 
in a completely different manner. A different tone and set of vocabulary is needed. 
This means that if there are things that have to be criticised, a manager would first of all 
have to encourage the worker in the positive things he has done and then say in a 
fatherly manner "Have you thought about improving it ? ", "I would suggest ... 
", or "I 
like what you did. Your presentation at the meeting was very good. It just contained a 
tiny imperfection. You used the word 'OK' a little too often, but apart from that I liked 
it a lot. " One has to make sure not to hurt their ego, no tocar la sensibilidad. Then the 
person won't feel molested, understands the boss, and tries to perform better next time. 
This perception coincides with the opinion Adler (1993) has. To her mind face-saving 
seems to be crucial in decision making to preserve honour and dignity. 
724 
If somebody needs to be told off directly, it happens with a smile. The person accepts it 
if the facial expressions are friendly. 
They never utter blunt criticism. Scolding should be directed towards the task or 
process, i. e. a report that was composed unsatisfatorily, and never towards the 
individual person. Often managers use the excuse that there is a company decision they 
have to follow. Generally, managers find out that if they tell their employees directly 
what they dislike, it is not going to work. 
"I won't get anything, because I will get this resentment from the people 
and their performance will be lower and it will come to sabotage and loss 
of trust in me. 9725 
Once they feel they lost face or their honour has been impuned, the relationship is likely 
to be destroyed. The employee will have lost the values of trust, loyalty, and discipline. 
Then, the only option the manager has, is to fire the employer. 
7.2.1.2.3.4 In the way of motivating people 
Many times, motivation works through providing additional benefits to the worker. It 
can be understood as a form of corporate paternalism. This coincides with the view 
Hofstede (1980) holds about collectivist countries, where employees expect 
723 Interview with the German manager of a Venezuelan subsidiary from a multinational pharmaceutical 
company. 
724 Adler, 1993, p. 504. 
725 Interview with the general manager of a printers trading company. 
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organisations to look after them like a family. 726 Benefits can include the following 
things: a company's restaurant where employees can eat, so they don't have to go home; 
the provision of certain products; retirement plans, something very unusual for 
Venezuela; also medical insurance; Christmas parties; small birthday presents. People 
are stimulated through competitive salaries and benefits, but also recognition of the 
individual and his family. 
This brings us down to another important means of motivation. It works through family. 
Things are likely to be done for the family to get their support: capacitating centres for 
families offering training courses, cooking, baking, and dress making classes, summer 
camps, and sports activities. 727 It is important for the company to have the worker's 
family members on its side, because they exert a strong influence on the employee. 728 it 
could happen that an industrious worker who stays longer in the company gets told off 
by his family members once he comes home from work. 
Some companies use this fact to their advantage by arranging Christmas parties to 
which all family members are invited. In addition, the most successful employees win 
prizes for two people to honour their performance. Thus the partner, i. e. husband or 
wife, is included. These prizes are sometimes quite impressive, for example a two- 
weeks-trip to Europe for the best performing regional salesman of a pharmaceutical 
company and his partner. This ensures that the employee will get all the support from 
his family, because there is this jolly nice three-day-trip to Isla Margarita waiting for us 
to be won next year ! 
In many cases motivation is achieved via an open-door policy. Generally speaking, the 
workforce is given access to the managers. Of course there are some exceptions. In 
Venezuelan industry it is rather unusual to call in at the president's office. 
Motivation is also achieved through trust. The worker has to know that there is 
somebody whom he can trust. 
Venezuelans are very sensitive to motivation, to being well treated, and to being 
respected. Having the appropriate tact, which does not mean that you let people walk 
726 see Appendix III; Hofstede, 1980, pp. 238-239. 727 
see chapter on "commitment. " 
728 see also chapter on "commitment. " 
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over you or that you let people do as they wish is also a motivating factor. Once the 
employees feel respected and well motivated, they respond very well. 
7.2.1.2.4 What happens if it is not practised? 
A discontent workforce will sabotage colleagues, managers, and processes. Their non- 
cooperative attitude will lead to low efficiency. High absenteeism, high fluctuation, and 
theft are also likely consequences. 
Loyalty will also be a problem, because wages are very low in Venezuela. If people do 
not feel very comfortable and "at home" at their workplace, they look for another job, 
where they can earn a little more. 
7.2.1.3 Behaviour in public 
How do Venezuelan managers behave in public ? Are they arrogant show-offs ? 
The answer can be deducted from the following train of thought: 
All Venezuelans have a strong desire to be respected. Social networks are very distinct 
and powerful in Venezuela. Many crimes happen especially in bigger cities, like 
Caracas or Maracaibo. According to new estimates 90 percent of all Venezuelans live 
below the poverty level. 29 Venezuela is a small country, el pals es un panuelo. Now 
what does this all mean ? 
People from all classes need to be treated with respect, especially the concierge, the man 
standing at the corner selling newspapers, the man who sells coffee in the streets, or the 
one who sweeps the streets. Why ? 
These people are the ones who protect you. They know exactly who are the crooks and 
thieves and they will squeal on a person, if they dislike the character. "Listen, he has a 
TV, a car and so on. " That is where the danger lies. The problem is not the fact that a 
person possesses valuables. The danger is, that if a person treats others disrespectfully, 
they will pay him back that way. Due to the power of social networks and 
communication, people in Venezuela know exactly who, where, when, and how 
somebody intends to do something. For example, the truck which brought all the liquor 
to an ostentatious private wedding in Caracas was high jacked at the very moment when 
the lorry driver stopped in front of the house to ring the doorbell. 
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Questioner: "Is luck involved ?" 
Consultant: "No. They know exactly who is who. If they rob someone, they 
always know whom they assault. " 
Concerning a manager's security, it means that one can have 10,000 body guards, and it 
still happens. On the other hand, a manager can also walk in the streets unprotected and 
nothing will happen to him. 
As it was shown in the chapter on the "lack of the rule of law" Venezuela can be 
considered as an insecure country. Especially in the Western parts of the country the 
danger of kidnapping is thought to be relatively high. Therefore managers do not show 
up in public too often. If they have to, they act low profile, discreto and avoid 
ostentation and demonstrations of wealth. 
In public, people do not boast usually about their wealth or income. 
"You don't want many people to know how much you have for security 
reasons. 19730 
If one keeps in mind the things mentioned in this chapter and remembers the figure "A 
note on public security" in the chapter "Lack of the rule of law", the following code of 
behaviour is more or less prescribed. Whenever a person parks his car in public, no 
matter what time or place, someone will almost always show up asking for some 
hundred Bolivares to look after the car while the person goes shopping, dining at a 
restaurant, or visiting a pub or a club. 
So how do you react ? 
If you tell the person to bugger off, it is the best way to get rid of your car. It is more 
suitable to hand over some money, like 200 Bolivares, equivalent to 20 British pence 
and say thank you, man. ... Protection money ? ... In a way yes. ... No, because it is a 
tiny amount of money, but it means a lot in terms of respecting a person. 
Relaxed so far ? Now here comes the scary part: It might also happen, that next time 
you park your car in the same area, the guy who approaches you to guard your car once 
again, knows your name although you have never explicitly told him - what a 
manifestation of the power of social networks ! 
729 N. N., 1999f, p. 4. 730 Interview with the president of a construction company servicing the oil industry. 
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7.2.1.4 Bureaucrats and the state 
The last group of people that will be discussed are bureaucrats. In this context the 
author means people who are employed in the public service sector and who work at 
public institutions and state-owned companies. 
Indeed, business life in Venezuela is marked by high government involvement. It is 
highly formalised. Even simple processes in business, like the installation of telephones, 
require permissions made out by public institutions, thus involving a lot of paperwork. 
Therefore many companies consider the rules that are set up by the government as 
rough guidelines. 
"Most companies surpass those guidelines of course, but the basic structure 
is set buy the government. X731 
Not sticking to the law is considered to be legitimate, not objectionable, and not 
something one should not do. Many times managers said it is better to do things outside 
the law than within the law, because this simplifies the whole process. Quite often 
people don't ask themselves the question of how they can achieve something through 
official channels, but they wonder whom they know, which contact is most useful and 
needs to be activated. For example, if a decree comes out, a German manager might 
start thinking how to restructure his company or accounting department to fulfil the new 
legal requirements. In Venezuela, managers almost automatically wonder how to 
subvert it. 
Official procedures tend to be quite formal, complex, and time consuming. This has 
various reasons: 
According to managers, Venezuelans in general believe in the saying of the more I 
decide, the more important I am. As a permit has to run through several offices, it can 
take years of trying to get a certain permit. 
Secondly, Venezuela is still a highly centralised country around Caracas. It can be 
considered as a relict of feudal times. It is merely a presidential democracy and 
therefore the ways of doing business with the government tends to take a long time, 
because of centralised decision making. 
731 Interview with the president of a chain of stores selling electronic equipment. 
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This outgrowth of centralism is confirmed by the Loughborough survey. Although the 
questionnaire was only answered by managers of non-public companies, the proposition 
Decision making is the central managerial act 
was enthusiastically approved by the Venezuelans (mean score of 4.00), showing 
statistically significant differences when compared to the British (3.45) and the German 
sample (3.23). 
When dealing with the state, one has to ser vivo. In this context, the expression does not 
mean smart or witty, it is related to dishonesty and has a little negative touch. It means 
to be crafty or wily to get around the system or to get licenses quickly. 
This can either happen through gestores, matraca, or visiting public authorities 
personally. The first two alternatives involve using unofficial channels, the last option 
tries to achieve something via treating civil servants in a chummy way. As some permits 
are complicated to obtain, CONAPRI, a local private council for investment promotion, 
even suggests trying to "get support from chambers, gestores, and/or develop your 
institutional relations department. "732 
The vice president of a Venezuelan bank defines gestores in the following way: 
"<They are> brokers of services for government officials. They are 
forbidden, but even though, they exist and they bribe and ... make a lot of 
money. They do the things for you that you should not do as a 
company. 1,973 
The Venezuelan system of procedures is designed to be as quick as anywhere else in the 
world. In theory it takes a week to receive a passport, but practise is another matter. If 
one has the money, one can receive it overnight over the phone. All it takes to do, is to 
go there and take a photograph, if one has the right gestor. This is called matraca. 
Matraca is a very Venezuelan expression. It simply means one has to pay an official. It 
is common practise in Venezuela, and people know they should not be doing this in an 
ideal state, 
"but in reality in order to succeed in any business that you do, you have to 
do it. ... If you like things done, you either need to pay for them, and/ or 
you have to know somebody who can expedite the process without paying. 
But it is another form of corruption. s734 
732 CONAPRI, 1998, ot. 7. 733 Interview with the Vice President of a Venezuelan bank. 734 ibid. 
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In this context, the term compadrazgo comes up again, but with a slightly different 
meaning. 35 It means knowing the right people with whom to do business. As the state is 
a big consumer, the whole country is dependent on the state. The big building sites 
belong to the state. To get a multi-million contract from the government, companies 
sometimes have to help (in financial terms) the state during the decision making 
process. 
It might also happen that the minister of finance gives his car to a friend, and signs a 
document that says please allow my friend to move freely and do whatever he likes. 
A less severe example of networking when dealing with public institutions is given by 
the manager of an engineering company, 
"You need to know people in key positions, whether in the water company, 
the electricity or the phone companies. In this way your services will be 
offered and taken care of faster. I would say 90 percent of the people 
depend on that. They have a friend who has a friend that works for that 
company. ... I have a friend in the electricity company, but maybe one of 
my employees knows somebody in the water company. At the end this is 
how the system works. If you are going to do something, consult your 
friends. I don't know anybody, but so and so knows somebody and through 
that friend you will get to the person you are looking for. But it is basically 
done through friendship. In these things there is nothing else involved, just 
friendship. "736 
Treating officials including policemen in a sensitive, respectful way is absolutely vital 
in Venezuela. It becomes very important to have don de gentes, because "you might be 
very bright, but if you push ... they can screw you very rapidly if they wish. 
037 It is felt 
that especially newly appointed officials are very likely to take advantage of being in 
the job, because they feel that they have been deprived of the opportunity to earn money 
this way (i. e. corruption) for many years. It also gives them the chance to take revenge 
on the people that come well dressed in a new car, because as officials they have the 
power to stop those people. 
"I should be able to come to an office and say `I have to get a driver's 
license. How much is the tax ? Here is my money, here are my documents. 
Answer me or give me a solution. ' ... (But it does not work this way. ) ... If I don't come with a friendly attitude, forget it. 038 
73S See chapter 5.5.5.3 on "Family ties and compadrazgo". 736 Interview with the president of an engineering company. "' Interview with the primer vice president of a shipping company. 738 Interview with the socio-president of a management consultancy. 
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Hence, managers who need to visit a governmental agency due to an inquiry, approach 
officials in a very low profile way, very bajo peil and talk like this "Oh, could you 
help me out with this? I don't know how to do this. Let us have a meal. " 
On the other hand, it also happens that instant contacts are made that can turn out to be 
very useful. A policeman stopped a car and asked the driver to show his license and 
documents. The driver did not have anything of these, because it was his uncle's car, 
but immediately realised that the policeman wanted money. So he gave him some 
money and the official said, "please do me a favour, I need to go to this and that place. " 
The driver took him there and the following happened: The policeman left his card with 
the man and said, "hey, I am normally located at that corner. If you have any problem in 
the city (Caracas), please don't hesitate to come to me. " 
This also shows how Venezuelans tend to think. At this very moment, bribing, instant 
contact, friendship, and relationship are valued more highly than ethics, because ethics 
do not lead to success. 39 
7.2.2 Power distance 
Remembering the chapters on "Commitment", "Organisation", and "Workers" two 
cultural dimensions of the Hofstede study were discussed in the Venezuelan context, 
uncertainty avoidance and individualism. A third dimension is called power distance. It 
is the extent to which members of a society accept an unequal distribution of power in 
institutions and organisations. 74° Some Latin American states show an acceptance of 
high power distance (Guatemala, Panama, Mexico, Venezuela), while countries like the 
USA, Great Britain, or Germany are more egalitarian (40; 35; 35). It is quite remarkable 
that Venezuela scores 81 points, while Chile, Spain, and Argentina are to be found in 
the mid field (63; 57; 49). 41 
There are several reasons why Venezuela outscored these three countries. Most of them 
can be deduced from the previous sections, i. e. the absence of the Enlightenment, 
persistence of feudal structures of the Middle Ages, and lack of education. As was 
shown in the section on politics, Venezuelan history was marked by the leadership of 
caudillos until 1953. From then on the scheme of sembrar el petroleo made the people 
believe that there needs to be a leader who distributes the oil income nation-wide. Due 
739 The story was told by a Venezuelan management consultant. 740 Hofstede, 1993, p. 42. 
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to the forty years of partidocracy, where two major parties are widely seen as 
responsible for having mismanaged the country's vast oil wealth over the past decades, 
many Venezuelan managers believe that a strong man with a strong character with a 
disciplined political base is still needed in order to help the country. 742 There is a 
preference for strong leaders, not laws. According to a representative opinion poll done 
in May 1999,93 percent of all Venezuelans believe that the country needs authority and 
discipline. 76 percent believe that a few leaders are better than many laws. This was 
also the reason that made Hugo Chavez possible, because Venezuelans considered him 
to be some kind of Superman, who can resolve all the problems in the following sectors: 
education (89 percent of Venezuelans), corruption (80), health (88), children living on 
the street (87), delinquency (83), unemployment (83), salaries (82), cost of living (79), 
743 tax evasion (78), and external debt (64). 
According to a representative survey done by Alfredo Keller y Asociados and C21 
(Consultores 21), the following mental map applies for Venezuela. 
Common perception of economic rationality 
92 
82 9/6 
The government's 82% 
function is to equally 
distribute the wealth 
73% 
We will be rich 
73% 
been abolls6i 76% 
due to corruption 
(Reading example: 92 percent of all Venezuelans believe that Venezuela is a rich country. ) 
Figure 27: Common perception of economic rationality. 
(source: Keller, 1999) 
741 see Appendix I; Hofstede, 1993, p. 40. 
742 see also N. N., 1999g, p. 6. 743 Keller, 1999. 
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It shows that Venezuelans favour a strong leader to propel a change in politics whose 
major task it is to distribute the wealth equally, like a father ensuring that all his 
children have enough to eat. This also serves as an evidence for the existence of a rent- 
seeking behaviour that is deeply embedded in the Venezuelan 744 
"People like to be led by leaders. "745 
Especially in small to medium sized companies the same pattern applies. The patron, 
the manager of the company is fully responsible for his subordinates. 
Thus it can be seen that Venezuela is a country used to leaders in politics as well as in 
business. When interviewing managers it was quite astonishing how often liderazgo 
(leadership) was mentioned as an answer to the question concerning what a manager 
needs to have in order to be successful in Venezuelan business. The following quotation 
serves as another example of the praise of leadership in business. 
Questioner: "What kind of education is necessary to become a manager in 
Venezuela ?" 
Gerente: "Leadership. A manager must have certain qualities that come with 
birth. Just like a musician has to have an ear in order to be a good 
musician. ... I define leadership as the capacity an 
individual has 
where people believe in him, so that he rises above the people. ""' 
Especially on the factory floor liderazgo, is needed in its true sense. Low level and blue 
collar workers consider the shop floor manager to be like the leader of a platoon, where 
the soldiers trust him with their lives. They contribute their skills, but the decision lies 
on the leader. 747 
The importance of leadership as a vital feature of management is confirmed by the 
Loughborough study as well. The Venezuelan sample has the highest mean score 
compared to the UK, USA, Germany, and Spain when responding to the following 
propositions: 
Management and leadership are coterminous 
744 see chapters on "The politics of business" and "Enlightening has never happened. " las Interview with the vice president of a Venezuelan bank. 746 Interview with the public relations manager of a brewing company. 747 This coincides with the consequences for organisations from Hofstede's power distance index; see Appendix II. 
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and 
Above all the manager needs powers of leadership 
and the contrast with the British sample is highly significant in the statistical sense. 
The version of power distance in Venezuela carries an interesting feature: Venezuelans 
want somebody else to take the responsibility. They like to exercise power without 
taking responsibility. There is an unwritten law in Venezuela, that works the way of 
"the more I decide, the more important I am ,,, 
748 and "everybody wants to put his stamp 
somewhere. , 749 
"The scent of power makes them happy. ... But responsibility is a 
completely different question. He does not necessarily have to take on 
"7so responsibility, but showing others his power, yes. 
What happens is that in Venezuela delegation happens from bottom to top and not the 
other way round. How does it work ? 
The employee would like to do something to show his unmatched abilities. "Boss, I do 
the job. " As soon as he runs into difficulties, where he has the chance to make a 
mistake, thus falling out of favour with his superior, he returns to his boss and asks 
"Hey, boss, you are much more experienced than I am. What would you do if you were 
me ?" 
So what happens ? At the first danger of doing something wrong, because it could ruin 
the employee's relationship with the superior, i. e. the power, a warning signal comes 
on. He walks to his boss, who feels important because of that. The boss decides and 
carries all the responsibility. 
In the following paragraph a management consultant talks about a former assignment: 
The consulting firm was asked to restructure a Venezuelan company because it was 
taken over by a German multinational company. When the consultants told the 
Venezuelan workforce that every employer will get more decision taking power but will 
748 Interview with a management consultant. 749 Interview with the president of a German pharmaceutical company. 750 Interview with the director of a company representing foreign firms in Venezuela. 
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also need to accept total responsibility for his actions, some employees resigned their 
jobs on the spot. They were not willing to act on their own authority, not accepting the 
buck, because it would mean that they could not shift responsibility and possible blame 
to someone else. 
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8 Conclusions 
In the following section a concluding discussion of Venezuelan business culture will be 
offered, followed by some discussion of the question whether it is going to change or 
not. 
There exist diverging opinions on the development of Venezuelan business culture and 
management. They can be divided into two poles. 
"I am torn two ways: On the one hand there is the economist who says `this 
is b... s..., we have to integrate internationally', on the other there is the 
entrepreneur who says `hey, if he ... (Chavez) ... closes down the frontiers 
again, then we will all be better off again. ,, 75 
On the one hand there is the older generation that is resistant to change, on the other, 
there are the younger ones who see the need for change. 
Relicts of traditional Latin American management traits that are typical for the older 
generation include: 
" Managers act more like terratenientes: Autocratismo, an authoritarian way of 
thinking and administrating. This can be seen in the prevalence of hierarchical 
structures, i. e. self-complacency, distance towards personnel and workforce, 
decision taking is highly centralised, managers are hard to convince. 
" Negation of globalisation. Competition is viewed as something threatening. 
Businesses mainly focus on domestic, national markets. 
"A high level of state involvement in the economy and protectionism tends to be 
appreciated. 
In fact they do not want an open market. They like to preserve the status quo, because it 
is less challenging than international competition and it is far easier to bribe an official 
than to struggle with competitors. 
This perception was widespread in many Latin American countries especially in the 
1980s and was reinforced by a high concentration of the state and the government in 
business activities. But since the beginning of the 1980s, especially after the first debt 
crisis in Mexico in 1982, reform processes have been brought into action. These 
processes happened at different speeds in the different Latin American countries. 
Management styles have been influenced by the results of these reform processes a 
Conclusions 249 
great deal, i. e. the opening up of the economy vis ä vis other countries, or the increasing 
competition. Thus companies were forced to alter their way of managing to adapt to the 
new situations. It can be seen that those countries that have been progressing furthest in 
their reforms, have undergone the greatest changes in management techniques and style. 
Compared to Venezuela where these changes are limited to a small elite at the moment, 
there are other countries where the changes have taken place on a much wider basis. 
There is for example Chile. Since 1981 a policy of opening up the economy has been 
pursued, exposing the economy to international competition. This could be the reason 
why Chilean management is considered to be the most advanced in Latin America. 
Venezuela started much later with reforms compared to other countries and it stopped 
halfway through the process. It was in 1989 when Carlos Andres Perez started the 
economic liberalisation. Due to social unrest in February of the same year and political 
destabilisation, the macroeconomic liberalisation came to nothing. What can be 
observed now is the fact, that there still exists a very strong traditional management 
caste, reactionaries, that wants to return to the old conditions because they had an easy 
living and made lots of money. 
However, there is a small group of younger managers who are more open towards 
changes and see the need for it. This results from the fact that they enjoyed the benefits 
of an international education and possess the will to change something for the better of 
the country: 
`Because as a market we are still way behind, but eventually we are looking 
towards that type of service-oriented economy, as in the States, where 
competition will guarantee the development of the economy. If that 
happens, we will all be better offs752 
Competition is considered to be healthy especially in the banking sector, because 
managers hope that eventually interest rates will go down and growing a business will 
become easier. 
They also consider privatisation a good thing, because it attracts foreign investors. The 
oil exploitation for example drew many international companies and foreign technology 
into Venezuela. Managers feel that this has opened up a chance to become more 
professional in management. Government employees and businessmen that used to 
75' Interview with a management consultant. 752 Interview with the president of a company selling consumer electronics. 
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ignore the qualities of good administration, management, and planning started to realise 
that they can learn from other business cultures. 
Furthermore, they are starting to understand that the market is not Venezuela alone but 
the whole of Latin America and merging with the Colombian competitor could mean a 
bigger market share and more strength in competing on an international playing field. 
But the development of cross border trade takes place only slowly. 
Despite the growth in intra-Latin American trade ties, commercial links remain 
problematic. Geography is a constraint, given inefficient transportation systems. Further 
hindering trade within the region are competing trade blocs and associations, such as the 
Andean Pact (member states are Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia), the 
Group of Three (G-3, with Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico), Mercosur (Argentina, 
Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil), and of course NAFTA (USA, Canada, and Mexico), 
and Aladi. "3 
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Figure 28: Development of Latin Trade, 1990-1996. 
(source: Brown, 1998, p. 21) 
Managers often expressed the wish to unify Latin America in economic terms, but 
considered it to be a very difficult task to convey the related benefits to the people. 
753 Herrera-Vaillant, 1997, p. 159. 
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Is it going to change ? 
In general, management has not changed yet, only in the sectors that are influenced by 
FDI and MNCs. 
The Venezuelan state still owns an incredibly large number of business sectors: the oil 
industry, the iron and aluminium industry, main hotels, TV and radio stations, limiting 
the development of the private sector. Additionally the state is still dominating the 
Venezuelan day to day business, i. e. procedures are still highly formalised. This again 
involves bribing and corruption to accelerate processes. Venezuelan government has not 
given up believing in the economic scheme of sembrar el petroleo and the mentality of 
papa estado paga por todo yet, promoting clientelism, networking, and heavy reliance 
on contacts. Hence the rent-seeking mentality continues to be deeply embedded in the 
Venezuelan psyche, hindering the development of an all Venezuelans embracing 
entrepreneurial spirit. 
And it seems as if it is going to get worse. The first draft of the constitution froze a 100 
percent state ownership of PDVSA and virtually closes the door for new associations, 
operating agreements or outsourcing of activities. Two articles constitutionally reversed 
the modernisation achieved by the oil industry in the last five years, article 338 and 339. 
Article 338 goes as follows: "The activities of exploration, exploitation, transport, 
manufacture and internal marketing of hydrocarbons, excepting the gaseous, are 
reserved to the state. Only in special cases, of national convenience and with previous 
authorisation of the National Assembly and as long as the state maintains control, may 
subscription of agreements with the private sector be held for the activities mentioned in 
this article. " Article 339 states, that PDVSA won't be privatised, its total shares will 
continue to be held by the state. 
Although opinion polls reveal that president Chavez is still supported by 84 percent of 
the Venezuelan people, businessmen have an opinion that is diametrically opposed: 
"1998 was the best year for everybody in the history of Venezuela. Oil 
coming on stream was at a good price, the economy was very strong, and 
then the appearance of Chavez messed up everything. "754 
It is also widely feared that PDVSA, the Venezuelan economic motor, becomes more 
and more politicised. Although it is a state owned company it has in the past been 
viewed as a meritocracy. 
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Additionally, the number of foreign companies actively manufacturing and producing in 
Venezuela continues to shrink, e. g. in the last four years fifteen pharmaceutical 
companies shut down their production facilities. Many multinational companies cut 
down the number of expatriate managers, engineers, and technicians in Venezuela due 
to declining revenues and underperforming subsidiaries in a volatile economy. 
Declining FDI since the end of the 1970s, which can be seen in the figure provided 
below, is reducing the influence of international management styles. Domestic 
managers have less contact with international managers than before as there are fewer 
of them in the country. 
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Figure 29: Total and private Investment in percentage of GNP in Venezuela, 1950-1997. 
(source: Frances, 1999, p. 69) 
The development and transfer of modem management know how, mainly taking place 
in business meetings, daily contacts, conversations, and exchanges of views comes to a 
significant slow down. Hence the influences coming from abroad are decreasing. 
Therefore, an impulse coming from abroad leading to a change of the contemporary 
Venezuelan management style is less likely to occur. 
But what about this generation of younger managers mentioned above ? What does the 
Loughborough Study indicate in this respect ? 
754 Interview with the president of a commercial stores' chain. 
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The following two figures serve as an evidence, that there is something developing in 
Venezuelan management that can be understood as a paradigm shift. Younger managers 
have different opinions about some propositions that were put forward in the 
questionnaire: 
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Figure 30: Venezuela: Indicators of Management Change I. 
The older the managers in Venezuela, the more strongly they agreed with the statement 
that: 
Informal contacts within the organisation are more often important than the 
formal relationships shown in the organisation chart in ensuring efficient work 
relations. 
The degree to which the answers correlated with the variable age was significant at the 
level of 0.05. Therefore it seems that the younger generation of managers shift the 
importance from having informal contacts within an organisation to working on a 
formal, more professional level to reach efficiency in business processes. The second 
example provided in this chart deals with the statement whether: 
Management is essentially about the operation of systems and standard operating 
procedures (SOPS) that are already in place. 
Here the correlation between age and answers was even significant at the 0.01 level, 
meaning that the younger the managers the stronger they disagree with the proposition. 
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It seems as if younger managers do not want to put up with the fact any longer that due 
to all the fire-fighting in daily business, making sure that all the systems are operating, 
there is no time left for strategy and planning. 
The second chart on indicators of management change in Venezuela conveys two 
paradigm shifts as well. Firstly, there is a trend for younger managers to not identify any 
longer with the task to determine the boundaries of ethical behaviour for their 
subordinates. Secondly they disagree more strongly with the proposition that 
A manager who frequently challenges how things are done is less likely to be 
promoted 
than their older counterparts. 
Venezuela: Indicators of Management Change II 
Strongly Fthics 4 Strongly ( realm its 3 
Agree 5 Agree 5 
4 00 
o 
00 
40000m 
3O 00 OO 
3000 
20 
0 00 
Strongly Strongly 
1 Disagree 2- Disagree 
Age 
25 35 45 55 65 75 25 35 45 Age 
55 65 75 
it is the role of senior management to 'A manager who frequently challenges 
determine the boundaries of ethical how things are done is less likely to be 
behaviour for their subordinates. " promoted. " 
(Bravais Pearson Correlation Coefficient: Ethic(: 0.382 (significance: 0,028), Crea3: 0,361 (sigruficaice 0,039)) 
Paternalism Self-Reliance 
C'onforiºti. c, n Individuality 
Figure 31: Venezuela: Indicators of Management Change II. 
These two findings point in the same direction: The younger generation of managers 
does not identify as strongly with the role of being a patron, a caring father who is 
looking after his subordinates like children, i. e. conveying the right values to them, and 
on the other hand accepting no criticism. The shift goes from paternalism and 
conformism to self-reliance and individuality. 
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What remains is the question of who is going to have his way ? Old hands preferring 
paternalism and protectionism or the young ones driving international professionalism. 
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Appendix I: Cultural differences - Hofstede's four dimensions. 
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Ink 
high 
GER USA ARG ESP CHL VEN 
UN ERTAINTY AVOIDANCE 
lo` 
GBR 
CHL 
USA GER VEN ARG ESP 
high 
MA LI ITY 
low 
CHL 
GBR VEN 
ESP ARG USA GER 
high 
Figure A 1: Cultural differences - Hofstede's four dimensions. 
(source: Hofstede, 1993, pp. 40,69,103,133) 
Abbreviations: 
ARG 
CHL 
ESP 
GBR 
GER 
USA 
VEN 
Argentina. 
Chile. 
Spain. 
Great Britain. 
Germany (West). 
United States of America. 
Venezuela. 
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Appendix II: Consequences for Organisations of the Power Distance Index. 
Consequences for organisations of the Power Distance Index 
Low PDI High PDI 
Less centralisation Greater centralisation 
Flatter organisation pyramids Tall organisation pyramids 
Smaller proportion of supervisory personnel Large proportion of supervisory personnel 
Small wage differentials Large wage differentials 
High qualification of lower strata Low qualification of lower strata 
Manual work same status as clerical work White-collar jobs valued more than blue- 
collar jobs 
Subordinates expect to be consulted Subordinates expect to be told what to do 
The boss is a resourceful democrat The ideal boss is a benevolent autocrat or 
good father 
Privileges and status symbols are frowned Privileges and status symbols for managers 
upon are both expected and popular 
Hierarchy in organisations means an Hierarchy in organisations reflects the 
inequality of roles, established for convenience existential inequality between higher-ups 
and lower-downs 
Figure Al Consequences for organisations of the Power Distance Index. 
(source: Hofstede, 1980, p. 135; Hofstede, 1991, p. 37) 
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Appendix III: Consequences of the Individualism-Collectivism Dimension for the 
Organisation. 
Consequences of the Individualism-Collectivism Dimension 
Low IDV Countries High IDV Countries 
Involvement of individuals with organi- Involvement of individuals with organi- 
sations primarily moral sations primarily calculative 
Employees expect organisations to look Organisations are not expected to look 
after them like a family - and can be- after employees from the cradle to the 
come very alienated if organisation fails grave 
them 
Organisation has great influence on Organisation has moderate influence on 
members' well-being members' well-being 
Employees expect organisation to de- Employees are expected to defend their 
fend their interests own interests 
Policies and practices based on loyalty Policies and practices should allow for 
and sense of duty individual initiative 
Promotion from inside (localism) Promotion from inside and 
Promotion on seniority outside (cosmopolitanism) 
Less concern with fashion in manage- Managers try to be up-to-date and en- 
ment ideas dorse modem management ideas 
Policies and practices vary according to Policies and practices apply to all 
relations (particularism) universalism 
Figure A3: Consequences of the Individualism-Collectivism Dimension for the Organisation. 
(source: Hofstede, 1980, pp. 238-239) 
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Appendix IV: Consequences of Uncertainty Avoidance for Organisations. 
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Consequences of Uncertainty Avoidance for Organisations 
Low UAI High UAI 
Less structuring of activities More structuring of activities 
i Fewer written rules More written rules 
More generalists or amateurs Large number of specialists 
Organisation can be pluriform Organisations should be as uniform as 
possible (standardisation) 
Managers more involved in strategy Managers more involved in details 
Managers more interpersonally oriented Managers more task-oriented and con- 
and flexible in their style sistent in their style 
Managers more willing to make indivi- Managers less willing to make individual 
dual and risky decisions and risky decisions 
High labour turnover Lower labour turnover 
More ambitious employees Less ambitious employees 
Lower satisfaction scores Higher satisfaction scores 
Less power through control of uncer- More power through control of uncer- 
tainty tainty 
Less ritual behaviour More ritual behaviour 
Figure A4: Consequences of Uncertainty Avoidance for Organisations. 
(source: Hofstede, 1980, p. 187) 
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Appendix V: Consequences of National Masculinity Index Differences. 
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Consequences of National Masculinity Index Differences 
Low MAS Countries High MAS Countries 
Some young men and women want ca- Young men expect to make a career; 
reers, others do not those who don't see themselves as 
failures 
Organizations should not interfere with Organizational interests are a legitimate 
people's private lives reason for interfering with people's 
private lives 
More women in more qualified and bet- Fewer women in more qualified and bet- 
ter-paid jobs ter-paid jobs 
Managers use intuition and strive for Managers expected to be decisive and 
consensus assertive 
Lower job stress Higher job stress 
Resolution of conflicts by compromise Resolution of conflicts by fighting them 
and negotiation out 
Appeal of job restructuring permitting Appeal of job restructuring permitting 
group integration individual achievement 
Stress on equality, solidarity, and Stress on equity, competition among 
quality of work life colleagues, and performance 
Figure A5: Consequences of National Masculinity Index Differences. 
(source: Hofstede, 1980, p. 296; Hofstede, 1991, p. 96) 
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Appendix VI: Entry Mode Choices. 
Entry Mode Choices 
!II1d 
0 
x 
Va 
ýn 
Direct P oduction 
tment 
Producti 
( 
n Subco 
DI) 
tracting 
S les Bran h 
Licensin 
Expo ng 
Management Involvement Intensity 
Company analysis 
Wholly owned subsidiary 
or Point venture ? 
Advantages Disadvantages 
-Reduction Of -Conflicting 
financial risk priorities 
"Reduction of "Loss of control 
political risk -Interaction cosi 
-Cultural fit 
-Synergy 
10 
Figure A6: Entry Mode Choices. 
(derived from: Austin, 1990, p. 314-324) 
[Country/ Company analysis: 0= very volatile; 10 = stable and promising 
The country analysis takes into consideration economic facotrs (market size, labour 
cost and skill, local managerial capacity, and development of infrastructure), political 
(risk, government reception to FDI, import controls, foreign exchange controls, and 
price controls), cultural (compatibility) and factors concerning the competitive 
situation of the company (industry concentration, relative competitive strength, local 
barriers to entry, and cannibalisation risk). 
The company analysis focuses on the following issues: product (maturity, brand 
differentiation, line diversity, and service intensity), technology (maturity, stability, 
complexity, and patentability), resources (capital, management, and LDC 
experience), and globalisation (international strategy). ] 
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Appendix VII: The Loughborough Study: cross-country analysis - Structure I 
The Loughborough Study: cross-country analysis - Structure I 
Structure I VENEZUELA 
"Structure is important for fixing the authority --' --- SPAIN a 
relations between organisational members. " 
GERMANY 3.6 
USA 3.8 
UK 3.41 
12345 
Structure 2 VENEZUELA 
-Structure is important in showing the a o0 SPAIN relationship between the posts/functions/ 
departments of the organisation. " 
GERMANY 1.6( 
77777 1 
USA 
11376 
UK 3. ý0 
2345 
= overall mean Dis grree 
SAp 
eeY 
D= 
mean is statistically significantly different from Venezuela at the 0.05 level. 
Figure A7: The Loughborough Study: cross-country analysis- Structure I 
Appendices 264 
Appendix VIII: The Loughborough Study: cross-country analysis: Structure II 
The Loughborough Study: cross-country analysis - Structure II 
Str'uctur'e 4 VENEZUELA 
The structure of a company may well change SPAIN 
as the strategy changes. " 
GERMANY 
USA 
UK 
Hierarchy I VENEZUELA 
"A clear cut hierarchy is essential to the 
SPAIN proper functioning of any organisation. " 
GERMANY 
USA 
UK 
3. 
4.39 
4.34 
12345 
= overall mean 
Strongly Strongly 
""""""' Disagree Agree 
0= mean is statistically significantly different from Venezuela at the 0.05 level. 
Figure A8: The Loughborough Study: cross-country analysis - Structure II 
12345 
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Appendix IX: The Loughborough Study: cross-country analysis - Hierarchy 
The Loughborough Study: cross-country analysis - Hierarchy 
llierarch% 2 VENEZUELA 
"The hierarchy rightly denotes rank and status. " SPAIN 141 
7 
GERMANY 2.29 1, USA !7 
UK Q. 89 
2345 
Hierarchy 3 VENEZUELA 
4 
"The hierarchy is necessary to achieve co- SPAIN 1571 
ordination. ' 
GERMANY 2.68 
USA 3.33 
UK 3 04 
2345 
g 
overall mean oisagriely 
Strongly 
pe Agree 
= mean is stansncallt signiJicanth dijj&"renz from Veneruela at the 0.05 level. 
Figure A9: The Loughborough Study: cross-country analysis - Hierarchy 
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The Loughborough Study: cross-count analysis 
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Appendix XII: English version of management attitudes questionnaire 
268 
Loughborough 
University 
Business School, England 
Management Attitudes Questionnaire 
Please answer all the questions. The questionnaire should take 10 minutes to 
complete. All the answers are confidential. 
Indicate your opinion where I is , strongly disagree" and 5 is strongly agree". 
Appendices 269 
Management Attitudes Questionnaire 
Nationality: 
Age: 
Sex: 
Current management position: 
Industrial/commercial sector of your organisation: 
Number of years in present organisation: 
Number of years managerial experience: 
Function area of present work: 
-sales/marketing 
-production/operations 
-finance 
-Design, R&D 
-Human resource management 
-General management 
-Other, please specify 
Appendices 270 
Structure 
" Structure is important for fixing the authority 
relations between organisational members. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12345 
" Structure is important in showing the relationship 
between the posts/functions/departments of the 
organisation. 
1234S 
" Side by side with the formal structure shown 12345 
in the organisation chart there is often an informal 
organisation, equally important for understanding 
how the company works and for getting things done. 
" The structure of a company may well change 
as the strategy changes. 
" Problems may be solved or objectives 
accomplished by changes in the organisational 
structure. 
12345 
1234S 
" Too much importance should not be attached 12345 
to the notion or organisational structure: at the 
end of the day companies are made up of people 
who have to work with each other. 
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Networking 
" Informal contacts within the organisation are 
often more important than the formal 
relationships shown in the organisational chart 
in ensuring efficient work relationships. 
" Promotions within a company are often 
influenced by informal contacts. 
Things often get done in companies by means 
of networking, when groups of managers 
form unofficial coalitions to move things 
forward. 
" The main benefit of company training 
sessions is the opportunity they offer for 
getting to know people in other parts of the 
organisation. 
" Most new business is the result of some 
informal contact rather than of cold-calling. 
Managers deprived of their networks as a 
result of company transfers are significantly 
disadvantaged. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
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Nature of Management Work 
" Management work is essentially about `fire- 
fighting' and removing `road blocks'. 
" Strategy is the first concern of the senior 
manager. 
" Management and leadership are coterminous. 
" In today's climate management means above 
all the management of change. 
" Management is essentially about the operation 
of systems and standard operating procedures 
(SOPS) that are already in place. 
" Management is primarily about the setting of 
objectives and the monitoring of plans for their 
achievement. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12345 
1234S 
12345 
12345 
12 3 4 5 
12 3 4 5 
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Management Qualities 
" Above all the manager needs specialist 
knowledge and relevant experience. 
" Above all the manager needs powers of 
leadership. 
" To be effective in any given company the 
manager needs knowledge and experience 
of that company's branch of industry. 
Above all the manager needs powers of 
persuasion. 
" Higher education and intelligence are 
important in enabling managers to see things 
clearly and to make rational decisions. 
" In management work common sense is a 
greater virtue than impressive qualifications. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12345 
12345 
1234S 
12345 
12345 
12345 
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Work and Leisure 
" Nobody ever climbed the corporate ladder 
without putting work first. 
" For the senior manager work will inevitably 
invade leisure time. 
" Senior managers value their work time more 
highly than their leisure time. 
" Managers owe it to themselves and their 
families to strike a sensible balance between 
the demands of work and home. 
" Over-involvement in work may well signify 
personal limitations. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12345 
" Management work is fun! Discussions of the 
work/leisure distinction are not really meaningful. 
" The current demands made on managers' time 
lead to serious disruptions on their home lives. 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
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Hierarchy 
"A clear cut hierarchy is essential to the proper 
functioning of any organisation. 
" The hierarchy rightly denotes rank and status. 
The hierarchy is necessary to achieve co- 
ordination. 
" Hierarchy is best seen as a set of lines of 
vertical communication. 
" Hierarchies are being increasingly modified 
by matrix structures and lateral 
communications. 
" Hierarchies will become increasingly less 
relevant as a result of increasing 
empowerment. 
" Hierarchy is the formalised expression of 
merit. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Decision Making 
" Decision making is the central managerial act. 
" The manager must aim at rational decisions, 
based on relevant information. 
" In practice decisions are usually a 
compromise between what one ought to do 
and one can get away with. 
" In practice the work of the manager is more 
about managing situations than taking 
decisions. 
" When you come down to it most decision 
making is intuitive. 
" When it comes to decision making the 
viability of implementation is the key 
consideration. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12345 
12345 
12345 
1234S 
I 
1 
2345 
2345 
" Today decision making increasingly involves 12345 
negotiation. 
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Management Change 
" Delayering has resulted in an increased 
competence for middle management. 
" Downsizing and delayering have put 
increasing pressure on middle management. 
" The key change in the last 10 years is the 
greater emphasis on results, performance and 
accountability. 
" The greater emphasis on results and 
performance have made management work 
more satisfying. 
" Today performance rather than hierarchy is 
the key determinant of management rewards. 
" Promotion and career paths have been 
clarified as a result of greater emphasis on 
measured performance. 
" Management jobs today involve less 
judgement and discretion than formally. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
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Learning 
" The development of their staff is prime 
responsibility of manager. 
" Status and financial reward are of 
secondary importance to the potential 
learning opportunities, particularly 
regarding a new management post. 
" In appointing managers, their potential to 
learn is of more importance than their 
existing knowledge and experience. 
" Views of a manager's peer group and/or 
subordinates should not form part of the 
appraisal system of a manager. 
A manager's ability to work in a team is 
the most highly valued part of his/her 
individual performance. 
" Managers should set an example by 
committing time and resources to the 
development of their staff. 
Staff development is primarily the 
responsibility of a firm's human resource 
specialists. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
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Short Term/Long Term 
Reward systems are based on a manager's 
ability to meet annual targets rather than 
on their accumulated experience, skills and 
knowledge. 
" Negotiations with third parties should 
focus on getting the 'best deal' for one's 
company not on building long term 
relationships. 
Meeting short term financial targets is the 
main criterion for promotion. 
" Focussing on the achievement of annual 
targets stifles innovation. 
" Line managers do not have time to engage 
in strategic planning. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
1 2345 
" Managers' decisions are primarily 12345 
motivated by the desire to achieve short 
term results. 
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Creativity 
" Managers avoid introducing innovations 
unless the financial reward systems 
formally recognise them. 
"A manager should constantly challenge 
how things are done rather than deferring 
to hierarchy and precedent. 
"A manager who frequently challenges 
how things are done is less likely to be 
promoted. 
" Line managers are not encouraged to 
innovate and take risks. 
" Innovation by managers is stifled because 
mistakes are punished, rather than being 
viewed as part of an individual's learning 
experience. 
" Innovation and risk taking is the preserve 
of senior management. 
" Ideas generated by informal groupings of 
managers may be ignored because such 
groupings are not considered legitimate. 
" Managers should not introduce innovatory 
working practices unless formally 
approved by senior management. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
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Ethics 
" Loyalty to one's company should always 
take precedence over personal integrity. 
" Undisclosed gifts to third parties are 
acceptable if they are necessary to secure 
an important contract. 
" Questioning a decision made by senior 
management on ethical grounds is 
unacceptable practice. 
" It is the role of senior management to 
determine the boundaries of ethical 
behaviour for their subordinate managers. 
" So long as managers operate within the 
law they should not concern themselves 
with ethical issues. 
" Unofficial private use of a company's 
resources by managers is basically 
acceptable. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12345 
12345 
1234S 
12345 
12345 
12345 
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Communications 
" Managers should only action requests and 
ideas put forward by subordinates if they 
come through formal communication 
channels. 
"A firm's formal communication systems 
are designed primarily to impart information 
downwards. 
" Senior management uses the formal 
communication system primarily as a 
control device. 
" Employees' access to senior management 
should be restricted to their line manager. 
" Informal rather than formal 
communication systems provide more 
feedback on managers' performance. 
" Managers learn more about the strategic 
direction of their company from informal 
(rather than formal) communication 
channels. 
" Managers should instruct staff on their 
responsibilities without being called upon 
to justify them. 
"A refusal of a request should be 
accompanied by an explanation 
not an apology. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
1234S 
12345 
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Appendix XIII: Spanish version of management attitudes questionnaire 
Loughborough 
University 
Business School, Inglaterra 
Cuestionario para los directivos 
(gerente, jefe, subjefe) 
Por favor conteste todas las preguntas. Completar el cuestionario deberla 
tomar unos 10 minutos. 
Indique su opinion donde 1 es no estar de acuerdo en absoluto" 
y5 es estar totalmente de acuerdo". 
Ejemplo: 
" Los impuestos son demasiado altos. 123 4O 5 
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Cuestionarlo para los directivos 
Nacionalidad y lugar de origen: 
Edad: 
Sexo: 
Actual cargo directivo: 
Sector industrial/comercial de su organizacibn: 
Numero de allos en la organizaciön actual: 
Numero de afos de experiencia directiva: 
Area funcional en la que trabaja actualmente (Marcar): 
-Ventas/Marketing 13 
-Produccibn 0 
-Financiero Q 
-Desarollo e Investigaciön 
Cl 
-Recursos humanos 
-Direccibn general 
13 
-Otro, por favor especificar: Q 
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Organigrama 
No estar de acuerdo Estar totalmente 
en absoluto de acuerdo 
" La estructura es importante para establecer las 
relaciones de autoridad entre miembros de la 
empresa. 
" La estructura es importante para mostrar la 
relacibn entre los cargos / las funciones / las 
secciones de la organisacibn. 
" Ademäs de la estructura formal mostrada en el 
organigrama hay a menudo una organisaciön 
informal, igualmente importante para hacer las 
cocas y comprender como la empresa funciona. 
" La estructura de una empress puede cambiar 
si la estrategia cambia. 
" Problemas pueden ser resueltos y objetivos ser 
realizados por cambios en la estructura organi- 
zativa. 
" No se debe dar demasiado importancia al organi- 
grama. Al final las empresas estän formadas por 
personas que trabajan juntas. 
12345 
1234S 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
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Red de conecciones 
No estar de acuerdo Estar totalmente 
en absoluto de acuerdo 
" Contactos informales dentro de la empresa, 
a menudo son mis importantes que las 
relaciones formales mostradas en el organigrama, 
para asegurar relaciones de trabajo eficaz. 
" Promociones dentro de una compafiia son 
habitualmente influidas por contactos informales. 
"A menudo se logran cosas en organizaciones 
mediante la utilizacibn de la red de conecciones 
profesionales, cuando grupos de las directivos 
forman uniones extraoficiales para progresar 
en el trabajo. 
" El beneficio principal de cursos de formaciön 
de la empresa es la oportunidad que ofrecen para 
reunir directivos de otras partes de la organizaciön. 
" Mucho de los nuevos negocios son el resultado 
de contactos informales por la red de conecciones 
en lugar de via oficial. 
" Los directivos privados de sus relaciones informales 
como resultado de transferencia de puesto o empresa 
estän en significativa desventaja. 
1234S 
12345 
12345 
1234S 
12345 
12345 
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Naturalesa de la actividad de los directivos 
" El trabajo directivo trata esencialmente 
de resolver problemas de emergencia 
y eliminar obstaculos emergentes. 
" Estrategia es la primera preocupacibn del 
gerente. 
" La direccidn de empresas y liderazgo son 
sinbnimos. 
" En el actual clima empresarial, direccibn 
significa ante todo realizacibn del cambio. 
No estar de acuerdo Estar totalmente 
en absoluto de acuerdo 
12345 
" La direccidn trata esencialmente del 
funcionamiento de sistemas y procedimientos 
de operaciön ya existentes. 
" La direccibn trata principalmente de la fijaciön de 
objetivos y la supervision de proyectos para 
su realizaciön. 
1234S 
12345 
12345 
1234S 
12345 
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Cualidades de direccibn 
No estar de acuerdo Estar totalmente 
en absoluto de acuerdo 
" EI directivo requiere sobre todo sabiduria 12345 
especialista y experiencia relevante. 
" El directivo requiere sobre todo los poderes 
de liderazgo. 
Para ser efectivo en cualquier empress el directivo 
necesita sabiduria y experiencia en el sector 
industrial de su empresa. 
" El directivo necesita sobre todo el poder de 
persuasion. 
" Educacibn superior e inteligencia son importantes 
para capacitar a los directivos de una comprensibn 
clara y una toms de decisiones racionales. 
" Para el trabajo de direccibn de empresas el sentido 
comi n es una virtud mayor que los grandes titulos. 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
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Trabajo y diversion 
" Nadie nunca subid el escalafön 
sin poner el trabajo en primer lugar. 
No estar de acuerdo Estar totalmente 
en absoluto de acuerdo 
1234S 
" Los gerentes estiman su tiempo 
de trabajo mas que su tiempo de ocio. 
" Para los gerentes el trabajo deberla 
indudablemente invadir su tiempo de ocio. 
Los directivos se lo deben a ellos mismos y 
a sus familias el hacer un equilibrio razonable 
entre las demandas del trabajo y las de la casa. 
" Envolverse demasiado en el trabajo significaria 
limitaciones personales. 
" iTrabajo directivo es divertido! Discusiones sobre 
la distinci6n trabajo y diversion no son muy 
significantes. 
" La demanda de tiempo de los directivos crean 
serias rupturas en sus vidas familiares. 
1234S 
12345 
12345 
12345 
1234S 
12345 
Appendices 290 
Jerarquia 
" Una jerarquia fuerte es esencial en el buen 
funcionamiento de cualquier organizaciön. 
" La jerarquia propiamente denota tango 
y estatuto. 
" La jerarquia es necesaria para obtener 
coordinacibn. 
No estar de acuerdo Estar totalmente 
en absoluto de acuerdo 
12345 
" La jerarquia es entendida mejor como una 
serie de canales de comunicacibn vertical. 
" Las jerarquias son modificadas crecientemente 
por las estructuras matriciales y las 
comunicaciones laterales. 
" Las jerarquias se haran cada vez menos 
relevantes como consecuencia de una 
creciente cesi6n de poderes a los 
trabajadores. 
" La jerarquia es la expresidn formalizada 
del merito. 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
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Toma de decisiones 
" La toma de decisiones es la funciön funda- 
mental de la direccibn. 
" El directivo debe buscar decisiones 
racionales fundadas en informacibn 
relevante. 
" En la practica las decisiones estän normal- 
mente en compromiso entre lo que un 
directivo debe hacer y de lo que se puede 
aceptar. 
No estar de acuerdo Estar totalmente 
en absoluto de acuerdo 
1234S 
" En la practica la funcidn del directivo consiste 
mäs en manejar situaciones que tomar 
decisiones. 
" Al final la mayoria de la decisiones estän 
tomadas intuitivamente. 
Normalmente en la toma de decisiones la 
viabilidad de la implementacion es la slave. 
" Hoy en dia la toms de decisiones incluye cada 
vez mas negociaciönes. 
1234S 
1234S 
12345 
1234S 
12345 
12345 
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Camblo en el manejo empresarial 
No estar de acuerdo Estar totalmente 
en absoluto de acuerdo 
" La reduccidn de nivelesjerärquicos han 12345 
conducido a un incremento de la com- 
pentencia para la direccibn media. 
La reduction de niveles jerdrquicos han 
Llevado a una presibn creciente para la 
direcciön media. 
" El cambio mis significante dentro de los 1 
ültimos diez anos es: el mayor enfasis 
en resultados, desempefio y responsa- 
bilidad. 
" EI cnfasis creciente por los resultados y 
desempeßo han hecho el trabajo directivo 
mäs satisfactorio. 
" Hoy en dia desempeilo en lugar de jerarquia 
es el factor detemzinante de las recompensas 
de la direcciön. 
" Promocibn y la carrera profesional han sido 
aclarados como consequencia de un mayor 
enfasis en el desempeiio medido. 
" El trabajo de los directivos hoy incluye menos 
discernimiento y prudencia que antes. 
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Enseäanza 
No estar de acuerdo Estar totalmente 
en absoluto de acuerdo 
" El desarollo de sus empleados es la 12345 
responsabilidad principal del directivo. 
" El estatus y recompensa financiera 
tienen importancia secundaria comparados 
con las oportunidades potenciales de 
aprendizaje a un puesto nuevo. 
" Al emplear un directivo su potencial pars 
apprender es mis importante que su 
sabiduria y experiencia actual. 
" Las opiniones del grupo equivalente a un 
directivo y de los subordinados no deben 
formar parte del sisterna para evaluaciön 
de un directivo. 
" La capacidad de un directivo para trabajar 
en equipo es la parte mas estimada de su 
actuacibn individual. 
" Los directivos deberian dedicar tiempo y 
esfuerzos para el desarrollo de sus empleados. 
" El desarrollo de los empleados es sobre todo 
la responsabilidad de los especialistas en 
recursos humanos de la empresa. 
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Planeacibn a corto ya largo plazo 
No estar de acuerdo 
en absoluto 
" Las sistemas de recompensa se apoyan mas 1 
en la capacidad del directivo en conseguir los 
objetivos anuales que en su experiencia 
acumulada, habilidades y sabiduria. 
" Negociaciones con otros empresas deberian 
enfocarse en obtener el mejor exito y no en 
construir relaciones a largo plazo. 
" Realizar los objetivos financieros de corto plazo 
es el principal criterito para la promocidn. 
" Enfocarse exclusivamente en la realisacidn 
de los objetivos anuales impide la innovaciön. 
" Los Jefes de departamento no tienen tiempo 
para ocuparse de la planificaciön estrategica. 
Las decisiones de la direccibn estan motivados 
principalmente por el deseo de conseguir los 
resultados a corto plazo. 
Estar totalmente 
de acuerdo 
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Creatividad 
No estar de acuerdo 
en absoluto 
" Los directivos evitan introducir innovaciones 1 
sin haber tenido reconocimiento formal de 
los sistemas de recompensa fmancieros. 
" El directivo deberia constantamente poner en 
duda los procedimientos actuales antes que 
someterse a la jerarquia ya lo establecido. 
" Un directivo que frecuentemente pone en duda 
coma se hacen las cosas es menos 
probable que sea promocionado. 
" Los jefes de departamento no son alentados para 
innovar y tomar riesgos. 
" La innovaciSn hecha por directivos es frenada 
porque los errores son castigados en lugar de 
ser vistos como parte del aprendizaje de un 
directivo. 
' Innovacibn y capacidad para tonrar arriesgas 
esta reservado a la direccibn superior. 
" Las ideas generadas por encuentros informales 
de los directivos son ignoradas porque no 
se consideran como encuentros l. egitimos. 
' Los directivos no deberia introducir 
Procedimientos de trabajo innovadores 
si no estän formalmente aceptados por la 
direccibn superior. 
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Normas de etica 
" Siempre se debe estimar rids la lealtad a 
la compaftia que la intcgridad personal. 
" Regalos no revelados para terceras partes 
son aceptables si son necesarios para 
obtencr un contrato importante. 
" Cuestionar una decision tomada por la 
direcciön superior por razones eticas es 
inaceptable. 
" Es la funciön de la direcciön superior el 
determinar los limites de la conducta 
etica de sus managers subordinados. 
" Si los directivos actüan dentro de los 
limites de la ley no deberian preocuparse 
por problemas eticos. 
" El use privado extraoficial de los recursos 
de una empress por managers es basica- 
mente aceptable. 
No estar de acuerdo 
en absoluto 
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Comunicaciön 
No estar de acuerdo 
en absoluto 
" Los directivos solamente deben tomar en 1 
cuenta peticiones e ideas presentadas por 
subordinados si vicnen a travEs de vias de 
comunicaci6n formales. 
" Se disefaan los sistemas de comunicaci6n 
formales de uns empress principalmente 
para que la informacidn descienda por la 
jcrarquia. 
" La direcciön superior emplea el sistema de 
comunicaci6n formal principalmente como 
un mecanismo de control. 
" El acceso de los empleados a los directivos 
se debe restringir a sus jefes de departamento. 
" Sistemas informales en lugar de sistemas 
de comunicaci6n formales proveen mss 
informaciones respuestas (`feedback') sobre la 
actividad del directivo. 
" Los directivos aprenden mäs Bobre la proyecciön 
estrategica de su empresa por vias de comunica- 
cibn informal. 
" Los directivos deben informar a los empleados 
de sus obligaciones sin tener que justifiquarse. 
" Una negativa a una peticibn debe ser 
acompafiada por una explicaciön y no 
una disculpa. 
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Glossary 
adecos ...................... Members of AD. 
barrios ..................... Squatter settlement, illegally based on private or public land, are 
formed in response to a critically inadequate housing shortage. 
bolivar ..................... Currency unit, divided into 100 centimos. Rate in effect since 
February 1973 was Bs 4.30 to US$ 1. 
campesino ................ rural dweller, usually of modest economic means; a peasant. 
caraqueno ................ Resident of the city of Caracas. 
caudillo .................... South American dictator, normally a military man who assumes 
power by force and is noted for autocratic rule. More than 30 
different caudillos governed Venezuela from 1830 to 1958. In no 
other country in Latin America, caudillismo was more 
pronounced than in Venezuela. 
compadrazgo ........... Ritual sponsorship of children by godparents, instituting a set of 
permanent, personal ties between parents, children and 
godparents. 
compadres ............... Parent and godparents who have a special relationship. 
conquistadores ........ conquerors, especially members of the Spanish soldiers and 
adventurers who conquered South American the 16th century. 
criollo ...................... Creole, a person of European (especially Spanish) ancestry but 
born in the Americas. Criollos were instrumental in overthrowing 
Spanish colonial rule. 
favela 
....................... Brasilian shanty town. 
favelado ................... Inhabitants of the favelas. 
finceros 
.................... same as, see terrateniente. 
hacienda 
.................. Large estate often producing for export, which represents a social 
as well as an economic system. The hacienda system symbolises 
a very unequal distribution of land, with a small number of people 
monopolising the bulk of cultivable land. 
haciendados 
............ The owner of an hacienda. 
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indocumentados 
...... Illegal and undocumented immigrants, mainly coming 
from 
Colombia or Peru. 
latifundio 
................. Large estate. 
latifundistas 
............. Owners of large estates or 
land, see also terrateniente. 
libertador 
................ Simon Bolivar is called this way, as 
he liberated the northern 
parts of Latin America (Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama) 
from the Spanish colonial empire in early 1800. 
llanero ..................... Inhabitant of the Llanos, or plains regions. 
machismo ................ Cult of male dominance, derived 
from the word macho, meaning 
male. 
maquiladoras .......... Assembly plants, which 
import component parts and make them 
up for export. 
maracucho ............... Resident of the second city of Maracaibo. 
marianismo .............. Cult of female subordination in general, 
but superiority in 
spiritual matters. 
mestizaje .................. Genetic mixing 
involving various combinations of Negro, white, 
and Indian. 
mestizo ..................... 
Someone of mixed European and Indian stock. 
minifundistas ........... Peasants owning five-to ten-acre plots, supporting their 
family at 
subsistence or less than subsistence level, contributing nothing to 
agricultural and economic development. 
mulato ...................... Someone of mixed negro and European stock. 
padrino .................... see palanca. 
palanca .................... or padrino; Intermediary between patron and client (literally a 
lever). 
panalinha ................ Informal group made up of people linked by personal ties, but in 
different occupations. 
patron ...................... Literally patron, as involved in a master-servant relationship; 
patrones may be landlords, employers, political bosses. 
peninsulares ............ Settlers in Latin America, being born in Spain. 
rancho ..................... An urban shelter below minimum housing requirements 
constructed of makeshift materials, such as discarded lumber, 
cartons, flattened tin cans, generally by the occupant. 
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sembrando e! petrdleo Literally, sowing the petroleum; using oil revenues to provide 
for national development. A long time goal of the Venezuelan 
government; diversification of the economy away from 
dependence on oil. Also connoted improving economic and social 
position of the nation's poor. 
terrateniente ............ Big landowner 
